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ABSTRACT
ROBERT GALANTUCCI: Taking the Lead on Trade: Legislative Participation,
Effectiveness and Strategy in Foreign Trade Policy.
(Under the direction of Layna Mosley)
This dissertation examines international trade policy in the United States. Each of the
four chapters addresses a theoretical or empirical weakness in the existing literature on
trade policy, with a particular focus on Congressional behavior. Broadly, the chapters en-
gage two key themes. Chapters 1 and 2 consider how changes to key political institutions
affected legislative participation and effectiveness in the issue area. Chapters 3 and 4 ex-
plore underlying influences on legislators’ positions on trade policy, and identify several
overlooked drivers of Congressional behavior.
The first two chapters challenge conventional narratives regarding the purported de-
cline of Congressional participation and influence in trade policy. Several key institutional
changes in the 20th century are often said to have displaced Congress from its consti-
tutionally granted role as the branch governing foreign trade policy. Scholarship regularly
contends that the “burden” of trade policy would be shifted to the executive branch, and that
Congress would be insulated from interest group pressures. Chapter 1 casts doubt on these
assessments. Examining over a century of bill sponsorship trends, I show that Congress has
not become less active in the issue area, notwithstanding substantial delegation to the presi-
dent and the concomitant expansion of the executive branch trade apparatus. My statistical
analysis demonstrates that delegation is actually accompanied by greater participation of
the legislature. The analysis yields several other noteworthy results; in particular, I iden-
tify a number of additional political and economic factors that play a large role in shaping
Congressional attention to trade policy. The results from these models are reinforced by a
supplemental statistical analysis relying on USTR Congressional consultation data.
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Chapter 2 similarly highlights continuity in legislative trade politics. Legislative re-
organization in the 1970s is often identified as the point at which key trade committees
“lost control over trade policy.” In this chapter, I demonstrate that the power hierarchy, in
many ways, remains intact. Through a quantitative analysis of legislative effectiveness in
the post-war period, I find that many of the traditionally powerful players in trade policy
retained their clout. These legislators – who, for example, serve on key committees or who
enjoy seniority or leadership status within Congress – are far more likely to see their trade
policy legislative proposals make it further along in the legislative process. Additionally,
beyond standard measures of legislative effectiveness (i.e., bill success), these legislators
have also increasingly exerted influence on policy through various oversight mechanisms.
Chapters 3 and 4 focus on identifying several often-overlooked influences on legislative
behavior on trade policy. The extant literature frequently explores the underlying determi-
nants of legislators’ posture on particular policy proposals. This line of scholarship, for ex-
ample, examines how constituency economic characteristics, campaign contributions and
macroeconomic shifts influence elected representatives’ stances on trade policy.1 Chapter
3 identifies another important influence on trade-related behavior: inter-legislator connec-
tions. Although legislative behavior is, of course, largely shaped by factors such as con-
stituency interests, the policymaking process takes place in an environment characterized
by repeated interaction, reciprocity and a host of other group-based dynamics. Through an
ERGM (network) analysis of cosponsorship behavior on trade legislation in several con-
gresses, I highlight the ways in which these network effects can influence support for trade
policy proposals.
Chapter 4 considers another important influence on legislative behavior on trade. In par-
ticular, I examine economic interdependence as a driver of trade and exchange rate policy
1Chapter 5 contains an analysis of how these considerations impact legislators’ support for import reg-
ulating legislation. The appendix is organized as a research note, and I highlight the potential limitations
of trade policy studies that focus extensively on roll call voting. I reexamine many of the most prominent
explanations for legislators’ positions in a novel empirical context – namely, by examining (co)sponsorship
data. As discussed in the Appendix, I argue that these data are often better indicators of legislative priorities
that the data relied upon in the overwhelming majority of existing analyses.
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choice. Here, I focus on the pivotal U.S.-China bilateral relationship. I show that extensive
U.S. reliance on the Chinese economy serves to constrain Congressional behavior. Al-
though many industries and legislators voice concerns about China’s efforts to artificially
reduce the relative value of its currency, legislators recognize the potential implications of
taking aggressive action against China. An exchange rate conflict – one that would spill
over into trade policy, and possibly investment policy as well – would impose severe costs
on both economies. A statistical analysis of legislators’ support for currency realignment
bills reveals that such considerations are reflected in Congressional behavior. Legislators
whose constituencies rely on the Chinese economy were more likely to oppose currency re-
alignment legislation, while legislators whose constituencies primarily compete with China
supported the bills at a higher rate.
This dissertation contributes to several bodies of literature. First, this research en-
gages with prominent historical treatments of trade policy that consider the implications
of changes to key political institutions. Notwithstanding a number of seemingly drastic
institutional shifts, I find that there is a great deal of continuity in Congressional participa-
tion and prerogatives in the issue area (Chapters 1 and 2). Second, this research helps to
identify underlying drivers of trade-related behavior. Factors such as inter-legislator rela-
tionships (Chapter 3) and the integrated structure of the global economy (Chapter 4), prove
to shape legislators’ positions in meaningful ways. These factors, then, supplement exist-
ing explanations for legislative behavior (see the Appendix for a review and reanalysis of
this literature). Finally, this dissertation offers a number of empirical advances by relying
on novel data sources, and by applying a number of underutilized statistical approaches in
the analysis.
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1 ACTIVITY OR ABDICATION? PATTERNS OF CONGRESSIONAL
PARTICIPATION IN TRADE POLICY
The literature on U.S. trade policy often highlights executive predominance in the issue
area. It is typically suggested or assumed that delegations of trade negotiating authority
beginning in the 1930s led to a corresponding decline in Congressional participation. I
demonstrate that, in contrast to the existing narrative, Congressional activity in trade pol-
icy has hardly declined over time. First, I show that – when looking at several measures
of legislative activity – it is clear that Congress remains heavily involved in the policy-
making process. In many periods of substantial delegation, in fact, Congressional activity
reached historical heights. Through an examination of bill sponsorship patterns, I identify
the economic and political factors that increase legislative activity on trade policy. These
findings with respect to Congressional participation are reinforced by a supplemental sta-
tistical analysis relying on consultation data.
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Studies of modern U.S. trade politics often focus on Congressional delegation of poli-
cymaking authority to the executive. The most well-known delegation came with passage
of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act (RTAA) in 1934, where Congress granted the
president authority over tariff negotiations (Hiscox 1999; Baily, Goldstein and Weingast
1997). The negotiating authority was renewed 11 times, and the president maintained this
power into the 1960s. In the 1970s, a new procedural vehicle, called “fast track” or “trade
promotion” authority, was created. In some ways, this grant of authority was even more
broad, as it allowed the executive to negotiate international trade agreements that covered
regulation in areas extending well beyond tariff policy.
Delegation did not just relate to trade agreement negotiations. Congress also transferred
a great deal of day to day authority over temporary trade protection (Du¨r and De Bie´vre
2005). Administrative agencies, such as the International Trade Administration and the
International Trade Commission were permitted to take steps to limit foreign import com-
petition, for example, by permitting temporary duties on imports that threatened domestic
injury.
This delegation to the executive, it was said, was tantamount to “the ‘abrogation,’ ‘abdi-
cation,’ ‘surrender,’ or ‘relinquish[ment]’ of congressional power, prerogatives, and respon-
sibilities” in the issue area (Holmer and Belo 1992). Leading commentators concluded that
these changes caused the trade policy of the United States to be “articulated and defended
by the executive, with Congress left to complain and carp from the sidelines” (Peterson
1994: 223; see also Destler 1994). These same critiques have been leveled in every major
episode of potential delegation of trade policymaking authority since the RTAA. And, the
controversy continues to this day, as the U.S. once again debates the appropriate role for the
legislature in two major trade negotiations – the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Has the role of the legislature been undermined
by the shifts in political institutions governing trade policy? Has the grant of power to the
executive constituted, as one ardent opponent of delegation claimed, “a virtual abdication
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of congressional authority and interest in the foreign trade area”?1
At first glance, there appears to be some truth to these claims. Figure 1.1 shows the
number of trade bills enacted over time. During the post-WWII period there is a steady
decline in the number of trade bills passed in Congress. During this same period, there
was a sharp expansion of the executive’s role in trade policy. The bottom portion of the
figure illustrates the budget growth of the three key agencies that comprise the execu-
tive/administrative trade apparatus. These data certainly appear to be consistent with the
notion that Congress was seeing its role in trade policy being replaced by the executive
branch.
These data, however, fail to tell the whole story. In this chapter, I argue that Congress
has continued to remain heavily involved in trade policy and, by many measures, legislative
activity on trade policy has even increased. By examining a wide scope of legislative
activity we can see that Congress continues to remain active, notwithstanding substantial
delegation.
To more systematically consider legislative participation, I conduct a statistical anal-
ysis of congress-wide bill sponsorship rates. I find that delegation of trade policymaking
authority to the executive actually has a positive relationship with the introduction of trade
legislation in Congress. These results are consistent even when controlling for a host of
other political and economic factors that influence the salience of trade policy as an issue
area. I also conduct a statistical analysis of the factors that lead to increased presidential-
congressional consultations on trade policy; this supplemental analysis confirms my key
hypotheses regarding the complementary nature of the executive-legislative efforts in the
isuse area.
The analysis here leads to several important conclusions. As an initial matter, these
findings demonstrate that delegation does not amount to a renunciation of authority and
1Burke, James [D-MA], Cong. Rec 1974.
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Figure 1.1: Trade Policy: Bills and Budgets
Data on bill passage are from the Congressional Bills Project, and agencies budgets are drawn from the annual accounts of the U.S. budget (available at
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/publication/?pid=54). Early figures for the Commerce Department’s allocation for international trade related activities are not directly comparable from
year to year. Prior to the formation of the ITA and its immediate predecessors, Commerce’s trade operations were scattered across a number of sub-departments.
interest in the area of trade policy. Even the U.S. trade politics literature that rejects the no-
tion that the president entirely dominates trade policymaking often relegates Congressional
involvement to one of limited “fire alarm” oversight. This approach, however, risks un-
derstating levels of legislative attention to the issue area. Congress is actually more active
during periods when authority had been delegated. As such, delegation is hardly designed
to enable a Congressional retreat from the issue area.
These findings also highlight the importance of considering a wide variety of legislative
4
behavior when studying trade policy. Many studies of congressional activity rely on snap-
shots of legislative behavior; relying on this type of data, however, does not fully allow us
to appreciate the level of activity to trade across Congresses. This research contributes to
the recent efforts that have begun exploring non-roll call participation in trade policy (Allee
and Miler 2013; Caddel 2014; Gulloty and Goldstein 2014).
Finally, I find substantial support for a number of prominent macro-level explanations
for legislative behavior on trade. Factors such as the business cycle, and the role of trade
in the national economy, prove to influence Congressional activity. Political considera-
tions, such as divided government, also play a meaningful role in influencing sponsorship
patterns. These results, then, identify the most paramount influences on trade-related leg-
islative behavior, while also accounting for the substantial variation in the rate at which
different Congresses participate in the policy area.
This chapter is organized as follows. In the next section, I consider the development
of delegation in U.S. trade policy; I discuss several major changes to key trade policy
institutions, and present some preliminary data on Congressional behavior. From there, I
turn to a more systematic examination of legislative attention by examining bill sponsorship
patterns over time. In the following two sections, I present my research design and data,
and then discuss the results from my statistical models. Finally, I conclude and discuss the
broader implications of my findings.
Delegation and Executive Expansion
Two major trends might lead us to expect a diminishing role for Congress in trade
policy: delegation to the executive branch, and a corresponding increase in the size of the
executive branch trade apparatus.
Starting in the late 1800s there were calls for greater delegation of tariff-setting au-
thority to the executive. In 1890, Republican president Benjamin Harrison sought to ex-
pand presidential discretion in the area. With the help of pro-tariff William McKinley as
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chair of the House Ways and Means Committee, the Administration secured passage of the
McKinley Tariff Act. Although the Act permitted the president to reduce/raise tariffs, the
aggregate effect of the legislation was a sharp increase in trade protection (Pastor 1980: 75;
Smith, Shedd and Murrill 2013; Tucker and Wallach 2009). The Act was opposed by the
more free trade oriented Democrats. One member of Congress, Rep. Benton McMillin (D-
Tenn.), staunchly opposed the proposal, declaring that the executive delegation contained
in the bill “was a cowardly surrender of the highest prerogative of the House. The bill gave
the president power not exercised by the Czar of Russia.” (Daily Globe 1890). Upon re-
gaining power in the legislature, Democrats revoked the tariff negotiating authority; when
their majorities slipped, however, similar provisions concerning delegation were reestab-
lished in the context of the Dingley Tariff of 1897. In 1922, the Fordney-McCumber Tariff
also permitted executive control over large portions of the country’s tariff policy.
As these various grants of authority illustrate, delegation on trade policy was not an
entirely novel development of the 1930s. These earlier grants, however, were limited in
scope, and often specifically provided for negotiating power over a fairly circumscribed
range of products.
The trend towards substantial delegation, however, took off in earnest in 1934 with the
Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. In the debate surrounding the RTAA, Senator Arthur
Vandenburg of Michigan complained that the bill would entitle “Washington bureaucrats”
to “identify so called ‘inefficient industries’ and to put them out of business by their fiat”
(Haggard 1988: 112). Initially, this skepticism was shared by many other legislators, par-
ticularly in the then-protectionist Republican Party. Despite these critiques, Congress re-
newed the president’s authority to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements on many occasions
over the next several decades.
A number of political practicalities made such a move attractive. First, selecting a tariff
rate that would meet the satisfaction of legislators representing a diverse set of economic
interests in many cases proved to be difficult. Absent delegation, the effect of rampant
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logrolling could generate a highly inefficient, protectionist national trade policy (see, e.g.,
Schattsneider 1934). Additionally, at the international level, a failure to have more cen-
tralized trade policy coordination might undermine the prospects for agreements between
the U.S. and its trade partners. That is, an executive might be unable to strike an agree-
ment if a trade partner was not confident that the negotiated deal would be acceptable to
Congress. As Cordell Hull, Secretary of State, and one of the most ardent proponents of
free trade in the early 20th century, reflected in his memoirs, “no American Senate had
ever approved a trade treaty negotiated by the Executive which materially reduced tariffs”
(Haggard 1988: 108). Delegating authority to the executive to negotiate an agreement, and
limiting Congress’s ability to override any such agreement, could make international trade
agreements far more likely.
Second, many scholars have asserted that a major reason for the extensive delegations
starting in the 1930s was specifically to reduce the immense amount of time that legislators
were forced to spend on trade policy. Hundreds of pages of tariff legislation and countless
hearings had, from many perspectives, become an unacceptable burden on Congressional
resources (Bailey, Goldstein and Weingast 1997: 312; Goldstein 1993: 144).
In recent debates over the proper role for Congress in trade policy, the same concerns
arose. Congress is regularly faced with considering bills on extremely specific topics, such
as a bill on the appropriate tariff rate for a single product, such as the chemical “1,3-
Dimethyl-2-imidazolidinone.” This kind of bill often has implications primarily for a single
industry, or in many cases even a single firm. Advocating for reform, in 2009 Senator Jim
DeMint [R-SC] noted that “It’s just ridiculous for hundreds of congressmen and senators
every three years to be dealing with these [pieces of tariff legislation.] I can’t really pro-
nounce the chemicals and everything. We dont know anything about this stuff, and there is
no reason why this should be a political process.” (Lewis 2009).
After the initial passage of the RTAA in 1934, Congress voted 11 times to renew trade
negotiating authority (in 1937, 1940, 1943, 1945, 1949, 1951, 1954, 1955, 1958 and twice
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in 1962). These were eventful years in terms of trade policymaking; in the eleven years
following the passage of the RTAA, for instance, 32 reciprocal trade agreements were ne-
gotiated (Destler 1986: 10).
The scope of congressional delegation changed in tandem with changes to the pre-
vailing mechanisms of restricting trade. Tariff barriers and other border measures did not
remain the most important obstacles to trade during the latter half of the 20th century. In
the wake of the steep cuts in tariffs that accompanied the early GATT rounds, nontariff
barriers (NTBs) to trade began to present a greater obstruction to international commerce.2
Accordingly, a new variant of executive trade authority was created to facilitate interna-
tional negotiations on NTBs as well. This new delegation took the form of “fast track” or
“trade promotion authority” (TPA), and was first embodied in the Trade Act of 1974. Under
these provisions, the executive was permitted to negotiate trade agreements that implicated
a wide range of domestic laws. Potential changes included modifications to customs valu-
ation, antidumping laws, intellectual property rights, foreign investment regulation, trans-
parency rules and labor rights protections. In short, a broader scope of policies could be
negotiated by executive branch officials, even including policy areas that are fairly tan-
gential in their relationship to traditional trade policy. After the executive negotiated such
an agreement, Congress was obligated to vote up or down on the deal, without amend-
ment. Such delegation, once again, led many opponents to wonder whether Congress had
effectively forfeited its role in trade policy. Representative James Burke [D-MA], argu-
ing against the Trade Act, asserted that “the delegation of authority to the President was a
’domestic Gulf of Tonkin resolution”’ (quoted in Pastor 1980).
Just as the tariff negotiating authority contained in the RTAA was repeatedly granted
to the president, TPA was also renewed on multiple occasions. Although the shape of the
delegation changed over time, the trend is clear. As Robert Pastor has explained, “one can
follow a distinct, consistent, and clear line from the 1934 Trade Act to its 1974 successor
2Though, some industries, such as textiles and agriculture, retained protection through traditional trade
policy measures such as quantitative restrictions and high tariffs.
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in the desire by the Congress . . . for empowering the President to negotiate first bilateral
and then multilateral agreements” (Pastor 1980: 191).
In addition to delegations relating to trade agreement negotiations, institutional shifts
also enhanced the executive’s role in administering temporary trade protection. The need
for temporary stop-gap measures to protect industries harmed by competition is an impor-
tant part of U.S. trade law, and these concerns were recognized in early domestic “trade
remedies” programs, such as the Antidumping Act of 1921 (Irwin 2005). Antidumping
procedures permit domestic industries to petition the Department of Commerce seeking
temporary duties on foreign products that enter the U.S. market at “less than fair value.”
When these inexpensive foreign products cause harm to domestic producers, a duty is im-
posed.3 Here too was an example of the executive branch playing an increasingly important
role in day-to-day trade politics, especially in the 1970s as the use of administrative pro-
tection rose sharply (Irwin 2005).
Distressed firms and industries in the U.S. have also obtained temporary trade protec-
tion through other administrative avenues. For instance, “escape clause” actions permitted
petitioners to seek a variety of relief (tariffs, quotas, adjustment assistance) to offset surges
in imports from trade partners.4 Beyond these general safeguards, there are similar avenues
available for firms harmed by trade with China or countries with which the U.S. has a free
trade agreement. Rather than lobbying members of Congress to introduce and pursue pas-
sage of favorable trade legislation – a highly uncertain and lengthy process – firms could
increasingly turn to administrative agencies for relief from import competition.
3For a petition to be pursued by Commerce, the International Trade Commission (ITC), a separate quasi-
judicial federal agency, must determine that the offending imports are causing material injury to domestic
producers. Assuming that this stage results in an affirmative finding, then the calculation of the appropriate
dumping rate is conducted by the International Trade Administration (ITA), within the Commerce Depart-
ment. The ITA calculates a duty that is sufficient to offset the dumping of foreign products, i.e., the difference
between the “fair value” and the actual price of the imported goods being sold in the U.S. (Another adminis-
trative form of protection, referred to as a countervailing duty, is obtained in a similar fashion, and is designed
to offset subsidies received by foreign producers.).
4As with antidumping petitions, a petitioner must receive a favorable ruling from the ITC prior to obtain-
ing relief from foreign competition. Even following a favorable ruling, the president has the discretion to
determine whether the remedy is appropriate.
9
Taken together, these shifts demonstrate a greater role for the executive and related
institutions. Competitive industries that sought to open foreign markets, or disadvantaged
industries that desired protection from foreign competition, would increasing interact with
executive/administrative agencies. The days of legislators hashing out trade policy on a
product-by-product basis was generally past.
In many ways, the various efforts to delegate would seem to pose a threat to Con-
gressional control over trade policy. While Congress was vested with the Constitutional
authority “to regulate commerce with foreign nations” and to “lay and collect taxes [and]
duties,” related powers were increasingly exercised by the executive. As Stephen Haggard
explains, “by delegating its authority, the Congress allowed new organizational interests
and centers of expertise to develop within the executive,” and, as a result “[e]xecutive in-
fluence over trade policy was obviously strengthened” (Haggard 1988: 108). Concerns
regarding the executive’s power relative to that of Congress have consistently been raised
by many industries and legislators (Haggard 1988: 112; Pastor 1980; Holmer and Belo
1992; Hiscox 1999; Conley 1999).
Coinciding with its increased role in trade policy, executive branch institutions ex-
panded to accommodate these new responsibilities. The three most important adminis-
trative/executive institutions are the International Trade Administration, the International
Trade Commission and the United States Trade Representative (USTR). The ITA’s key
mission is to advance the interests of U.S. industry by providing safeguards from interna-
tional competition while also facilitating exports and promoting international investment
in the U.S. The agency was created in 1980, within the Department of Commerce, and as-
sumed a number of functions that were previously spread out across various subdivisions
within Commerce. The ITC (previously the Tariff Commission) is a quasi-judicial agency
that is charged with determining whether foreign trade practices harm domestic industry
through imports or intellectual property violations, while also providing advice regarding
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the tariff schedule. Finally, the USTR handles the negotiations of trade agreements on be-
half of the executive, and also administers a number of programs designed to enforce trade
agreements and open foreign markets. The position was created in the 1960s and was, at the
time, known as the Special Trade Representative. Previously, these functions had largely
been served by State Department officials. As Figure 1.1 demonstrates, these three trade
institutions have grown rapidly since their inception. Over the last 50 years, the missions
of each of the three agencies have expanded substantially, and their budgets have grown
accordingly.
Beyond the sharp increase in the number of employees responsible for trade-related
activities within these government units, the executive has been active in other ways as
well. For example, in the post-WWII period there has been an increase in the number of
executive orders on trade. In the 1950s the executive issued 8 trade-related orders, and in
the following decade, there was a jump up to 22. In 70s, 80s and 90s, the average number
of executive orders per decade was in the upper 30s.5
Presidential proclamations on trade policy also increased substantially. Rottinghaus and
Maier (2007), for example, argue that the increased use of presidential proclamations from
the 1970s to the mid-2000s is consistent with an increasingly “unilateral” presidency. On
trade policy, they conclude, “Congress has authorized the president to oversee these policy
elements, energizing presidential power in that area” (2007: 342).
In every decade since the key delegations of authority contained in the RTAA, there
have been dramatic warnings regarding the fate of Congress’s evaporating role in setting
trade policy. In 1940, during a debate over whether the RTAA should be extended, Senator
Treadway vigorously opposed the continuation of tariff negotiating authority. He lamented
the fact that the delegation had resulted in a number of trade agreements being negoti-
ated and implemented without Congressional consent, asking,“Why should the Congress
of the United States sit idly by and abdicate its constitutional authority over treaties and
5Data on executive orders were obtained from the Policy Agendas Project, http://www.policyagendas.org/
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the regulations of foreign trade while foreign legislative bodies continue to exercise that
prerogative” (Cong. Rec 1940: 1886).
In the 1950s, industry interests also called for a reassertion of congressional control
over the tariff. A textile information service report laid out the key goals of the industry’s
trade association, highlighting that the U.S. must “Restore effective congressional control
over trade policy” and push for the “Elimination of State Department domination of trade
policy.” (Cong. Rec. 1958, 1792). Many other industries similarly urged that the State
Department was too insulated from industry concerns, and that a Congressional reassertion
of power was necessary. In 1962, as Congress debated the Trade Expansion Act, Represen-
tative Moorehead [R-OH], argued against the trade negotiating authority, explaining that he
did not “see any justification for the Congress to abdicate its power for so drastic a program
as the President is proposing.” In fact, he continued, “I believe legislation is required that
will recover some of the control over trade policy that Congress has already given away.”
(Com. Rpt. 1962, 3033).
As the president’s increased role in trade policy continued into the 1970s and 80s, a
new set of questions emerged as to whether Congress’s authority was being infringed upon.
The precise form of the delegation changed with the advent of trade promotion authority,
but this grant of authority allowed a wide scope of policies to be negotiated as part of a
trade agreement. Trade promotion authority extended the president’s ability to negotiate
trade agreements to cover “domestic” issue areas well beyond the realm of traditional trade
policy. As a result, a greater number of legislators saw their jurisdiction impinged by
proposed trade agreements.
The extensive scope of this delegation was particularly highlighted in the trade negoti-
ations taking place in the early 1990s, which were conducted pursuant to trade promotion
authority. The Uruguay Round Agreement and the NAFTA both covered areas well beyond
the traditional levers of trade policy. The president negotiated agreements that covered a
wide array of policy areas relating to nontariff barriers to trade such as import licensing,
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labeling requirements, product standards, customs procedures, subsidies and a host of other
related policies.
Controversy over delegation to the executive remains controversial in 21st century
trade policy. In 2007, the AFL-CIO, for example, lobbied against delegation, urging that
“Congress must act now to reassert its voice and control over trade policy.” (Comm. Rtp.
2007: 46). Robert Matsui [D-CA], a House Democrat, critiqued Trade Promotion Author-
ity, noting that even in spite of his free trade orientation, he feared that Congress might
“concede to the Executive Branch its constitutional authority over foreign commerce and
domestic law without adequate assurances that Congress will be an active participant in the
process.” He warned, “Congress should be a partner, not a mere spectator or occasional
consultant to the process.” To what extent were his fears regarding executive authority jus-
tified? Has the continued expansion of the executive branch served to replace legislative
activity in trade?
Patterns in Trade Policy
Despite the countless warnings of presidential dominance, an initial look at several
indicators of Congressional activity reveals that the growth of the executive branch did
not diminish legislators’ level of participation in the policy area. In many ways, Congress
actually dedicated increasingly large portions of its time to legislation relating to trade
policy.
Figure 1.2 denotes the proportion of trade-related bills sponsored in Congress from
1901 to 2013. Periods where executive negotiating authority is in place are shaded in grey.
As the figure shows, there is no apparent drop off in trade bill sponsorship during periods
of delegation. Overall, over the course of the time period, there appears to be a rise in the
proportion of trade bills sponsored (measured as a share of total Congressional activity).
From the mid-1930s to the 1960s, there is a clear upward trend in attention to trade; a
similar pattern appears from the 1970s through the 80s. Both periods are characterized by
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delegated authority.
Figure 1.2: Trade Bills & Delegation Status, by Congress
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We see similar fluctuations in terms of cosponsorship behavior as well. See Table 1.1.
In the Senate, from the 93rd to the 111th Congress, the total number of cosponsors on
trade legislation per congress ranged from a low of 182 to a high of 811. In the House,
during this same period, figures ranged from 729 to 3141. Although these figures do not
cover as extensive a time period as the data on sponsorship, they hardly suggest a Congres-
sional retreat from the issue area. As above, executive authority did not lead to legislative
inaction.6
Table 1.1: Cosponsorships, by party
Total Cosponsors Democrat Republican Cross Party
93rd 31 13 18 19
94th 98 55 43 46
95th 118 61 57 56
96th 90 52 38 54
97th 65 42 23 32
98th 165 87 78 88
99th 506 263 243 318
100th 290 177 113 168
101st 194 108 86 112
102nd 297 217 80 203
103rd 148 123 25 122
104th 76 35 41 45
105th 81 53 28 42
106th 183 93 90 118
107th 41 30 8 32
108th 151 90 61 83
109th 134 63 71 76
110th 69 53 16 45
The table shows the number of cosponsorships on all trade regulating bills in the subject
congress.
6Additionally, the rise in legislative activity starting in the mid 1970s also coincides with a greater use of
administrative forms of trade protection. At this time, institutional changes encouraged industries to rely to
a greater extent on trade protection from the ITC/ITA process. Domestic firms sought protection through the
application of temporary duties on “dumped” foreign goods, rather than by appealing to Congress for trade
protection (Destler 1995; Oatley and Galantucci 2015). Notwithstanding the increased availability and use of
such avenues for trade protection, this trend did not displace Congressional activity.
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In short, although there are fluctuations over time,7 the data reveal an unquestionable
upward trend in activity since the 1940s. Taken together, these data suggest that even when
trade agreement negotiating authority and trade protection had increasingly become the
purview of the executive, Congressional activity levels remained high. There have been
fluctuations in Congressional attention to trade, to be sure, but these patterns certainly
do not represent a declining interest in the issue area. In the next section, I conduct a
more systematic analysis of the relationship between executive delegation and patterns of
Congressional activity on trade policy.
Research Design
To consider the relationship between Congressional activity on trade policy and execu-
tive delegation, I examine over a century of bill sponsorship. The period under considera-
tion ranges from 1901-2013, and covers the 57th-112th Congresses.
The dependent variable in the analysis is the number of trade-related bills sponsored in
each House or Senate, measured as a share of total bills introduced in the congress. To as-
certain the number of trade-related bills, I relied on the ProQuest Congressional database.
The database attributes “key terms” to each bill sponsored during the period under consid-
eration. For each congress, I have included all bills that include terms directly related to
trade policy measures.8 The dependent variable in the Senate models has a mean value of
approximately .033, and ranges from .001 to .220. In the House, the mean value for the
variable is .026, and ranges from .001 to .182.9
7I explore the economic and political factors that drive these fluctuations in greater depth below.
8These criteria captured all bills that were characterized with the following: “import”; “export”; “tariff”;
”trade agreement”; ”foreign trade.”
9Sponsorship constitutes an ideal, and widely used, measure of legislative attention to trade policy. As
Woon (2009) explains, “An ideal measure of issue attention would consist of the total amount of a legis-
lator’s personal and staff time devoted to researching, discussing, thinking about, or working on a specific
issue, perhaps weighted by the value of each person. ... Nonetheless, it would be very costly to collect for
an adequately sized sample and time period. Even if collected, establishing the reliability of the measure,
especially for any historical period, would be problematic at best. Instead, bill sponsorship provides a readily
observable, albeit imperfect, indicator of issue attention.” See also Schiller (1995); Koger (2003).
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The independent variables in the analysis relate to the key drivers of Congressional
interest in trade. The first two variables relate to the prevailing institutional setting in the
congress in question. DELEGATION is coded as 1 in a congress when the executive branch
has been granted trade negotiating authority. As noted above, the first major delegation of
authority in the 20th century came with the RTAA in 1934. Although it was renewed many
times subsequently, for several stretches there was a gap in this delegation (Cooper 2014).
The authority lapsed during the late 1960s and first half of the 1970s, until it was renewed in
1975. This delegation lasted until 1994, ending with the conclusion of the Uruguay Round
Agreement, and the creation of the WTO. For the next seven years, efforts to renew TPA
were unsuccessful; key committees in Congress often voiced objections to the legislation,
or, in the rare cases where TPA made it to the floor, Congress ultimately voted against the
bills. In 2002, TPA was renewed once again for a period of 5 years, and President George
W. Bush made trade agreement negotiation a significant portion of his legislative agenda,
using the authority to negotiate a host of agreements. When this grant lapsed in 2008, it
was not extended for the next seven years. At the time of this writing, a high profile debate
is ongoing in Congress over the propriety of granting TPA to the Obama administration, as
many legislators are concerned with the implications of greater trade with major European
and Asian economies.
DIVIDED GOVT is coded as one in any instance where a single party did not control
both the presidency and the chamber under consideration. Divided government may lead to
a more active Congress as legislators seek to restrain or critique the trade policy preferences
of a president from the opposing party. When the president (the agent of trade policy
delegation) is not sufficiently attentive to Congressional demands, we can expect greater
activity from the legislature, i.e., the principal (Lohmann and O’Halloran 1994; O’Halloran
1994).
The next two variables are designed to capture the economic environment in the Congress
in question. GDP GROWTH is coded as the Congress-to-Congress change in GDP prior to
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the congress in session. This variable accounts for the anticipated negative association be-
tween GDP growth an attentiveness to trade policy. Trade policies – in particular, trade
policies designed to support vulnerable business interests – are likely to garner more atten-
tion during downswings in the business cycle (see, e.g., McKeown 1984; Gallarotti 1985).
I also include TRADE SHARE, which is calculated as the proportion of the U.S. economy
that is devoted to international trade. This variable, which steadily increases during the
time period under consideration, controls for the likely positive association between trade’s
importance to the U.S. economy and Congressional attention to the issue area. Finally, I
include TRADE DEFICIT. This variable accounts for the current account as a share of GDP,
as large account imbalances are often hypothesized to fuel concerns over trade policy.
Results and Discussion
My models provide evidence consistent with my expectations. Congressional attention
to trade does not decline with greater executive activity in the area, as many standard expla-
nations would anticipate. In fact, Congressional attention actually increased during periods
of delegation. A variety of economic factors also drove chamber-wide levels of attention to
trade policy. The results are contained in Table 1.2
There is no evidence of executive participation replacing congressional activity in trade
policy. In fact, the coefficient on DELEGATION is actually positive and statistically sig-
nificant in both Models 1 and 2. The coefficient is significant at the .10 threshold in the
Senate, and at .05 in the House.10 The models demonstrate that congressional activity
increases during periods of delegation, even while controlling for a host of other key influ-
ences on participation rates. This finding runs directly counter to a number of theories of
principal-agent dynamics in trade policy. First, counter to the expectations of many legis-
lators and commentators, legislative activity on trade policy is not simply subsumed by the
10Given that the effective N for these models is quite low, a finding of statistical significance at the .10
threshold is meaningful here.
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executive during periods of delegation. If executive empowerment was designed to reduce
legislative burden, it appears to have had the opposite effect. Similarly, delegation does not
appear to operate as a mechanism through which legislators can insulate themselves from
the pressures of interest groups (see also Hiscox 1999; Goldstein and Gulotty 2015). After
all, legislators take more positions (as measured by bill sponsorships) once substantial trade
policy authority has been delegated.
Before turning to the other variables, it is worth exploring this counter-intuitive finding
a bit more. One potential explanation for the positive relationship between DELEGATION
and sponsorship might be that Congress ramps up its activity in the wake of a legislative-
executive battle surrounding delegation. In other words, because extending (or renewing)
trade negotiation authority is often a highly contentious fight in U.S. trade policy, one might
surmise that Congress is simply increasing its activity immediately after such an event to
demonstrate a commitment to protecting domestic producers. However, in a robustness
check, I included a dummy variable denoting the two Congresses following a grant of
negotiating authority. Inclusion of such a term does not alter the reported results in any
meaningful way. As such, the increase in Congress activity during periods of delegation is
not simply a function of a brief post-delegation uptick in activity. Rather, there is a decisive
positive relationship between delegation and rates of legislative activity.11
This finding is not purely a function of my primary focus on bill sponsorship. In Model
3, I used the number of trade-related Congressional hearings as the count for my dependent
variable. There was no statistically significant association (in either direction) between
delegation status and levels of congressional attention to trade while using this alternative
measure. In an unreported model, I also experimented with another dependent variable
denoting the number of trade bills enacted into law in each Congress. Again, there was
11I also ran the models while focusing exclusively on the post-war period. Doing so substantially reduced
the N of the model. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that delegation never had a negative relationship with
Congressional activity on trade. Nor did these results change when including a variable to denote the relative
strength of the U.S. dollar.
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Table 1.2: Models of Bill Sponsorship
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
coef/(se) coef/(se) coef/(se)
GDP Change -0.141* -0.084** 0.030
(0.07) (0.05) (0.06)
Trade/GDP 0.652*** 0.358*** 0.152*
(0.15) (0.10) (0.12)
Pres Party 0.014 0.007 -0.019**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Divided Govt 0.002 -0.015** 0.001
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Delegation 0.019* 0.014** 0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Trade Deficit -0.006 -0.004* 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Intercept 0.094 0.059 0.015
(0.08) (0.05) (0.06)
R2 0.60 0.54 .17
N 56 56 57
Models 1-3 are OLS models.
* indicates significance at p < 0.10; ** at p < 0.05; *** at p < 0.01.
no statistical relationship between delegation and bill enactments.12 Taken together, these
findings undermine the “burden reduction” and “political insulation” arguments as to why
Congress chooses to grant trade policy functions to the executive.
The results with respect to DIVIDED GOVT were largely consistent with explanations
about congressional-executive tension leading to increased activity on trade. In the House
(Model 2), there was a positive and statistically significant relationship between divided
government and bill sponsorship. This finding suggests that the propensity of Congress
to voice its concerns regarding trade policy increases when the sitting president is from a
different party. In the Senate model, there was no relationship, and the variable was not
close to reaching statistical significance.
12As noted above, a glance at the number of trade bills enacted into law over time shows a downward
trend. See Figure 1.1. This trend, however, does not bear any statistical relationship to the status of executive
delegation.
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Other variables in the models generally performed as expected. GDP GROWTH had a
negative and statistically significant relationship with trade bill sponsorship (p-value<.01).
Trade policy is often hypothesized to take on increase importance, and thus attract more
attention, in difficult economic environments. This expectation plays out during the pe-
riod under consideration, as economic growth was associated with a reduction in trade bill
sponsorship rates.
TRADE SHARE also had the anticipated relationship with trade policy activity. The
coefficient was positive and statistically significant at the .01 level in Models 1/2. As inter-
national commerce came to represent a larger and larger share of the U.S. economy, trade
policy represented a larger portion of Congressional activity.
To consider the substantive effects of my key variables, I calculated predicted proba-
bilities. First, I calculate the predicted proportion of bills dedicated to trade policy, while
changing the value of DELEGATION and holding all other variables at their means. The
resulting change to Congressional behavior was substantial: during periods of delegated
authority, the proportion of Congressional bills devoted to trade policy was nearly double
that of periods where trade negotiating authority was not in place. In practice, this amounts
to the proportion of trade bills increasing from 4 percent, to approximately 8 percent, of all
bills introduced in a hypothetical congress.
The other variables had important substantive effects as well. A one-standard deviation
increase to GDP GROWTH, for example, led to a 30 percent decline in the number of trade
bills sponsored. Figure 1.3 provides a visual presentation of the effects of DELEGATION
and GDP GROWTH.
Not surprisingly, as trade became an increasingly important component of the U.S.
economy, trade policy was a more common subject of Congressional bill introductions. A
one standard deviation increase to TRADE SHARE led to nearly a 100 percent increase in
the proportion of trade bills sponsored, as a share of total Congressional bill introductions.
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Figure 1.3: Proportion of Bills Devoted to Trade
Although I have focused on the Senate model for the calculations thus far, these vari-
ables had comparable effects regardless of whether the predicted probability calculations
are based on the Senate (Model 1) or the House (Model 2). As noted above, divided gov-
ernment had a statistically significant and positive effect in the House. Accordingly, I
calculated the substantive effect of this variable, based on Model 2. Divided government
led to a 50 percent increase in the number of bills sponsored.
As these figures illustrate, political institutional changes and the macroeconomic envi-
ronment are both critical drivers of attention to trade policy in Congress. Taken together,
observed patterns of Congressional activity on trade policy have certain secular trends, but
exhibit a strong cyclical element as well.
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An Examination of Executive-Legislative Consultations
In the preceding analysis, the results suggest that Congressional participation in trade
policy actually rose during periods when the executive was active in the issue area. An-
other way to examine this same dynamic is to assess patterns of consultations between the
executive branch and the legislature. To do so, I conduct a statistical analysis relying on
new data covering USTR consultations with Congress.
The dependent variable is a count of the number of USTR consultations with Congress
during the month under consideration. The time period runs from January 2000 to Febru-
ary 2015, spanning various economic environments as well as two different presidential
administrations. As above, I anticipate that when the executive branch steps up its activity
in trade, it must lead to a corresponding increase in Congressional involvement. Specifi-
cally, the executive (agent) must more frequently consult the legislature (principal). Given
the count outcome, I run a negative binomial model for the analysis.
The model bears out my expectations, and the results are contained in Table 1.3. The
key independent variable, FTA VALUE, is a proxy for the current importance of the ex-
ecutive’s trade negotiating agenda. The variable is measured as the combined GDP of all
countries with which the U.S. had ongoing formal trade negotiations during the year-in-
question. This variable is designed to account for both the number of ongoing negotiations,
as well as the potential economic impact of the proposed agreements.
The coefficient on FTA VALUE is positive and statistically significant at the .01 thresh-
old. As the trade negotiating activity of the president increased, Congress was far more
involved in the process.
The performance of the other variables was largely consistent with expectations. GDP
CHANGE, measuring the period-to-period change in national GDP, was negative and sta-
tistically significant. As the economy improved from one quarter to the next, the number
of consultations decreased. This likely reflects the presence of greater skepticism of trade
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liberalization during economic downturns. DIVIDED GOVT was also negative and statisti-
cally significant. This constitutes a departure from the above models, where this variable
was positive. However, this result is not unexpected in this context. During periods of
divided government, it may be more difficult to aggressively pursue trade agreements alto-
gether, thus decreasing the overall need for inter-branch consultations.
Table 1.3: Models of USTR-Congress Consultations
Model 1
coef/(se)
FTA VALUE 0.390***
(0.04)
DIVIDED GOVT -0.186***
(0.07)
GDP CHANGE -0.102***
(0.02)
CONG. RECESS -0.615***
(0.12)
INTERCEPT 4.075***
(0.06)
AIC 1626.78
N 182
Model 4 is a negative binomial model.
* indicates significance at p < 0.10; ** at p < 0.05; *** at p < 0.01.
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Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that Congress remains active in trade policy in spite
of the growing role of the executive in foreign trade policy. The trade policy literature
regularly treats delegation and the expansion of the executive branch trade apparatus as
potential substitutes for Congressional action. Commentators also suggest that legislators
strategically avoid the issue area as a matter of position avoidance or operational efficiency.
In contrast to these narratives, I show that delegation has not amounted to a renunciation
of legislative attention to the issue area. Importantly, these findings do not apply exclu-
sively to sponsorship activity, which is often viewed largely as position taking behavior.
Congress does not hold fewer trade-related hearings or enact fewer laws during periods of
delegation. Additionally, executive-legislative consultations increased when the executive
branch’s trade agenda was at its most ambitious; under these conditions, the USTR met
more regularly with Congressional officials.
These findings are consistent with a number of recent studies that have highlighted the
continued engagement of Congress in U.S. trade politics. For example, research has em-
phasized that legislators remained responsive to economic constituencies in the wake of
delegated authority (Goldstein and Gulotty 2015). Other research has noted that legislators
are heavily involved in the policy making process even when standard indicators of leg-
islative behavior would seem to suggest otherwise (see, e.g., Allee and Miler 2014; Caddel
2014).
It bears noting again that bill sponsorship activity actually increased in a meaningful
way during periods of delegated trade negotiating authority. This was a particularly robust
finding in the models here. Such a trend is consistent with the notion that members of
Congress might increase the signaling of their preferences to the executive branch when
the president’s role is greatest (see, e.g., Lindsay 1994; Pastor 1980). Or, legislators may
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increasingly sponsor legislation as a critique of executive action or inaction. These expla-
nations receive preliminary support in light of my analysis of consultation data. Future
research might usefully evaluate these explanations through a micro-level analysis of be-
havior focusing on individual legislators or policy proposals. As a preliminary matter, how-
ever, the consultations model demonstrates that Congressional involvement in the process
constitutes more than mere “signaling.”
Finally, this chapter provides a unique analysis in that it employs a quantitative exam-
ination of attention to trade policy over a long time horizon. Beyond exploring the role of
delegation, this approach allows me to emphasize that other political institutional factors
such as divided government also play a meaningful role in influencing patterns of Congres-
sional behavior. I also find that economic factors, such as the business cycle and the trade
dependence of the national economy, exert a clear influence on rates of legislative activity.
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2 STILL FOLLOWING THE LEADERS: INSTITUTIONAL POWER &
EFFECTIVENESS IN TRADE POLICYMAKING
Contemporary studies of trade policy rarely consider the relative importance of key leg-
islators in the trade policymaking process. The majority of research focuses on examining
the various influences on the direction of legislators’ trade preferences, without considering
legislative effectiveness in the area. The limited trade politics research that does consider
the roles of individual legislators often highlights the ways in which Congressional leaders
largely saw their influence dwindle in the 1970s. In this chapter, I demonstrate that many
of these leaders remained disproportionately critical to the passage and implementation of
trade policy. In the first part of my analysis, I examine 33 Congresses of data and identify
the factors that contribute to legislative success. The results indicate that, notwithstanding
the “decentralization” of trade policy, Ways and Means membership, chamber seniority
and party leadership status remained key predictors of effectiveness in the policymaking
process. In the second stage of the analysis, I turn to a more qualitative discussion of the
role of the trade committees in policymaking. Relying on a variety of government reports
and committee transcripts, I show how key legislators retained much of their power in trade
policy, although the shape of this influence changed over time.
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Several key developments in the 1970s are largely credited with upsetting the traditional
power structure of Congressional trade politics. As tariff rates dropped and trade policy be-
came increasingly concerned with non-tariff barriers to trade, the underlying jurisdictional
claim of Ways and Means was undermined. The committee originally derived its trade pol-
icy authority as a function of its responsibility for revenue bills, which includes most tariff
legislation. However, modern trade policy began to implicate a far wider set of policy areas
and congressional committees. These other committees began making a play for much of
the jurisdiction of Ways and Means, and in many cases the inter-committee conflict was
acute (Destler 1995; Gibson 2000; Nivola 1993). Taken together, these changes led many
commentators to conclude that “trade policy had become less ‘controllable’ in Congress”
(Nelson 2007; see also Destler 1995). No longer, they observed, could a small number of
dominant legislators control trade policy outcomes by virtue of their positions and status
within the institution.
In this chapter, I argue that there is substantial continuity in Congressional leadership on
trade. Although the unrivaled power of the old guard of trade policymakers was challenged
in the 1970s, much of the earlier power structure remains in place. First, I argue that
key power brokers – such as committee members/chairs, party leaders and legislators with
seniority – are still overwhelming likely to be the most effective legislators within the trade
policy arena. Second, I emphasize that in many cases members of Congress simply saw
their means of influence change. In particular, Congressional leaders often retained close
supervisory roles over trade regulation, even where their ability to dominate the lawmaking
process was challenged.
To assess my hypotheses, I examine legislative behavior in the House of Represen-
tatives during the post-war period (spanning the 80th-112th Congresses). My statistical
analysis yields results consistent with my expectations. Holding key positions in the House
is critical to a legislator’s level of effectiveness in trade policy. Ways and Means mem-
ber/chair status and chamber seniority were strongly associated with a higher rate of bill
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success. Legislators in these positions were more likely to see their bills reported out of
committee and passed into law; they were also more likely to garner support from their
colleagues on their policy proposals. Other institutional considerations, such as serving
in party leadership positions or being a member of the majority party, also proved to be
determinative of legislative success. Importantly, these factors were powerful predictors of
legislative effectiveness in both the pre and post-reform era.
Additionally, beyond introducing and seeking passage of legislation, there are a host of
formal and informal roles that key legislators can play in the policymaking process. Mem-
bers of Ways and Means, for example, are far more likely to be involved and influential in
representing constituents’ interests in consultations with the executive and administrative/quasi-
judicial venues.
These findings demonstrate that legislators can have vastly different roles throughout
the various stages of the legislation process. To the author’s knowledge, this is the only
effort to provide a quantitative and systematic examination of legislative leadership in trade
policy across an extended period of time.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I briefly discuss the existing
literature on legislators’ participation in the trade policymaking process, and describe the
limitations associated with these research designs. In the following section, I explain how
a more comprehensive treatment of the legislative process can allow us to better identify
legislative effectiveness in the issue area; in this section, I also lay out my primary hypothe-
ses. In the following section, I describe my research design and data. Finally, I turn to a
discussion of the results and conclude.
Congressional Leadership on Trade Policy
Members of the House Committee on Ways and Means have historically played a dis-
proportionately large role in setting trade policy. This authority was in many ways chal-
lenged in the 1970s.
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In the pre-reform committee system, a series of powerful Ways and Means chairs essen-
tially preempted any efforts at trade policymaking that did not meet their approval. Wilbur
Mills, who chaired the committee from 1958 to 1974 was so powerful, for example, that
other members complained that being on the committee was like being “on the tail of Mills’
comet” (quoted in Pastor 1980: 151). He maintain such centralized control that other com-
mittee members often knew little about proposed pieces of legislation and did not even
have the means to acquire the information (Pastor 1980: 155). Although Mills was noto-
rious for his tight grip on trade policy, a similar description could be applied to previous
chairs of Ways and Means (and Finance in the Senate). The clout of these legislators was
enshrined in the titles of many general tariff bills in the late 1800s and early 1900s. The
Payne-Aldrich Tariff of 1908, Underwood-Simmons Tariff of 1913 and the Fordney Mc-
Cumber Act of 1922, for example, bore the name of the chairs of the Ways and Means and
Finance committees (Eckes 1995: 104). Even earlier pieces of tariff legislation contained
the name of the Ways and Means chair (see, e.g., the “Morrill,” “Dingley,” “McKinley”
tariffs).
As trade policy became less about tariffs, and more about the wide variety of non-tariff
barriers to trade, the underlying jurisdictional claim of Ways and Means was undermined.
The committee originally derived its trade policy authority as a function of its chief respon-
sibility for revenue bills – which includes most tariff legislation. But as tariff rates dropped
and non-tariff barriers to trade expanded, trade legislation began to implicate a wider set of
congressional committees.1 One commentator described the changes,
Now the cast of characters and the agendas they were trying to advance were
becoming longer because of the new, more complicated policy requirements
and because of increased staff support and opportunities for political aggran-
dizement. Participation spread to include the House Energy and Commerce
Committee (domestic content, certification standards), the House Foreign Af-
fairs and Senate Foreign Relations committees (foreign loans, exports con-
trols), the Judiciary committees (antitrust reciprocity), the banking committees
1Additionally, during the post-war period, international institutions increasingly limited the extent to
which tariff protection was a possible policy route for governments
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(financial services, foreign investment, the Export-Imports Bank), the agricul-
ture committees (farm trade), the armed services committees (procurements
codes), and so forth. (Nivola 1993).
In short, other committees started to encroach on the jurisdiction of Ways and Means
(Destler 1995; Gibson 2000). These developments would serve to challenge the power of
members serving on key committees, and more generally undermined the prerogatives of
senior legislators.
Although several scholars have highlighted the potential implications of such major
changes for trade policymaking, the existing literature has done little to systematically ex-
amine these effects. Nor has there been any systematic efforts to identify the most powerful
legislators in the policy area. Studies of legislative behavior on trade policy typically exam-
ine how a host of member and constituency-level characteristics drive the direction of trade
preferences. For example, these studies examine the ways in which trade policy behavior
is influenced by state economic profiles (Krehbiel 1993; Bailey, Goldstein and Weingast
1997; Gilligan 1997; Rogowski 1987; Busch and Reinhardt 1999; Pincus 1975; Coughlin
1985; Allen and Hopkins 1997; Tosini and Tower 1987), the role of PAC contributions and
interest group activity (Grossman and Helpman 1994; Hall and Deardorff 2006; Gawande
and Bandyopadhyay 2000; Gawande and Hoekman 2006), and ideology and partisanship
(Nollen and Quin 1994; Whalen and Whalen 1990; Baldwin 1984). These considerations
are critical to identifying legislators’ posture on trade liberalization, but do not provide
much insight into legislative effectiveness.
In fact, the direction or intensity of trade preferences often bear little relationship with
legislative success. An example can illustrate. In the 110th Congress, the Cato institute
classified members of Congress according to their voting records on trade-related bills.
Members who most consistently voted in favor of trade protection, i.e., voted for trade bar-
riers and/or subsidies, were labeled as “interventionists”; legislators who consistently voted
against these polices were “free traders.” After compiling voting records, the researchers
identified 15 legislators as being the most resolute in their respective trade preferences.
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Among these 15 legislators were 7 hardline free traders, while 8 regularly voted for in-
tervention in the economy. Despite having relatively consistent voting records on trade,
however, these legislators were not among the most active or effective in terms of initiating
legislation. In fact, they introduced fewer bills than their less hardline colleagues, and their
bills were no more likely to make it out of committee or into law.2 In short, even legislators
who are consistent in terms of their support for particular trade policies are not necessarily
better at obtaining favorable policies.
The trade policy literature has done little to explore legislative leadership or effective-
ness in the issue area. And, because of an empirical focus on roll call voting, it is not
currently well-positioned to do so. In the sections that follow, I present a number of hy-
potheses regarding legislative effectiveness, and propose various empirical strategies for
examining these expectations.
Legislative Effectiveness in the Trade Policy Process
There is wide variation across legislators in terms of their ability to see their bills re-
ported out of committee, passed in the chamber and signed into law. Holding a number of
key positions within Congress can increase their likelihood of success.
Membership on committees of jurisdiction can make legislators effective sponsors for a
number of reasons. Legislators on these committees have additional information on policy
proposals, and their exposure to the issues gives them a greater level of expertise in the
policy area under consideration (Krehbiel 1991). Importantly, these legislators are also
able to participate in hearings, where industry and government experts offer testimony
to identify the interests at stake. They also see the various markups of a bill to identify
how legislation has progressed, and are present for the committee or subcommittee debate
on legislation (see generally, Hall 1987, 1996; Evans 1991; Fenno 1973 for discussions of
2The same is true when examining legislators’ pro-business rankings, based on the numerical score at-
tributed to each legislator by the Club for Growth. Neither the legislators receiving the highest “pro-business”
score, nor the ones receiving the lowest scores, were especially active/successful sponsors of trade legislation.
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congressional committee membership and participation in constructing legislation).3 These
opportunities reduce costs associated with participation, and increase their comparative
effectiveness in the area (e.g., Evans 1991; Hall 1996; Allee and Miler 2013).4
Legislators regularly stress the importance of obtaining allies on key committees if
proposed legislation is to have any chance of success. Like any legislation, most trade bills
never make it out of committee. To overcome this hurdle, sponsors of trade bills actively
seek out the support of members of Ways and Means. In fact, in many cases where MCs
are unsuccessful in obtaining the support of key committee members, potential bills may
not be proposed in the first instance.
Archival materials from several legislative offices reveal the importance of such con-
siderations. For example, during an effort to introduce a bill to amend the Trade Act’s an-
tidumping provisions, one legislative aide asserted “The bill is drafted, and we are presently
attempting to obtain cosponsors. Our objective is to introduce it with as many from the
[Ways and Means Committee] as we can get.” In another instance, an aide advised his
legislator that he was unable to amass sufficient support from committee members, and
“without their [the committee’s] blessing, no real point in even offering it on the floor.”5
Given the demonstrated importance of these committee members to the legislative process,
I anticipate that they will be the most effective sponsors of trade legislation.6
Although legislative reform presented some challenges to key players on Ways and
3The importance of getting key committee members on board is, of course, not lost on interest groups
as well. Frequently, they target committee members with communications and political contributions. This
includes targeting members of the committee in general, with a special emphasis on committee/subcommittee
chairs and ranking members (Grier and Munger 1986, 1991; Gwande and Hoeckman 2006).
4There are also a host of expectations associated with serving on Ways and Means. As Destler (1998:
98) notes, members of Ways and Means have a greater interest, and additional pressure, to legislate on trade-
related issues when compared to non-committee members in the chamber (see also Destler 2005).
5Documents on file with author.
6Researchers have relied on various measures of relative legislative “success” (see, e.g., Matthews 1960;
Frantzich 1979; Anderson et al. 2003; Cox and Terry 2008; Hasecke and Mycoff 2007; see Volden and
Wiseman (2013) for a review of the literature). This includes, for example, examining which legislators see
their bills reported out of committee or passed into legislation. Although the particular measures relied upon
vary, they have similarly focused on the extent to which a MC is able to move his or her proposal through the
legislative process. These measures are discussed further, below.
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Means, their authority in the issue area was not undermined. Additionally, beyond shep-
herding legislation through the lawmaking process, I also anticipate that these legislators
retain important advisory roles; I revisit this point below, following the statistical analysis.
Legislative Effectiveness: Bill Sponsorship/Success
To explore legislators’ level of effectiveness in trade policy, I statistically examine bill
success in the House of Representatives. My unit of analysis for the models is a legislator-
congress, and the analysis spans from the 80th to the 112th Congress.
There are a number of dependent variables relied upon in the analysis. In Models
1 and 2, the dependent variable is a count of the number of trade bills that the MC-in-
question sponsored that made it out of committee in each Congress. In Models 3 and 4,
the dependent variable is the number of sponsored bills that became law. These dependent
variables are all counts, and therefore I run a series of negative binomial models. (Models 5-
6 rely on a different type of dependent variable, and I return to a discussion of this outcome
variable below.) Table 2.1 contains a summary of the dependent variables for each of the
models run here.
Table 2.1: Dependent Variables
Model Dependent Variables
Models 1-2 # of sponsored bills reported out of committee
Models 3-4 # of sponsored bills passed into law
Models 5-6 subject legislator’s centrality score
In determining the relevant legislation to include in the analysis, I rely on the Con-
gressional Bills Project (CBP) and Policy Agendas Project bill coding system (see Adler
and Wilkerson, 1973-2012; Baumgartner and Jones 1993). The CBP database contains all
bills introduced during the period under consideration, and every bill is coded according
to 19 substantive policy topics, each corresponding to a major policy area. The bills used
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in the analysis here were drawn from the category of bills designated as relating to “for-
eign trade.” This issue area covers bills concerning: trade negotiations/disputes, tariffs and
import restrictions, export promotion and regulation, US competitiveness and productivity,
balance of payments, exchange rates, and a variety of other related issues.
The independent variables contained in the analysis relate to member-level character-
istics that are likely to influence legislative effectiveness on trade. The key independent
variables relate to each MC’s position within the institution. WAYS AND MEANS denotes
membership on the key committee of jurisdiction for trade legislation. For certain models,
I also relied on variables that denote committee chair and subcommittee chair status. I
anticipate a positive relationship between this variable and legislative effectiveness. Simi-
lar variables were included to account for other committee memberships that are likely to
be influential in trade policy, such as Foreign Affairs, Energy/Commerce and Agriculture.
Committee data were obtained from Nelson (1973-1992) and Stewart and Woon (1993-
2012).
Additional member-level institutional variables include majority party status (MAJ.
PARTY), length of service in the chamber (SENIORITY) and leadership status (PARTY
LEADER). I have also included a variable denoting each member’s ideology (NOMI-
NATE) and whether he or she is in the same party as the sitting president (PRES. PARTY).
These data were obtained from Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and corresponding updates.
The results from my models provide support for my hypotheses. Key committee posi-
tions bear heavily on the extent to which a legislator is successful in the trade policymaking
process. Other institutional factors, such as seniority, leadership status and majority party
membership, also had decisive relationships with legislative success.
Before turning to the results of the statistical models, it is worth examining the raw data.
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics denoting the propensity with which legislators were
able to see their bills reported out of committee, passed in the House, and enacted into law.
For Ways and Means members, the average number of bills that were introduced, and then
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subsequently reported out of committee, was just under .22 per legislator-congress. For
all other committees, this rate fell to well below .10. The likelihood that a non-Ways and
Means member sponsors a trade bill and sees it out of committee appears to be extremely
small. The same is, naturally, true for bill passage/enactment.
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I also briefly consider the outcomes associated with legislators that had substantial pe-
riods of service on and off the committee on Ways and Means. Table 2.3 shows that these
legislators were substantially more likely to sponsor a trade bill and see it out of committee
during their period of Ways and Means service. This comparison between performance
while serving on and off the committee is an important one – this helps to demonstrate that
it is not simply some underlying trait that is associated with selection to this committee that
drives success in the trade policy realm.7 Instead, it appears that committee membership
itself increases legislators’ ability to successfully pursue trade policy.
Table 2.3: Legislative Success, by Ways & Means Service
Sponsored Cosponsored Cosponsors Reported Passed Law
Obtained Out Chamber
Ways/Means
Members
On Ways/Means 2.243 4.575 9.106 0.122 0.108 0.059
Off Ways/Means 1.540 3.904 7.123 0.082 0.079 0.035
Ways/Means
(3 yrs min.)
On Ways/Means 2.334 5.413 2.727 0.079 0.081 0.030
Off Ways/Means 1.661 6.202 6.405 0.021 0.008 0.008
Data are drawn from the Congressional Bills Project as well as Fowler (2006a, 2006b).
The second set of row only includes legislators that served at least three years on/off of the
committee.
I now turn to my regression models of legislative success. The results from these models
are contained in Table 2.4. The variables performed in a manner that was broadly consis-
tent with my initial analysis, and provide support for my hypotheses. With respect to the
7Such a comparison is useful, as selection to committees is clearly not random. Legislators have underly-
ing priorities and motivations that lead them to seek and be qualified for committee membership in the first
place (see, e.g., Strahan 1990: 78).
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committee membership variable, Ways and Means had a robust positive relationship with
legislative success. Members of this committee were more likely to see their bills reported
out of committee (Model 1) and enacted into law (Models 3). The results are consistent
when examining bills that are passed in the chamber, but that did not become law.8
Membership on Agriculture, Educations/Labor and Energy/Commerce had negative re-
lationships with bill success over the full period. The coefficient on Foreign Affairs was
positive across models, though the relationship never reached statistical significance. I
interpret these findings as evidence of the primacy of Ways and Means on trade policy.
It is important to note that these findings were largely consistent when examining the
pre and post-reform era. When splitting the sample to isolate the 80th-93rd Congresses,
or the 94th-112th Congresses, the key variables performed as expected. WAYS&MEANS
and WAYS&MEANS (CHAIR) were both statistically significant predictors of legislative
success at the .001 threshold across time periods. There is, however, some evidence that
their predominance was reduced. In the pre-reform period the predicted number of chair-
sponsored trade bills that made it out of committee was 1.18, compared to just .04 for
all other representatives; in the post-reform period these figures shifted to .411 and .022.
There was a corresponding decrease for rank and file members of the committee, but they
remained far more likely than their non-Ways and Means counterparts to successfully in-
troduce legislation.
Another key change relates to the importance of other committees memberships. Mem-
bership on the Agriculture, Banking and Foreign Affairs committees prove to have a posi-
tive relationship with bill success when starting the sample in the 1970s, though their power
8Similarly, when relying on a variable denoting committee/subcommittee chair status, this variable also
had a robust relationship with success (Models 2 and 4). Table 2.6 (contained in the appendix) shows the
average level of activity and effectiveness of the Ways and Means Chair and the Trade Subcommittee Chair,
and compares this performance to that of the average member of the chamber. That these two legislators were
substantially more likely to see their bills reported out of committee is not surprising. That said, the stark
difference of their success rate when compared to the average legislator is telling. The Chair of Ways and
Means has historically held substantial power over the proposals that make it out of committee. In several
crucial ways, committee system reform of the early 1970s weakened the position (Destler 1995: 69-70). That
said, chairs still retain a host of agenda-setting powers, such as scheduling hearings and committee debates.
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Table 2.4: Models of Legislative Effectiveness
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(coef/se) (coef/se) (coef/se) (coef/se)
NOMINATE -0.413** -0.467* -0.191 -0.298
(0.18) (0.25) (0.19) (0.30)
MAJORITY -0.003* -0.003 -0.001 0.000
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PARTY LEADER 1.432*** 1.366*** 1.884*** 1.806***
(0.44) (0.44) (0.54) (0.42)
SENIORITY 0.109*** 0.092*** 0.115*** 0.077***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
AGRICULTURE -0.229 -0.938*** -0.717* -1.505***
(0.25) (0.24) (0.38) (0.39)
ED./LABOR -0.878*** -1.562*** -0.369 -1.156***
(0.31) (0.31) (0.35) (0.36)
FOR. AFFAIRS 0.479 -0.251 0.424 -0.366
(0.31) (0.30) (0.33) (0.31)
ENERGY/COMM 0.351 -0.440* 0.054 -0.841***
(0.24) (0.23) (0.31) (0.30)
WAYS&MEANS 2.642*** 2.927***
(0.16) (0.18)
WAYS&MEANS (CHAIR) 3.243*** 3.813***
(0.32) (0.29)
TOTAL BILLS 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
INTERCEPT -4.653*** -3.755*** -6.189*** -5.058***
(0.39) (0.40) (0.44) (0.43)
LN ALPHA 1.323*** 2.300*** 1.054*** 2.059***
(0.23) (0.19) (0.27) (0.32)
N 14,128 14,128 14,128 14,128
Models 1-4 are negative binomial models.
* indicates significance at p < 0.10; ** at p < 0.05; *** at p < 0.01.
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never approached that of Ways and Means.
That the legislators on Ways and Means retained such power in policymaking is espe-
cially noteworthy given the change to trade policy during the course of the period. Starting
in the 1970s trade legislation was increasingly referred to multiple committees. This prac-
tice permitted a host of legislators from these other committees – who often had a different
set of priorities than the typical MC serving on Ways and Means – to influence proposed
trade policies. This included higher numbers of referrals to Foreign Affairs, Appropri-
ations, Agriculture and Energy/Commerce. And, as trade policy increasingly concerned
areas not traditionally tied to revenue policy, the jurisdictional basis of Ways and Means
would seem to be undermined. The vast majority of trade bills in the period, however,
were still referred to Ways and Means. From the mid 1940s to the 1970s, approximately
80 percent of the trade-related legislation introduced in Congress was referred to Ways and
Means. The number actually increased to nearly 88 percent in the second half of the period
(although multiple referrals did become far more common).9 The results here, nonethe-
less, indicate that the Ways and Means committee was unparalleled in terms of containing
legislators who were well-positioned to see trade legislation through the entire legislative
process.
The other institutional variables performed largely as expected. MAJORITY PARTY
was associated with increased legislative success, and the coefficient on the variable was
positive and statistically significant across models. SENIORITY also had a significant and
positive relationship with legislative success, regardless of specification.
In unreported models, I included variables related to the economic characteristics of
MCs’ districts. These variables are routinely included in trade policy analyses that seek pri-
marily to explain the direction of trade preferences, and account for district employment in
manufacturing sector, the agricultural sector, union membership and unemployment rates,
9This is not to argue that increasingly overlapping jurisdictions on trade policy were not important to
legislative outcomes. For example, the increase of multiple referrals undoubtedly led to a higher likelihood
that trade proposals would be modified during the committee process (see, e.g., Gibson 2000: 125-136; see
also Destler 2004).
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and educational attainment rates. These data were primarily drawn from the U.S. Census,
and were compiled by Adler (1973-2005) and updated by the author. Inclusion of these
variables did not modify the results reported here.
Figure 2.1: Predicted Probabilities
To get a sense of the substantive impact of the key variables, I calculated predicted
probabilities based on Model 3. Specifically, I calculated the predicted number of trade
bills that a legislator would see out of committee, while varying the values on the key
variables discussed above (holding constant the values of the remaining variables). The
predicted probabilities are plotted in Figure 2.1. As the plot demonstrates, holding critical
institutional positions had a strong influence on legislative success. Here, I ran the analysis
exclusively on the post reform era – thus isolating the period when Ways and Means mem-
bership should have its weakest impact. Despite this, Ways and Means membership was
associated with a 600 percent increase in the number of trade bills a legislator saw reported
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out of committee.10 The impact was substantially less for members of FOREIGN AFFAIRS
and BANKING, though they still saw approximately twice as many as a rank-and-file mem-
ber. The only variable that had a greater substantive impact was SENIORITY, which led to
a 7.5 times increase in the number of bills successfully reported out of committee. Finally,
being a member of the majority party was associated with a 300 percent increase in the
predicted count.
Importantly, these results hold when running the regressions while relying on the subset
of trade bills that were also referred to a committee other than Ways and Means. In these
robustness checks, WAYS AND MEANS remains significant at the .01 threshold, regardless
of the measure of legislative success used (referred out of committee, passed in chamber, or
enacted into law). Seniority and party leadership, once again, bore the anticipated positive
relationship with bill passage success. The key difference from the models reported above
is that membership on Foreign Relations was also a positive and significant predictor of bill
success.
Taken together, the results demonstrate that a select group of legislators are overwhelm-
ing important in trade policymaking. Ways and Means membership, party leadership and
seniority were the most consistent predictors of success in terms of advancing legislation.
An Illustration - Legislative Effectiveness, 103rd Congress
In this section, I examine the importance of institutional roles by examining a single
Congress in greater depth. Specifically, I focus on the legislative network of bill sponsors
and cosponsors in the 103rd Congress to identify the legislators that proved most central
to the passage of trade legislation. This congress is a particularly useful one for consid-
eration, as trade reemerged as a high salience issue at this time. Following the decline in
attention to trade policy after the mid-1980s, the issue became critical given that the trade
agenda featured bills relating to the WTO, NAFTA and several other import/export policy
10The impact was even more substantial when isolating the Ways and Means Chair and Trade Subcommit-
tee Chair.
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proposals.
Figure 2.2 displays the network of inter-legislator cosponsorship connections on all
trade bills introduced in the congress under consideration. The legislators who serve on the
House Ways and Means committee are labeled. As the figure illustrates, there is a relatively
high level of activity in this policy area among both Democrats (in blue) and Republicans
(in red). Trade was high on the legislative agenda during this term, and the density of
(co)sponsorship ties probably does not come as a surprise.
Figure 2.3 shows the far less dense cosponsorship network for bills that were passed into
law. There were 375 trade bills introduced in the 103rd Congress, which amassed a total of
1573 cosponsors. Of those bills, only nine ultimately became law. This network, in contrast
to the one depicted in Figure 2.2, shows the overwhelming influence of key members of
Congress. The large circles (i.e., “nodes”) represent legislators who are on the Committee
on Ways and Means or are party leaders.11 As the figure suggests, approximately half of the
sponsors/cosponsors on these “successful” bills were obtained from particular members of
Congress – especially Ways and Means members, party leaders and senior legislators.
11The majority leader was Gephardt [D-MO], and the minority leader was Michel [R-Ill]. The rest of
the leadership was Foley [D-Wa] (speaker), Bonior [D-MI] (majority whip) and Gingrich [R-Ga] (minority
whip). The latter three legislators do not appear in the network, as they did not sponsor any trade bills that
were ultimately enacted.
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A statistical analysis of this cosponsorship network provides results consistent with my
cursory visual interpretation. Here, I ran two regressions to assess the factors that made
legislators “central” to the network of legislators involved in the passage of trade bills.
The dependent variable, each legislator’s centrality score, is measured two ways. First, the
variable is measured as the total number of cosponsorship connections – on passed trade
bills – to other members of congress; this figure includes all cosponsorships received on
passed bills that he or she introduced, summed with the number of cosponsors he or she
offered on colleagues’ successful bills. The variable is alternatively measured as simply
the number of cosponsorships each legislator obtained on his or her own bills (Models 7
and 8, respectively).12 The results from these models are presented in Table 2.5.
As the results indicate, WAYS & MEANS had a positive and statistically significant
relationship with centrality, and was significant at the .01 level in both models. PARTY
LEADER was significant at the .01/.10 levels, depending on the model under consideration.
SENIORITY also had a robust positive relationship with a legislator’s centrality score. These
results further demonstrate that holding key institutional positions remains critical to a
legislator’s effectiveness in the trade policymaking process.
12In the study of social networks, “centrality” captures an individual’s relationships with other members
of his or her network. These connections can represent an individual’s level of popularity or power within
the greater network. In the context of the Congressional bill sponsorship network, centrality indicates the
extent to which legislators collaborate by introducing and cosponsoring each other’s legislation (see, e.g.,
Fowler 2006a; 2006b; Victor and Ringe 2009; Gross, Kirkland and Shalizi 2012; Porter, Mucha, Newman
and Warmbrand 2005; Ringe, Victor and Gross 2013; Koger 2003; Cho 2008; Kirkland 2011; Haar 2006).
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Table 2.5: Centrality - Legislation and Enacted Bills
Mod 7 Mod 8
b/se b/se
SENIORITY 0.085** 0.101***
(0.04) (0.04)
NOMINATE -0.765 -3.270**
(1.07) (1.38)
DEMOCRAT 0.000 0.007
(0.01) (0.01)
SCHOOL ENROLL. 3.286 -15.373
(7.24) (8.22)
FARM EMPL. -39.940 -20.978
(37.23) (33.97)
MFG EMPL. -8.403 5.474
(5.47) (7.59)
UNEMPLOYMENT -55.026* -76.962
(30.92) (39.43)
UNIONIZATION 0.011 0.001
(0.03) (0.03)
WAYS & MEANS 2.045*** 1.746***
(0.40) (0.40)
PARTY LEADER 2.347*** 1.556*
(0.67) (0.40)
INTERCEPT -2.180 -0.668
(2.23) (0.87)
R2 0.24 0.26
N 435 435
Models 5-6 are OLS models.
* indicates significance at p < 0.10; ** at p < 0.05; *** at p < 0.01.
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Maintaining Power Through Other Means
Thus far, I have demonstrated how MCs holding critical positions within Congress have
retained substantial legislative power, notwithstanding the institutional/policy changes in
the 1970s. These legislators remain intricately involved in setting trade policy by block-
ing/approving key trade appointments, and by financing and structuring the agencies that
make trade policy. And, Congress, led by these members, has not hesitated to reassert itself
vis-a-vis the executive.13
However, Congressional prerogatives can also be examined by exploring legislators’
participation in areas beyond introducing and passing legislation. For example, MCs on
Ways and Means also testify in support of their constituencies before the key trade institu-
tions, such as the International Trade Commission. In the period from 1997-2010, over half
of the antidumping/countervailing duty cases at the ITC saw a legislator testify on behalf
of an industry seeking trade protection; members of the key trade committees were clearly
the most active legislators in doing so (Caddel 2014).
Perhaps the most important role for these MCs is to be intricately involved in ma-
jor trade agreement negotiations. For instance, the Trade Act of 1974, which delegated
trade agreement negotiating authority to the president, “retained provisions initiated by the
House that provided for direct participation throughout negotiations by members and staff
of the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee: five mem-
bers from each committee (not more than three from any one party) were to be accredited as
members of the negotiating delegation; they and designated staff were to receive briefings
and documents and were to have full access to negotiating sessions” (Destler and Graham
1980: 58). These MCs, then, play a role that extends well beyond simply casting votes on
implementing legislation following negotiations.
13In the last 120 years, Congress has passed 25 major trade laws dealing with delegation. In 8 of these
cases, Congress acted to decrease the existing scope of delegation. And, of these 8 cases, 6 followed the
RTAA and 3 followed the Trade Act of 1974 (O’Halloran 1994).
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Nor did the 1974 Act constitute an isolated example of congressional-executive coop-
eration on trade. Both branches appear to take the consultation process very seriously. An
excerpt from a Senate Finance committee report from 1980 well-illustrates this point. Dur-
ing a discussion surrounding the appropriate level of oversight and appropriations for the
office of the Special Trade Representative (now known as the U.S. Trade Representative),
several senators highlighted the close contact between the Trade Representative and the key
Congressional trade committees. Senator Heinz specifically asked that the budget autho-
rization for the Trade Representative take place at less frequent intervals. He argued, “I am
inclined to believe that a one-year authorization or reauthorization is a little too frequent.
... I don’t think we need to keep the STR [Special Trade Representative] on that short of a
string.” Heinz, the Chairman of the committee, also highlighted the historically high level
of interaction between the Representative’s office and committee member’s offices. The
following exchange took place prior to a vote:
Senator Ribicoff: Hardly a week goes by that I don’t receive a personal call
from Mr. Askew [the sitting STR]. He comes by the office, keeps you in-
formed, tells you what is going on. I don’t think there is any agency that is in
as close contact as STR.
The Chairman: My impression is that STR stays closer than any of them.
Senator Ribicoff: They do, and they want to. They realize a connection be-
tween this committee and themselves.
Following this discussion, the committee ultimately voted to reduce the authorization
frequency for the Trade Representative (Finance Comm. Executive Meeting, Apr. 30,
1980).
Similarly, in the lead up to the passage of the Omnibus Trade Act in the late 1980s, the
Chair of the Senate Finance Committee, Lloyd Bentson, emphasized that the bill would
increase Congress’s role in the administration’s trade policy dealings. Other legislators
similarly highlighted that broad support among key committee members would be critical
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to securing the bill’s passage – and this would ensure that Congress was not a mere “pup-
pet” in setting trade policy (Schwab 1993: 260, 267). Ultimately, the bill reflected these
concerns. The Omnibus Act, while extending “fast track authority” (i.e., executive negotia-
tion power), also provided that Congress could revoke this fast track authority by passing a
resolution of disapproval if Congress was dissatisfied with the level of consultation between
itself and the United States Trade Representative (USTR) (Cooper 2014).
In 2002, the President was again granted fast-track (now called “trade promotion”) au-
thority pursuant to The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act. Just as in the 1988 grant
of power, Congress made very clear that key players would stay involved with the negotiat-
ing process. Importantly, the Act created a new mechanism for congressional consultation,
the Congressional Oversight Group (Cooper 2014). The executive was required to provide
the advisory group with sufficient notice of intent to enter into a trade agreement to permit
research and analysis prior to any formal consultation. And, even after an agreement was
signed, this group was permitted to meet extensively before the drafting and passage of any
implementing legislation.
It is important to note that while these reforms empowered Congress vis-a-vis the ex-
ecutive, it predominantly provided power to a select group of MCs. An examination of the
operation of the Congressional oversight process suggests that the traditional trade com-
mittees were the primary beneficiaries. In the 4.5 year period between August 2002 and
April 2007, the USTR met with members of Congress over 1600 times. By far the most
common Congressional meetings occurred with the Senate Finance and House Ways and
Means Committees (about 900); the second most frequently consulted committees were
those relating to agriculture, which saw about 300 total meetings. The Ways and Means
and Finance committees had consultations with USTR officials on a weekly basis, with
meetings frequently lasting somewhere from an hour to an hour-and-a-half (GAO 2008).
Not only did the traditional trade committees have more frequent consultations than
other committees, they also were far better positioned to process and act on the information.
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Interviews from the Government Accountability Office reported that non-trade committee
staff did not understand many of the issues, or the economics jargon, during briefings.
One staff member who worked for a legislator on a trade committee explained that staff
members “on the other committees of jurisdiction are at a disadvantage because trade is
not their primary issue, and they don’t have time to follow it.” (GAO 2008).
For similar reasons, trade vs. non-trade Congressional staff had drastically different
views regarding the timing of the consultations. Staff of the trade and agriculture com-
mittees said the timeliness of consultations was appropriate, and gave them sufficient time
to prepare to develop their positions on the agreements. Staff from other committees of-
ten disagreed, complaining that there was inadequate time to prepare, and that “they felt
briefed rather than consulted” (GAO 2008). Staff members with expertise in the area (typ-
ically Ways and Means, Finance and Agriculture) clearly required less time to respond to
trade policy proposals and relevant market information. As a result, members of the trade
committees had an overall more favorable view of the consultation process.
What this brief discussion illustrates is that, in many ways, the continued power of
select legislators is actually understated in the statistical analysis above. Not only have the
traditionally powerful trade legislators retained much of their influence in introducing and
passing legislation, they also have an important role in other aspects of trade policymaking.
These legislators are the most frequently consulted members of Congress, and importantly,
are in the best position to receive and understand the information provided by the executive
branch’s trade negotiators.
Conclusion
Traditional analyses of legislative behavior on trade overwhelmingly focus on explain-
ing the direction of legislators’ positions. What these approaches do not do, however, is
discriminate among legislators to identify the MCs that are most effective in influencing
policy. The analysis here explores which legislators are most likely to be successful in
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enacting legislation, and in influencing trade policy through formal/informal consulations.
The results suggest that a relatively small group of MCs are far and away most likely
to be successful trade policymakers, despite major shifts in the 1970s that were expected to
undermine these same legislators. Ways and Means members/chairs, and other legislators
holding key roles in Congress, were the most effective legislators, regardless of the mea-
sure of effectiveness that was relied upon. These MCs saw their bills further through the
legislative process at a far higher rate than their colleagues.
This is certainly not to downplay the importance of non-institutional factors as influ-
ences on trade policymaking. The import/export orientation of a legislator’s district, and the
macroeconomic climate, influence rates of legislative activity and voting behavior. How-
ever, such variables had little discernible relationship with legislators’ direct policymaking
capabilities.
Even when institutional changes appeared to open doors for new players in trade policy,
various factors allowed for substantial continuity in Congressional trade leadership. Mem-
bers of the key trade committees continue to enjoy formal relationships with the executive
branch trade officials that give them agenda-setting/gate-keeping power when it comes to
the most important trade policy proposals. A host of informal relationships also shape the
behavior of key trade officials. It is a limited set of MCs that are privy to the most informa-
tion regarding proposed trade policies, and these same legislators have the expertise to act
on that information. In the contemporary negotiations concerning the Transatlantic Trade
and Investment Partnership and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the key discussions involve
ranking members of the key trade committees and the executive. These legislators have the
power to heavily shape, and even outright obstruct, executive efforts to pursue two major
international trade agreements.
These findings highlight the institutional determinants of the trade policymaking pro-
cess. Such considerations are obscured when research treats legislators as homogenous –
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which is an especially common practice in the quantitative trade policy literature. The find-
ings here illustrate that legislative influence, if not legislative activity, is overwhelmingly
shaped by institutional criteria.
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3 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE & INSTITUTIONAL CONNECTIONS:
CONGRESSIONAL NETWORKS AND FOREIGN TRADE POLICY
Inter-legislator coalitions have long been instrumental in formulating and implementing
key pieces of international trade legislation. The existing literature on trade politics, how-
ever, typically highlights district and member-level characteristics as the key determinants
of legislative behavior, to the exclusion of relational influences that may operate in the
lawmaking process. Studies typically treat each legislator’s choice to support a particular
piece of trade legislation as independent from the choices of his or her colleagues. I argue,
however, that a legislator’s propensity to support a trade bill is often a function of his or her
existing relationship with the bill’s primary sponsor. Using standard regression techniques,
as well as an exponential random graph (network) model, I find that inter-legislator con-
nections have a substantial impact on observed patterns of support for trade bills introduced
in the U.S. Congress. Relationships of reciprocity, and joint service on key committees, in-
crease the likelihood that two legislators form a sponsor-cosponsor tie on a proposed trade
bill, even when controlling for a host of legislator and district-level criteria. The results
suggest that quantitative examinations of trade policy making should be careful to explore
the potential interdependence of legislators’ sponsorship decisions.
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In 2005, the Central American Free Trade Agreement was passed in Congress by the
slim margin of two votes. Although it initially appeared as though Republican leadership
might fail to secure passage of the legislation, last-minute negotiating permitted CAFTA to
make it through the House. In the end, there were even several notable pro-CAFTA votes
from legislators representing districts with extensive import-competing industry. Nancy
Pelosi, who opposed the bill, criticized the vote, saying that “Once again, the floor of the
House of Representatives resembled the set of ‘Let’s Make a Deal’.” The CAFTA legis-
lation, however, is hardly unique in that its passage relied on legislative bargaining. One
of the most infamous pieces of trade legislation in U.S. history, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff
Act of 1930, is often cited as an archetypal example of log-rolling behavior. Legislators
representing vastly different business interests struck deals to support major tariff increases
on each other’s products. Although this kind of inter-legislator bargaining is critical to the
policy making process, much of the existing trade politics research fails to devote adequate
attention to the relational determinants of policy outcomes.
The standard literature on trade politics extensively considers how the manufacturing
profile and labor market characteristics of a legislator’s constituency shapes his or her posi-
tions on trade. This work also explores how member-level factors, such as party, ideology
and PAC contributions, influence trade policy preferences. Although these various consid-
erations are undoubtedly important to explaining trade policy outcomes, reliance on these
explanations alone provides only an atomistic view of the lawmaking process. Elected
officials do not adopt policy positions in a vacuum, and inter-legislator relationships also
influence policy choices.
In this chapter, I argue that previous collaboration and shared committee membership
are two important types of legislator-to-legislator relationships that shape the trade policy
making process. First, establishing ongoing collaborative cosponsorship relationships can
give rise to legislative coalitions, and can facilitate future cooperation and expectations of
reciprocity. In this regard, trading support for legislation through mutual cosponsorship is
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essentially another version of the log-rolling dynamic that is often seen in the context of roll
call votes. Second, joint committee membership serves as another type of inter-legislator
connection that influences policy making. By jointly serving on trade-related committees
(Senate Finance/House Ways and Means), legislators are able to use their shared expertise
and key positions of authority to collaborate to effectively design and pursue passage of
legislation. Accordingly, coalitions of legislators on these committees will be particularly
likely to cooperate on trade legislation.
To examine my hypotheses, I run several statistical models of trade bill cosponsorship in
both the Senate and the House. In the first step of my analysis, I run a set of logit regression
models of cosponsorship choice, incorporating several variables to capture the effect of
previous collaboration and joint committee membership on support for trade legislation.
I then run an exponential random graph (network) model to more fully incorporate such
effects in a context that allows me to directly address the non-independence of legislators’
decisions. In addition to the quantitative analysis, I also draw on a variety of qualitative
materials, such as Congressional papers and published accounts of legislative negotiations,
that shed light on legislators’ decision making when considering to cosponsor legislation.
The analysis yields results consistent with my hypotheses. Legislators that are highly
connected in terms of previous collaboration have a higher propensity to support each
other’s pending trade legislation. This finding was robust to the inclusion of a host of
control variables capturing the effect of member and constituency-level similarities and
differences between legislators. Even controlling for commonalities in terms of ideology,
partisanship, geography and district manufacturing profiles, prior cooperation was predic-
tive of the formation of new cosponsorship ties. Additionally, common membership on
committees of jurisdiction had a positive relationship with the likelihood of a cosponsor-
ship tie forming. These results suggest that legislative connections are an important sup-
plement to existing explanations for behavior in the context of trade policy. Although I
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explore legislative collaboration in the context of trade policy, an area where such relation-
ships have often been under-explored, my findings have more general implications. This
research, then, also contributes to the growing literature on legislative networks as a source
of cooperation and conflict at many stages of the policymaking process.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I briefly discuss the main strands
of the existing literature on trade policy making in the U.S. Congress. In the following
section, I discuss the ways in which our models of legislative decision-making on trade
policy could be improved by evaluating the potential role of inter-legislator connections. I
next present my research design and the data I rely upon to test my hypotheses. In the final
two sections, I discuss the results of my models, interpret these findings and conclude.
Trade Politics in Congress
The literature on trade politics extensively considers how constituency characteristics,
interest group behavior and member-level traits influence elected officials’ positions on
trade policy. A well-established empirical literature has tested these various explanations,
and has (to varying degrees) identified them as important determinants of trade policy mak-
ing.
A large focus has been placed on exploring how the composition of industries in a
district or state will lead a legislator to support particular policies (Krehbiel 1993; Bailey,
Goldstein and Weingast 1997; Gilligan 1997; Rogowski 1987; Busch and Reinhardt 1999;
Pincus 1975). For example, Coughlin (1985) noted that the presence of the automobile and
steel industries in particular Congressional districts increased the likelihood that a legislator
would vote in favor of a domestic content bill for automobile manufacturing. Allen and
Hopkins (1997) found that the percentage of state employment dedicated to textile and
apparel production had an impact on legislative voting on trade policy. Similarly, Tosini
and Tower (1987) found that support for textile quota legislation reflected a district’s overall
orientation toward foreign trade, i.e., export-oriented vs. import-competing.
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Although geographically-based constituencies are important, industry interests are also
active at the national level (see Fordham and Mckeown 2003). This can readily be seen in
the lobbying/PAC activity of manufacturers and trade associations. Campaign contributions
are likely to motivate, or at least subsidize, support for policies that are favorable to donors
and the industries they represent (Grossman and Helpman 1994; Hall and Deardorff 2006).
A number of empirical studies have found support for the so-called “protection for sale”
model of policy outcomes (Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000; Gawande and Hoekman
2006).
In addition to these district and interest group influences on trade policy making, a
host of other member-specific characteristics are also determinative of legislative behavior
on trade policy. Factors such as ideology and partisanship have been shown to influence
positions on trade (Nollen and Quin 1994; Whalen and Whalen 1990). Baldwin (1984), for
example, documents the partisan realignment on trade, as the Democratic party eventually
became the party most closely associated with trade protection. Other research suggests
that conservative members of Congress, who generally do not support an active role for the
government in the economy, are less likely to support measures that distort trade.
Although it is critical to appreciate the various ways in which district characteristics and
legislator attributes influence trade policy outcomes, the existing research often overlooks
important dynamics within the Congressional policymaking environment. How do legis-
lators’ interactions with their colleagues influence their support for particular bills? The
lack of attention to inter-legislator relationships is surprising in light of early trade politics
research, which recognized the impact of intra-institutional dealings as a key determinant
of policy outcomes (Schattschneider 1935).1
The omission of such considerations is especially surprising because trade policy is an
1In fact, the effect of log-rolling became so severe that Congress delegated many of its policymaking
duties on trade issues to the executive branch. Line-by-line decisions on tariffs, for example, were in large
part removed from the hands of legislators, who are more likely to be beholden to especially narrow interest
groups. That said, Congress retained a great deal of policy influence on trade, as it participates in passing
trade agreements, overseeing the administered protection process, and designing many trade policies of a
broader scope.
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issue area in which relational influences on legislative behavior may be particularly impor-
tant. As Strattman (1992) explained in a discussion of log-rolling, legislative bargaining is
most likely to take place in the context of policies that potentially provide large benefits to
a minority group and impose relatively low costs on others. Stated differently, legislators
facing low costs, i.e., those representing districts that are not directly affected by a policy,
may very well be willing to offer (or trade) their support for a piece of legislation that has
large economic implications for a select group of other legislators. This criteria applies in
full force to many of the policy areas most relevant to international trade, such as tariffs,
quotas, subsidies and price supports (Strattman 1992, 1995). A trade policy position that
is fundamental for one legislator’s agenda may very well be relatively unimportant to, and
thus negotiable for, another legislator. As the passage of major trade bills like CAFTA,
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act and many others illustrates, our understanding of trade policy
outcomes can be at best incomplete, and at worst misleading, if we underestimate the role
that inter-legislator relationships can play in the law making process.
To the extent that the trade politics literature has recognized the role of Congressional
interactions as an influence on policy outcomes, it has done so in a limited way. First,
this research has primarily focused on horse-trading exclusively in the context of roll call
voting. In particular, this research is often focused on log-rolling on a single vote or a
series of proximate votes, rather than exploring the effects of a broad range of legislative
relationships that unfold over time.2 This approach does not explain the role of other types
of legislative relationships/coalitions. Does a legislator’s long-term pattern of interaction
with a particular member of the chamber affect whether he or she supports bills that the
colleague introduces? Does shared membership in a Congressional grouping, such as a
committee or a state delegation, lead legislators to support each other’s policy proposals?
To answer these questions, I consider how a broader set of ongoing relationships may
impact support for trade policies.
2See, e.g., Schattschneider (1935); Strattman (1992); Irwin and Kroszner (1995, 1999).
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Legislative Networks and Trade Policy
The growing literature on legislative networks has pointed to a number of channels
through which legislators’ interactions can impact policymaking. Research has exam-
ined the potential influence of institutional structures, such as caucus groupings (Victor
and Ringe 2009), joint committee membership (Porter, Mucha, Newman and Warmbrand
2005), social relationships (Ringe, Victor and Gross 2012), and even members’ seating
assignments (Masket 2011). The legislative network variant that has received special atten-
tion relates to the relationships arising from bill sponsorship (Koger 2003; Fowler 2006a,
2006b; Sinclair 2008; Kirkland 2011). Studies considering (co)sponsorship have found
that bill sponsorship relationships can give rise to a number of network-based effects on
legislative behavior, such as coalition formation and reciprocity.
Cosponsorship provides an ideal setting to test these types of effects, as it is an inher-
ently relational behavior. Primary bill sponsors devote time and resources to introducing
bills (Schiller 1995; Sulkin 2005), and expend additional resources convincing other leg-
islators to cosponsor legislation through personal contacts and “Dear Colleague” letters
(Fowler 2006a). With respect to legislative outcomes, garnering cosponsorships can con-
tribute to a bill’s success, as research suggests that bills with a greater number of cosponsors
are more likely to be considered (Wilson and Young 1997; Bratton and Rouse 2011; Krutz
2005; Woon 2008). When a bill’s sponsor attracts cosponsorships, they are touted during
floor debate, in constituency communications and in campaign settings (Campbell 1982).
Cosponsorship is also an important activity from the cosponsor’s perspective. Although
in terms of resources cosponsoring a bill can often be a low cost activity, providing a
cosponsorship is properly viewed as more than mere cheap talk. First, cosponsorship is
viewed as a stronger show of support for legislation (and its sponsor) when compared
to simply providing a yea vote should the bill make it to the floor. Indeed, legislators
may offer a roll call vote in support of a bill while specifically declining to cosponsor
that same piece of legislation. Legislators have good reason not to take cosponsorship
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decisions lightly, as bill (co)sponsorship is a highly public decision that is observed by other
members of the legislature (Krehbiel 1995) and by electoral audiences (see, e.g., Goodliffe,
Rothenberg and Sanders 2004).3 This leads to a second, but related, point – cosponsorship
is highly selective. Unlike voting, which generally includes nearly all members of the
chamber, the average legislator cosponsors only a small percentage (approximately 2 or 3
percent) of all bills that are introduced (Hertherington 2001). As such, a show of support
with a cosponsorship is especially meaningful. Third, there are consequences to reneging
on a cosponsorship commitment. Bernhard and Sulkin (2013), for instance, find that a
failure to uphold a cosponsorship pledge is often met with retaliation from other legislators.
Providing support for legislation in this manner, then, is an important consideration for both
primary sponsors and cosponsors.4
In light of the importance attached to a cosponsorship decision, and the fact that such
decisions are inherently relational, recent research has begun to explore the ways in which
cosponsorship ties can lead to a host of network-based effects on legislative behavior. One
such effect is related to establishing trust and cooperative legislative relationships. By
creating and maintaining allies in the chamber, legislators are better able to advance their
own interests in the long term.
Beyond simply finding allies with compatible goals, however, legislators can also de-
velop relationships based on reciprocity. When legislators support the policy initiatives of
their colleagues, they increase the likelihood of receiving concomitant support for their own
initiatives (Burkett and Skvoretz 2005). Bratton and Rouse (2011), for instance, find that
3Krehbiel (1995) emphasizes bill sponsorship as an intra-institutional signal to other legislators that the
cosponsor supports the primary sponsor (see also Harward and Moffett 2010). Others emphasize the act of bill
sponsorship as a position taking activity targeted to actors outside Congress (see, e.g., Goodliffe, Rothenberg
and Sanders 2004).
4Sponsorship itself is an important area of study notwithstanding the fact that it takes places early in
the legislative process. Bill sponsorship has been found to affect levels of campaign contributions (Hall
and Deardorff 2006; Rocca and Gordon 2010) and may have an influence on a legislator’s reputation as an
effective representative (Weissert 1991). Even bills that do not ultimately get passed can influence the content
of future legislation (Koger 2003; Kessler and Krehbiel 1996) and facilitate the formation of legislative
coalitions (Bernhard and Sulkin 2013).
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legislative cosponsorship networks are characterized by reciprocity. They find that when
controlling for common ideology, common partisanship, district characteristics and a host
of other variables, legislators are more likely to provide support for colleagues who have
cosponsored a bill they have introduced. Similarly, Berhard and Sulkin (2013) emphasize
the ways in which cosponsorship can lead to a log-rolling dynamic, as it can be used to cre-
ate legislative coalitions. Several other recent empirical efforts arrive at results consistent
with these findings (see, e.g., Clark and Caro 2013; Cranmer and Desmarais 2011).
Internal memoranda from the office of former Representative/Senator John Heinz [R-
Pa] are instructive in this regard. Heinz, as an active participant in the trade policy making
process, and ultimately a chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on International Trade,
sponsored many trade bills during his tenure in office. His decisions relating to cospon-
sorship demonstrate that his office explicitly considered the ways in which supporting a
proposed piece of legislation with a cosponsorship could impact longer-term legislative
relationships. In one memo, a legislative aid advised Heinz to consider supporting a bill
introduced by Ernest Hollings [D-SC], noting that “Hollings was quick to cosponsor and
push your bill, and a return of the favor is appropriate.” In another note regarding a poten-
tial cosponsorship, Heinz was advised: “I have no objections [to cosponsoring a proposed
bill] but no interest either. If you have no problem with the concept I suggest you cosponsor
it so they’ll owe us one later on.” A final memo well-illustrates the expectations of reci-
procity that are part of cosponsorship choices. When Heinz was asked to cosponsor a bill
on the U.S. Export-Import Bank, sponsored by Dixon [D-Ill.], the legislative aide writing
the memo noted that
Dixon did not go on your [export-import] bill, so you do not owe him one.
However, the idea represents Dixon’s entree to the export finance issue and
forming an alliance with him has proven a successful strategy for circumvent-
ing the inaction/opposition of the Committee leadership on international issues
in the past.5
5These memorandum/notes were obtained from the Senator H. John Heinz III Archives at the
Carnegie Mellon University Libraries. Much of the collection is available in digital format at:
77
As these excerpts suggest, there are a number of key dynamics taking place in the context
of bill cosponsorship decisions. There are certainly expectations of reciprocity. Just as
in the context of roll call voting, cosponsorships appear to be the subject of log-rolling;
though, in some cases this dynaimc may not be explicit. Importantly, legislators also use
cosponsorship as a key mechanism through which to show support for colleagues and to
form ongoing working relationships. Members of Congress, then, are concerned with the
longer-term impact that their cosponsorship decisions may have on their legislative rela-
tionships with colleagues.
For these reasons, a legislator’s propensity to sponsor a piece of trade legislation is in
part determined by his or her relationship with the primary sponsor of that bill. As an
initial matter, I anticipate that the trade bill sponsorship network will be characterized by
reciprocity or “mutuality.” That is, if legislatori cosponsors legislatorj’s trade bill in the
current congress, I anticipate that legislatorj will be more likely to be a cosponsor on a
piece of legislatori’s trade legislation. This leads to Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1: The trade legislation (co)sponsorship network will be characterized by
reciprocity.
Hypothesis 1b: The trade legislation (co)sponsorship network will be characterized
by a higher degree of reciprocity than the equivalent cosponsorship network of other issue
areas.
Hypothesis 1 is intended to cover reciprocity within the context of a single Congress’s
trade bill sponsorship network, i.e., reciprocity occurring only in the context of trade legis-
lation introduced during this two-year period. Relationships of reciprocity, however, do not
http://digitalcollections.library.cmu.edu/portal/browse.jsp
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necessarily manifest themselves in the context of a single congress or issue area. They may
develop over a longer time frame and may cover additional issue areas. Legislators’ collab-
oration in other issue areas beyond trade may also bear on their propensity to support trade
legislation in the current Congress. Additionally, cooperation in a previous congress may
be indicative of a cooperate relationship that is not captured in the sponsorship behavior in
the current Congress. Such relationships make legislators more likely to extend support for
each other’s trade legislation in the present.
For this reason, I anticipate that prior collaboration will impact present cosponsorship
choices. Even when controlling for the host of factors that influence the likelihood that a
pair of legislators cooperate on a pending piece of trade legislation – such as similarities/
differences in ideology and constituency economic characteristics – I anticipate that high
levels of previous cosponsorship ties (or “connectedness”6) between two legislators will be
a strong predictor of their willingness to support a trade bill introduced by the other. This
discussion leads to my second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: A legislator that was highly connected to a trade bill’s primary sponsor
(in the previous Congress) is more likely to cosponsor the bill.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are concerned with cosponsorship-based ties between legislators.
My third hypothesis concerns another type of connection between legislators that relates to
their committee assignments. Shared membership on one or more committees provides an
opportunity for the formation of working relationships, which may also affect sponsorship
behavior (Bratton and Rouse 2011; Gross, Kirkland and Shalizi 2012). Unlike cospon-
sorship, membership on a committee does not necessarily reflect a legislator’s selective
decision to work with the other members of that committee. That said, shared committee
6Fowler uses the term “connectedness” to measure the extent of sponsorship-based cooperation between
a pair of legislators (Fowler 2006a, 2006b). Connectedness encompasses more than simply the frequency of
ties, but also accounts for the closeness of a given tie. I discuss this concept and the way that this variable is
operationalized below.
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membership can be viewed as a loose connection that might make the establishment of a
legislative relationship more likely for several reasons.
First, a bill is likely to be referred to a committee on which its primary sponsor sits
(Bratton and Rouse 2011). Accordingly, the primary sponsor has opportunities to secure
the support of fellow members of the committee of jurisdiction, who can become involved
with legislation in its early stages. Moreover, cosponsorships from relevant committee
members are often pursued actively, as the support of these legislators can help the bill
make it over early hurdles in the legislative process. Absent committee support, legislators
may be not inclined to introduce a bill from the onset.
Additionally, by working together on certain policy areas, legislators with shared com-
mittee assignments are well-positioned to draft legislation together. Long periods of com-
mittee service can lead legislators to develop expertise and a reputation for effective policy
making in an issue area (Kroszner and Stratmann 2000). Pairs of legislators who jointly
served on committees, then, have increased opportunities for collaboration and shared
knowledge of the relevant policy area. Several recent empirical studies have found sup-
port for the proposition that such relationships lead to collaboration outside the area of
trade policy (Bratton and Rouse 2011; Gross, Kirkland and Shalizi 2012; Clark and Caro
2013; Cranmer and Desmarais 2011).
In the context of trade legislation, the most relevant committee in the Senate is the
Committee on Finance. In the House, Ways and Means is the committee of jurisdiction
for most trade legislation. Although many trade-related bills touch on the jurisdiction of
other committees (e.g., Government Affairs, Commerce, Banking, Energy, etc.), legislation
pertaining to tariffs, quotas, customs regulations and trade agreements necessarily makes it
to Finance and Ways and Means (Whalen and Whalen 1990). As such, legislators who are
on these committees are particularly critical partners if a proposed trade bill is to have a
realistic chance of passage. For these reasons, I anticipate that two legislators who jointly
serve on these committees will be more likely to cosponsor each other’s legislation. This
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leads to Hypothesis 3:
Hypothesis 3: Joint membership on Finance/Ways and Means will increase the propen-
sity that two legislators share a sponsor-cosponsor tie on a trade bill.
I expect that inter-legislator connections – namely, previous patterns of (co)sponsorship
cooperation as well as common committee membership – are important predictors of a leg-
islator’s decision to cosponsor a pending piece of trade legislation. Although such network-
based considerations are likely to operate across many policy areas, such relational influ-
ences are particularly important in the context of trade policy. In this policy area, legislation
often has considerable implications for a minority group and imposes low costs on others.
Accordingly, unlike the many policy areas where legislators may be altogether hesitant to
negotiate away their preferred positions, trade policy is ripe for relationship-based influ-
ences on policy making (Strattman 1992, 1995).
Research Design & Data
To explore the relationship between legislative connections and trade policy making,
I run two types of statistical models. As an initial step, I run two sets of logit models
of cosponsorship choice. In these models, I explore the various factors that influence the
likelihood that a legislator chooses to cosponsor a piece of trade legislation. To preview the
findings here, I find support for the proposition that network-based effects are influencing
legislators’ cosponsorship decisions. These results suggest that a modeling strategy that
incorporates legislator-to-legislator interdependencies could more accurately capture the
formation of the trade bill cosponsorship network. Accordingly, I next specify a series
of exponential random graph models (“ERGMs” or “network models”) to more directly
consider the role of these relational processes.
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Table 3.1: Bill (Co)sponsorship Summary Statistics
103rd House 110th Senate
Total bills introduced 375 80
Bills introduced (Dem.) 202 46
Bills introduced (Rep.) 163 34
No. of Cosponsors 1573 282
Unique Sponsors 154 46
Figures are based upon the coding of the Congressional Bills Project Database.
I test my hypotheses in the U.S. Congress, in both the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives. My analysis includes both chambers, and two congresses that are separated by
12 years, to ensure that my hypotheses hold in varying economic/political environments.
For the Senate model, I rely on the 110th Congress (2007-2008), where Democrats con-
trolled Congress while the Republican Party held the Presidency. For the House models,
I relied on the 103rd Congress (1993-1994), when there was a period of unified govern-
ment under the Democrats. These periods also encompass some variation in terms of the
prevailing macroeconomic climate.7
My models of legislators’ cosponsorship choices are based on an analysis of all trade
bills in each Congress. The relevant set of legislation under consideration includes all bills
classified as “foreign trade” legislation, in accordance with the coding of the Policy Agen-
das Project/Congressional Bills Project. This includes bills that suspend or impose tariffs,
quotas and import licensing requirements, and can include other trade-related measures,
such as product standards and labeling requirements. The category also covers bills related
to negotiating and implementing trade agreements, changes to the administrative provision
of trade remedies, as well as bills related to currency regulation.
The data on (co)sponsorship were sourced from the THOMAS Congressional bills database,
7Models 1-3 are the logit models of Senate cosponsorship behavior, and Models 4-6 are logit models
examining House behavior. Models 7-9 are the ERGMs of House behavior, and Models 10-12 are ERGMS
covering Senate behavior.
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Figure 3.1: Trade Bill Cosponsorship Distributions
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and were compiled by Fowler (2006a, 2006b).8 Summary statistics indicating the number
of cosponsors per bill are summarized in Table 3.1 & Figure 3.1. Data on committee
membership are from Stewart and Woon (2012). Information on the construction of the nu-
merical ideology (NOMINATE) scores can be found in Poole and Rosenthal (1997). Data
on the economic profiles of legislators’ districts were obtained from a variety of sources,
including: Baldwin and Magee (2000), the U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Cen-
sus Bureau. Additional information regarding the data sources and the coding used in this
chapter can be found in the appendix.
(A) Logit Models
As noted above, I test my expectations in two steps. In the first stage, I rely on a
series of logit models. My unit of analysis is each legislator’s individual cosponsorship
opportunity – that is, each legislator’s decision whether or not to cosponsor a piece of trade
legislation. The unit of analysis is measured as a dyad, with each dyad containing a bill’s
primary sponsor and each of the potential cosponsors in the chamber. For instance, in the
Senate models, for each of the trade-related bills introduced in the 110th Congress, there
would be 99 cosponsorship opportunities (as the primary sponsor is excluded). Because
there are 75 relevant bills in the congress under consideration, my N for these models is
99 x 75 = 7425 dyads. The same approach is relied upon for the analysis of cosponsorship
decisions in the House. The dependent variable is coded as 1 if the potential cosponsor
ultimately cosponsored the piece of legislation in question; 0 otherwise.
The first key independent variable of interest, CONNECTEDNESS, is dyadic, and mea-
sures the degree of (co)sponsorship-based connectivity between each potential sponsor and
the legislator who sponsored the bill in question. I anticipate that previous cosponsor-
ship ties are representative of a relationship between the legislators that is predictive of
cooperation, even when controlling for underlying factors that may lead them to hold simi-
lar/divergent preferences on trade. CONNECTEDNESS is measured based on copsonsorship
8The data are available at: http://jhfowler.ucsd.edu/cosponsorship.htm.
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cooperation during the previous session of Congress.9
CONNECTEDNESS, however, is not simply measured as a count of dyadic sponsor-
cosponsor ties in the prior congress. Rather, each tie is weighted downward based on the
number of other legislators who cosponsored that same bill. This weighting scheme cap-
tures the different level of “connectedness” that may arise from any given act of cosponsor-
ship (Fowler 2006a). A number of bills, often ceremonial, or otherwise noncontroversial,
frequently obtain a large number of cosponsors. These bills do not necessarily reflect a
close relationship between the sponsor and all cosponsors. Where a bill has only 1 or a few
cosponsors, in contrast, each of those cosponsorship ties is likely to be indicative of a more
selective and higher intensity relationship between the cosponsor(s) and primary sponsor.
CONNECTEDNESS, therefore, is calculated with a weighting scheme where each previous
cosponsorship tie contributes 1
total#cosponsors
to the dyadic connectedness score.
I anticipate a positive relationship between CONNECTEDNESS and my dependent vari-
able. Closer working relationships in the past are likely to impact a current decision
whether or not to support pending trade legislation.
The next variables relate to relevant committee memberships. I include variables to de-
note shared committee assignments between each potential cosponsor and the bill’s primary
sponsor. In the Senate, the key committee of jurisdiction for trade legislation is Finance.
JOINT FINANCE is coded as 1 if both the primary sponsor and the potential cosponsor sit
on the committee. In the House, the key committee is Ways and Means, and JOINT WAYS
AND MEANS is coded in the same manner. These committees are the most important
for trade legislation in the two chambers. I anticipate that shared committee membership
facilitates legislative relationships that are relevant to the trade bill sponsorship process.
Accordingly, these variables should have a positive relationship with the formation of a bill
9Using cooperation in the current congress would be inappropriate for two reasons. First, if the entire
Congress was considered, I would be improperly including connections that formed after the bill under con-
sideration was introduced, see, e.g., Gross and Kirkland (2012). Second, to use only those connections that
occurred before the bill in question would improperly suggest that there was little connectivity between leg-
islators early in the Congress, as few bills would have been sponsored at that point.
85
cosponsorship tie.
I include a host of control variables related to district economic characteristics and
member-level traits. In the discussion that follows, I describe the variables used in the
model of cosponsorship choice in the Senate. Unless otherwise noted, the variables are
calculated in an analogous manner for the House versions of the models.
The first four variables are included to capture similarities/differences between the two
legislators in the dyad under consideration. NOMINATE DIFF. is included to account for
the ideological distance between the subject legislator and the bill’s primary sponsor. This
variable is measured as the absolute difference between the two legislators’ NOMINATE
scores. I anticipate that higher values for this variable will have a negative effect on the
likelihood of a cosponsorship tie forming. Another variable that measures a similar dy-
namic between legislators is SAME PARTY. SAME PARTY is coded as 1 if both legislators
are members of the same political party. Naturally, I anticipate that common partisanship
will have a positive relationship with the probability that two legislators cosponsor a trade
bill. As these two variables were highly collinear, only one could be included in the models
at a time. As discussed below, the results are comparable regardless of which variable is
included.
EXP-IMP RATIO DIFF. captures the differences in manufacturing profile between two
legislators’ states. The export-import ratio for each state is measured as the number of jobs
in exporting industries divided by the number of jobs in import-competing industries (Bald-
win and Magee 2000). Industries were divided into export-oriented/import-competing cat-
egories based upon whether the U.S. is a net exporter in the related SIC (4-digit) category
under consideration. EXP-IMP RATIO DIFF., then, is the absolute difference in the export-
import ratio between the two legislators. I anticipate that two legislators that both represent
states with internationally competitive manufacturing industries, or two legislators both
representing less competitive industries, will be more likely to have common positions on
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trade legislation. In contrast, where they represent dissimilar industries, i.e., EXP-IMP RA-
TIO DIFF. is large, they will be less likely to collaborate on trade legislation. As such,
I expect that this variable will have a negative relationship with a legislator’s decision to
cosponsor the bill in question.
SAME STATE is included to capture dynamics arising from representation of a single
state (Gross 2008). Legislators from the same state could be more likely to support each
other’s legislation for a number of reasons. It could be that these legislators face similar
constituency pressures as a result of representing adjacent or proximate (and thus poten-
tially similar) districts. It might also be the case that the legislators have other types of ties
to each other. In the House, for example, Matthews and Stimson (1975) note that, based
on interviews with a randomly selected sample of representatives, a member’s state party
delegation was the most frequently mentioned source of policy-relevant cues. Kingdon
(1989) notes that state delegations are a particularly valued source of information because
of the trust that develops between legislators over time.10 Similar dynamics might arise in
the Senate, depending on the partisan balance of a state’s Senate representation (Schiller
2000). A glance at overall levels of cosponsorship trends does suggest that there is lo-
calized grouping in terms of legislators’ level of participation in trade policy. See Figure
3.2.
The next set of variables are monadic, and relate to attributes of individual legislators.
I include LABOR PAC $ to account for the role of labor contributions on a legislator’s
propensity to participate in trade policy making. Organized labor has long been active
in the trade policy arena, and a relationship with these interest groups might influence
policy choices. For similar reasons, UNIONIZATION is included. The variable is coded as
the number of unionized workers as a share of workers in the state. DISTRICT MFG. is
10In addition to shared information, there are practical reasons to act consistently with one’s delegation.
Delegation solidarity on an issue gives increased leverage for the delegation’s position as it engages in House-
wide bargaining. There are also “defensive” reasons to ensure that ones policy stance falls in line with other
members of a state delegation; for example, doing so can make it easier to justify one’s position to his or her
constituency (see generally Matthews and Stimson 1975; Truman, 1956; Kingdon 1989).
87
included to account for the composition of a state’s economy. States that rely heavily on
manufacturing sectors for income and employment will typically be more affected by trade
policy than districts that are more service oriented.11 Accordingly, legislators representing
these states should be more likely to take a leading role in sponsoring and supporting trade
legislation. I anticipate that these three variables will have a positive relationship with
cosponsorship.
In addition to the above variables, I experimented with several other controls to ensure
the robustness of my findings. For example, I ran the models including 19 variables to
denote the proportion of state employment in each of the 19 two-digit SIC manufacturing
employment categories.12 I also ran models including district UNEMPLOYMENT and EDU-
CATIONAL ATTAINMENT, as well as MAJORITY PARTY status of the potential cosponsor.
Doing so did not alter the findings reported.
(B) Network Model (ERGM)
In stage two of my analysis, I rely on a network (ERGM) model to explore the factors
that lead to a “tie” (i.e., a sponsorship-cosponsorship relationship) forming between two
legislators in the context of trade legislation. In Models 1-6, I roughly approximated such
network-type effects by including variables denoting several dyadic relationships in a re-
gression analysis. In Models 7-12, I more directly test these relational effects in a context
where unit independence is not assumed (see, e.g., Snijders et. al. 2006). This will permit
me to fully assess the relative importance of network-based effects on bill cosponsorship
11Agricultural sectors also have their own relationship with the trade policy-making process. However,
during the period under consideration, agri-trade policy is more prominent in the area of subsidy-related
legislation than in the context of traditional trade measures that make up the bulk of the Congressional Bills
Project’s “foreign trade” category.
12The manufacturing employment data for each congressional district are aggregated at the two-digit Stan-
dard Industrial Classification code level. The manufacturing categories are: (20) Food & Kindred Products;
(21) Tobacco Products; (22) Textile Mill Products; (23) Apparel & Other Textile Products; (24) Lumber &
Wood Products; (25) Furniture & Fixtures; (26) Paper & Allied Products; (27) Printing & Publishing; (28)
Chemical & Allied Products; (29) Petroleum & Coal Products; (30) Rubber & Miscellaneous Plastics Prod-
ucts; (31) Leather & Leather Products; (32) Stone, Clay, & Glass Products; (33) Primary Metal Industries;
(34) Fabricated Metal Products; (35) Industrial Machinery & Equipment; (36) Electronic & Other Electric
Equipment; (37) Transportation Equipment; (38) Instruments & Related Products.
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choice while also accounting for the standard member/district-level characteristics. As
above, the ERGMs presented here cover legisative (co)sponsorship behavior in the 103rd
House and the 110th Senate.
The dependent variable in the analysis is the sociomatrix representing the realized
cosponsorship ties on all trade bills in the Congress under consideration. Therefore, the
matrix is n x n, where n equals the number of legislators in the chamber being considered.
A 1 in cellij within the matrix represents a tie between Legislatori and Legislatorj . Ties are
directed, and a 1 represents an outbound tie from the cosponsoring legislator (in the row) to
the primary sponsor of the bill (column). Therefore, cellij is not necessarily equal to cellji.
The network is dichotomized, and a tie (or “edge”) between the legislators is counted as
present as long there is at least one episode of cosponsorship on a trade bill between the
two legislators during the Congress under consideration (Cho and Fowler 2010).13 Figure
3.1 provides a visual representation of the trade bill cosponsorship network in the 110th
Senate.
Ties within the observed network clearly do not form at random, and the independent
variables in the analysis can be thought of as the factors that influence the probability of
a tie forming between pairs of legislators. As above, several of these variables are mea-
sured dyadically, including the key independent variables CONNECTEDNESS and JOINT
FINANCE. Several other dyadic variables account for the ways in which similarities or dif-
ferences between two legislators impact their propensity to cosponsor legislation together
(i.e., “homophily” effects). These include NOMINATE DIFF., EXP-IMP RATIO DIFF.,
SAME PARTY and SAME STATE. “Nodal” variables capture the factors that make an indi-
vidual legislator more likely to form an edge (i.e., participate in cosponsorship episodes)
with other legislators in general. These include variables such as DEMOCRAT and DIS-
TRICT MFG.
Thus far, the variables discussed are analogous to those included in the logit models.
13The choice to dichotomize the network is not a controversial one here, as the vast majority of ties resulted
from a small number of cosponsorships between the legislators.
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Figure 3.2: Trade Bill Network; 110th Senate
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I also include two network terms in the ERGM. EDGES is included to denote the overall
number of ties in the trade bill sponsorship network, as this clearly bears on the odds of a
tie forming between any two nodes. This can be thought of as an intercept term within the
ERGM framework.
One of the advantages of network models is that we are able to include variables that
relate to overall network tendencies. This type of term is often referred to as endogenous,
as it captures the influence of the network on the behavior of nodes, as opposed to extra-
network characteristics, such as district-level manufacturing characteristics or partisanship.
I include a term, MUTUALITY to capture reciprocity in the context of the trade bill
sponsorship networks under consideration here. This variable accounts for the tendencies
of nodes to “return the favor” when a legislator cosponsors a bill that they have introduced.
I anticipate a positive coefficient on this variable. (As noted above, this variable captures
reciprocity specifically within the context of trade legislation with 110th Senate and the
103rd House, while the CONNECTEDNESS variable accounts for log-rolling type behavior
across time and issue areas.)
I also include a term denoted as GWESP, short for “geometrically weighted edgewise
shared partners,” that is designed to account for another higher-order dependency within
the network structure. Specifically, the variable GWESP captures “transitivity” – or the
propensity of triangles to close – within the cosponsorship network. In practice, this means
that whenever two actors share a tie to a common partner, it is increasingly likely that
those two actors will also share a tie between themselves: if Legislatorj supports a bill
introduced by Legislatori, and Legislatorh also supports a bill by Legislatori, it is more
likely that Legislators h and j will support each other’s bills as well.14
A number of scholars have found support for the notion that there is transitivity in
14I include a parametric version of the GWESP term, which gives each additional “shared” partner a
smaller positive impact on the probability of two persons forming a tie. This variable has fewer problems
associated with model convergence compared with a standard “triangle” term (Goodreau, Kitts, and Morris
2009.). Relying on a GWESP term, the user can select the discount or decay rate of the influence of each
additional shared partner. I experimented with multiple scaling parameters, and the results were consistent
regardless of my choice of decay parameter (see Goodreau et al 2008)
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cosponsorship behavior. As Bratton and Rouse (2011) explain, “we find that the associates
of each legislator are relatively likely to cosponsor together, even after taking into account
a host of other powerful effects” (445). Work by Cho and Fowler (2010) and Cranmer
and Desmarais (2011) also find support for transitivity in cosponsorship networks. These
friend-of-a-friend-is-my-friend dynamics could result from a host of social network influ-
ences. Perhaps transitivity reflects one legislator coordinating support among his or her
colleagues by playing a leadership role (see Goodreau, Kitts, and Morris 2009 for a discus-
sion of transitive processes). It could also reflect the propensity of Congressional groupings
to form. This latter point is an especially important consideration in the context of trade
legislation, as many legislators are members of key industry-level caucuses. The Congres-
sional steel, coal and textile caucuses, for example, have often been very active in trade
policy. Through these sub-network organizations, legislators are often lobbied as a group
to support particular pieces of legislation. As a result of these types of social network dy-
namics, we may see groupings of two or three or more legislators sponsoring bills together
at an increased rate (see Bratton and Rouse 2011; Cho and Fowler 2010). For my purposes
here, the important point is that – regardless of the precise causal processes that fosters
transitivity in a given case – I am able to control for these effects in the ERGM context.
Results & Analysis
The results of my models provide support for my hypotheses. Inter-legislator connec-
tions – namely, previous bill sponsorship collaboration and shared committee membership
– can help us to explain legislators’ propensity to support trade bills introduced by their
colleagues. These findings are robust to a host of control variables, as well as substantially
different modeling approaches.
I start by briefly considering the logit models. The results from these models (Models
1-6) are contained in TABLE 3.2. With respect to my key independent variables, CON-
NECTEDNESS is statistically significant at the .01 level. This result is consistent with my
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expectation that legislators are more likely to have a sponsor-cosponsor tie form with col-
leagues that they have collaborated with in the past. Additionally, joint membership on
relevant committees also increases the odds of a tie forming. JOINT FINANCE and JOINT
WAYS AND MEANS were both positive and statistically significant at (at least) the .05
threshold.15
The other variables generally performed as expected. The coefficient on NOMINATE
DIFF. is negative and statistically significant. As the ideological difference between the
primary bill sponsor and a potential cosponsor increases, the likelihood of cosponsorship
decreases. In an alternate specification, I used shared partisanship (SAME PARTY) as an-
other measure of ideological similarity. This variable also performed as expected, yielding
a positive and statistically significant coefficient. As the ideology and partisanship vari-
ables are highly collinear, only one could be included in the models at a time. I rely on
the NOMINATE DIFFERENTIAL variable for subsequent models, as its inclusion led to
slightly better model fit.
The export/import orientation of a legislator’s district mattered as well. As the manu-
facturing profiles of two legislators’ constituencies diverged (i.e., EXP-IMP RATIO DIFF.
got larger), the legislators were less likely to cosponsor each other’s legislation. This find-
ing was statistically significant and robust across models. DEMOCRAT was positive as
well, indicating that Democratic partisanship (regardless of the similarity or difference be-
tween legislators ideology/partisanship) had an independent positive effect on consponsor-
ing trade legislation. The positive effect of this variable is likely attributable to the party’s
representation of vulnerable worker populations and its comparatively close relationship
with organized labor (see Baldwin 1994). Additional evidence with respect to labor’s pos-
ture towards trade policy is provided by the positive coefficients on UNIONIZATION and
15I also experimented with variables to explore whether joint membership on other committees appeared
to make cosponsorship ties more likely. By and large, common service on other committees did not lead
to a robust relationship with legislators’ trade bill sponsorship propensities. Interestingly, however, joint
membership on the House Foreign Affairs Committee was positive and significant, while joint membership
on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations was not.
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Table 3.2: Logit Models of Cosponsorship
Senate (110th) House (103rd)
Mod. 1 Mod. 2 Mod. 3 Mod. 4 Mod. 5 Mod. 6
INTERCEPT -3.30** -3.45** -4.40** -4.73** -4.77** -6.14**
(0.22) (0.23) (0.22) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Individual
DEMOCRAT 0.47** 0.44** 0.58** 0.70** 0.71** 0.68**
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
DISTRICT MFG. 3.50** 3.77** 3.70** 2.18** 2.21** 2.55**
(1.14) (1.15) (1.15) (0.83) (0.84) (0.84)
Dyadic
NOMINATE DIFF. -1.44** -1.41** -1.97** -1.98**
(0.22) (0.22) (0.11) (0.12)
SAME PARTY 0.60** 1.02**
(0.13) (0.07)
EXP/IMP MFG. DIFF. -0.23** -0.21** -0.22** -0.17** -0.18** -0.16**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
SAME STATE 1.23** 0.14 0.11 1.43** 1.24** 1.29**
(0.33) (0.54) (0.55) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
CONNECTEDNESS 0.05** 0.05** 0.66** 0.66**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06)
JOINT COMMITTEE 0.03** 0.03** 0.38** 0.39**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.17) (0.17)
AIC 2203.4 2182.7 2209.7 13874 13775 13860
BIC 2245.0 2238.1 2265.1 13933 13854 13939
N 7425 7425 7425 150510 150510 150510
Models 1-6 are standard logit models. The dependent variable is binary, and is coded as 1
if the subject legislator cosponsored the bill in question, and 0 otherwise.
* indicates significance at p < 0.05; ** at < 0.01
LABOR CONTRIBUTIONS.
The most important conclusion from the logit models is that there are inter-legislator
dynamics at work. Connections between legislators arising from previous legislative col-
laboration and joint committee membership facilitate cooperation on trade legislation. In-
cluding such variables led to a non-negligible increase in model fit.
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In addition to the robustness of the relationship between CONNECTEDNESS and JOINT
COMMITTEE and the dependent variable, it is worth noting that the effects are substan-
tively meaningful. I calculated the predicted probability of cosponsorship ties forming
while varying the values of the key variables. A one standard deviation increase in CON-
NECTEDNESS, holding other variables at their means/median values, led to a 12 percent
increase in the odds of a legislator cosponsoring the bill. The substantive effect of joint
committee membership was even higher. For instance, a pair of legislators that both served
on Ways and Means were 66 percent more likely to cosponsor a trade bill together than
a dyad composed of legislators not on the committee. To put these figures in perspective,
a one standard deviation increase in NOMINATE DIFF. led to an 46 percent decrease
in the probability of sponsorship; a one standard deviation increase in EXP/IMP RATIO
DIFF. led to a 13 percent decrease in the probability of a cosponsorship. In short, con-
nections between legislators appear to be important factors in determining cosponsorship
decisions. With these dynamics in mind, I next turn to the network models, which permit
me to directly account for these inter-legislator dependencies.
The results from Models 7-12 (ERGMs) provide evidence consistent with my earlier
findings. For presentation of the results, I have sorted the variables by type, reflecting
their nodal, dyadic or network-wide character. The models were fit using the R package
“ERGM”. See TABLES 3.3 AND 3.4.
My independent variables, by and large, performed as anticipated. CONNECTEDNESS
was again positive and significant at the .05 threshold. A higher degree of connectedness
between two legislators (measured in the previous congress) was associated with an in-
crease in the odds of those legislators forming a sponsor-cosponsor tie on a trade bill in
the current congress. This result provides strong support for Hypothesis 2. Even when
controlling for a variety of factors that determine legislators’ positions on trade policy, leg-
islative relationships appear to exert an influence on sponsorship decisions. These results
were consistent in both the House and Senate models.
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Table 3.3: Network Models of Cosponsorship
House (103rdth)
Mod. 7 Mod. 8 Mod. 9
Nodal Terms
DEMOCRAT 0.70** 0.69** 0.37**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.02)
Dyadic Terms
NOMINATE DIFF. -1.47** -1.48** -1.30**
(0.21) (0.12) (0.05)
EXP/IMP RATIO DIFF. -0.16** -0.17** -0.12**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.02)
SAME STATE 1.01** 1.03** 1.30**
(0.10) (0.10) (0.04)
CONNECTEDNESS 0.16** 0.12**
(0.06) (0.03)
JOINT COMMITTEE 1.40** 0.48**
(0.18) (0.13)
Network Terms
EDGES -5.48** -5.54** -3.64**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.05)
MUTUAL 0.41**
(0.06)
GWESP† 0.48**
(0.04)
GW-INDEGREE -6.78**
(1.49)
AIC 1374 1304 1281
BIC 1418 1362 1346
Models 7-9 are exponential random graph models.
* indicates significance at p < 0.05; ** at p < 0.01.
† “geometrically weighted edgewise shared partner”.
I received strong support for Hypothesis 3. Common membership on the key commit-
tees of jurisdiction, Ways and Means in the House and Finance in the Senate, had a posi-
tive effect on the probability of cosponsorship. The coefficient on JOINT FINANCE/JOINT
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Table 3.4: Network Models of Cosponsorship
Senate (110th)
Mod. 10 Mod. 11 Mod. 12
Nodal Terms
DEMOCRAT 0.69** 0.72** 0.42**
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
Dyadic Terms
NOMINATE DIFF. -1.06** -0.70*
(0.35) (0.33)
EXP/IMP RATIO DIFF. -0.28** -0.25* -0.17
(0.12) (0.l2) (0.11)
SAME STATE 1.31** 1.44** 1.60**
(0.42) (0.42) (0.46)
CONNECTEDNESS 0.70** 0.49*
(0.24) (0.23)
JOINT COMMITTEE 1.41** 0.81**
(0.23) (0.18)
Network Terms
EDGES -4.56** -5.30** -5.29**
(0.25) (0.33) (0.33)
MUTUAL -1.78
(1.08)
GWESP† 1.67** 1.73**
(0.11) (0.18)
AIC 1374 1304 1281
BIC 1418 1362 1346
Models 10-12 are exponential random graph models.
* indicates significance at p < 0.05; ** at p < 0.01.
† “geometrically weighted edgewise shared partner”.
WAYS AND MEANS was positive and statistically significant across specifications. These
results are consistent with my hypothesis that when legislators sit on committees together,
the potential for collaboration and cooperation increases.
Hypothesis 1 received mixed support. In the House model, MUTUAL was positive and
statistically significant at the .01 threshold, indicating the presence of a highly reciprocal
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network. This finding was in accord with expectation. In the Senate model, however, the
variable had a negative coefficient, though its p-value did not reach conventional levels
of statistical significance. The difference between the performance of MUTUAL across
chambers may be a function of the relative density of the two networks. In the House, far
more trade bills are introduced on a per congress basis. Accordingly, there are an increased
number of opportunities for this type of quid pro quo type behavior to emerge. In the
Senate, in contrast, the number of opportunities to reciprocate are reduced. Additionally,
a substantial portion of proposed change to trade policy can take the form of amendments.
Taken together, these factors may explain the differences in levels of reciprocity in the trade
bill network.
It also bears noting that reciprocity was particularly pronounced in the area of trade
policy, consistent with Hypothesis 1b. Figure 3.3 shows the level of edgewise reciprocity,
while controlling for the density of the network. Stated differently, for each issue area, the
figure shows the log-odds that a tie (cosponsorship) is reciprocated, when accounting for
the baseline probability of a tie forming in the network (Butts 2008). (Such a measure is
critical, as there is high variation of network density across issue areas. Some issue areas
resemble “small world” networks with relatively few participants; others see extremely
broad rates of participation. See Figure 3.6 in the Appendix for an illustration) As the figure
shows, the Foreign Trade legislation network is among the most reciprocated networks
across the major issue areas. The traditionally most partisan issue areas, such as Social
Welfare and Labor and Employment and related areas, were far less likely to see this level
of reciprocity. This finding emphasizes the potential importance of relational effects in the
trade policy context.
The other variables performed largely as anticipated. The coefficient on NOMINATE
DIFF was negative and statistically significant at the .01 threshold. As the difference be-
tween two legislators’ ideologies increased, the pair of legislators became increasingly un-
likely to cosponsor a bill together. In an alternate model, relying on common partisanship
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Figure 3.3: Reciprocity - A Cross-Issue Comparison
instead of a continuous ideology score, legislators of the same party were far more likely
to form a sponsor-cosponsor tie. (As above, very high collinearity between these measures
required that I include one term at a time. The results were consistent regardless of the
variable used, see Models 8/9, 11/12). Being from the same state had a positive impact on
legislators’ propensity to sponsor bills together. This could be the result of district com-
monalities or potential inter-legislator influences (e.g., party delegation). The most critical
point, here, is that notwithstanding the inclusion of these additional variables, there still
appears to be significant network-based effects on cosponsorship.
I also note that several of the monadic variables that were part of the logit models were
removed from the ERGM specification, as they did not contribute to model fit. In the
ERGM context, including terms that do not contribute to replicating the underlying data
generating process often leads to model degeneracy (Cranmer and Desmarais 2011). To
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the extent that this is a limitation of network models (which is not necessarily clear), any
potential concern regarding the omitted variables is limited here in light of the consistent
results I achieved across numerous logit/ERMG specifications.
Other network-based processes appear to be at work as well. GWESP was positive
and statistically significant across models. The positive and significant coefficient on this
term is indicative of transitivity. In short, this result indicates that if two legislators share
one (or more) cosponsorship partners, they are more likely to form a connection among
themselves.
As in the context of logit models, we can interpret the coefficients in terms of log-odds.
The odds of a cosponsorship tie forming between two legislators whose CONNECTEDNESS
score was a standard deviation above the mean score was about 4.6 higher than a cospon-
sorship tie forming between two legislators of only average connectedness. The odds of a
cosponsorship tie forming between two legislators who jointly serve on the key commit-
tee of jurisdiction was over 2 times higher than a pair of legislators that do not both sit
on the committee. Consistent with the earlier models, then, the effects of network-based
influences on sponsorship behavior are substantial.
With respect to the ERGMs’ general performance, inclusion of the inter-legislator con-
nections variables – i.e., CONNECTEDNESS and JOINT COMMITTEE – improved the model
fit (as measured by AIC) over a baseline version of the model. Including the GWESP term
to account for transitivity also had a large impact on the fit of the model. It appears that
network effects are at work, and are important to understanding legislators’ behavior when
it comes to cosponsoring legislation.16
Another way to assess the goodness of fit of a network model is to examine how well
the model specified generates a network that closely represents the underlying data. One
way to do so is to simulate many networks and see how often global attributes that were
16The results with respect to two of the variables were slightly different in the ERGM model. Although
they remained positive, EXP/IMP RATIO. DIFF. and DISTRICT MFG. were no longer statistically significant
influences on cosponsorship behavior. This suggests that we have to be careful to account for relational
influences when modeling trade-related legislative behavior.
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predicted by the model are reflected in the observed data. For instance, we might ask:
does our model do a good job of approximating the average number of connections entered
into by each legislator? Approximating the average number of shared partners between
two nodes? To make such an assessment, I simulated 100 networks and compiled the
in-degree, out-degree, edgewise shared-partner, and minimum geodesic distance statistics
for these networks. I plotted the distribution of these global statistics from the simulated
models against the observed values for each statistic. See Figures 3.4 and 3.5. In these
figures, the thick line represents each of the four goodness of fit statistic’s distribution in
the original network. The plots represent the distribution across all 100 simulated networks
of the statistic in question (with the 95 percent bounds on these distributions demarcated).
The plots demonstrate that the estimated networks do a good job of approximating the
underlying data, as the line denoting the “true” value falls within the estimated range.17
It is also worth noting that the models converged well by all accounts. Several diag-
nostic tools that are implemented in R are useful for assessing convergence (see Goodreau
et al. 2008). I used the mcmc.diagnostics function in the R package “coda” (Plummer,
Best, Cowles, and Vines 2007) to examine model statistics during the last iteration of the
MCMC estimation procedure. The plots and histograms generated by the function show
that the predicted values for my covariates are stable, as they vary stochastically around the
mean value. Because the plots do not show any signs of trending we can be confident that
the model properly converged. Additionally, the results indicate very low autocorrelation
in the Markov chains.
To summarize, all of the models provide support for the proposition that inter-legislator
connections have an important influence on the propensity of legislators to provide cospon-
sorship each other’s bills. As the results of the ERGMs suggest, there are dyadic and
higher-order network effects at work. Properly incorporating such dependencies in the
cosponsorship network substantially increased the fit of the model. Accounting for these
17The plots were created with the “coda” package in R (Plummer, Best, Cowles, and Vines 2007).
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Figure 3.4: 103rd House - True vs. Simulated Networks
effects also had an impact on the performance of several variables that are typically relied
upon to explain trade policy positions.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have explored how legislators’ ongoing relationships with colleagues
impact their cosponsorship decisions. The literature on trade policy typically emphasizes
member-level and constituency characteristics as key determinants of policy choice. These
factors, however, should not be privileged to the exclusion of intra-institutional dynamics
that influence policy making as well. Here, I draw attention to the ways in which working
relationships between legislators can also contribute to explaining support for particular
trade policies.
The level of connectedness between a primary bill sponsor and a potential cosponsor
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Figure 3.5: 110th Senate - True vs. Simulated Networks
had a robust positive relationship with the propensity of a cosponsorship tie to form. Even
when controlling for a host of constituency and ideological factors that influence trade pol-
icy positions, connectedness predicted cosponsorship. Legislators who work together to
introduce legislation develop relationships, and once established, these relationships influ-
ence the likelihood of future cooperation. Other types of connections, such as those arising
from common committee membership, also provide increased opportunities for collabora-
tion. Two legislators’ joint participation on a relevant legislative committee (specifically
Finance and Ways and Means) increases the likelihood of sponsor-cosponsor tie forming
on trade bills in the 103rd and 110th Congresses. These results were robust to numerous
model specifications and alternate modeling strategies, including both standard logit and
exponential random graph (network) models. In addition to helping to explain the trade
policy making process, my findings also contribute to the recent work that highlights the
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role of network-based effects on legislative behavior more generally.
By integrating models of legislator-level characteristics with models that account for
relational determinants of policy choice, we are better able to approximate the actual leg-
islative process. Because of my substantive focus on a single issue area (foreign trade),
I was able to incorporate network-related considerations into a model containing several
variables that are highlighted in the trade policy literature. This approach allowed me to
examine the relative effect of these two sets of influences on trade-related legislative be-
havior. The analysis here suggests that we can improve upon existing models that ignore
interdependencies in legislators’ trade policy decisions.
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4 THE REPERCUSSIONS OF REALIGNMENT: US-CHINA
INTERDEPENDENCE AND EXCHANGE RATE POLITICS
Manufacturing and primary goods sectors are generally considered to be the principal
beneficiaries of a weaker currency. Many of these industries and the elected officials who
represent them, however, have opposed legislation designed to combat the dollar’s overval-
uation relative to the Chinese yuan. I argue that legislators are hesitant to take aggressive
action on the exchange rate issue because doing so could lead to a disruption of the broader
US-China economic relationship. The threat of an economic conflict is a particularly im-
portant consideration in the context of currency bills, where proposed legislation is linked
to trade policy and other areas of international economic regulation. A Bayesian statistical
analysis of legislative behavior on two recent exchange rate bills in the US Congress pro-
vides overall support for my hypotheses. Legislators with ties to business interests that rely
heavily on the Chinese economy were likely to oppose the bills, while the strongest sup-
port came from legislators representing import-competing domestic producers. The results
highlight the ways in which bilateral exchange rate politics, and US-China interactions
more generally, are shaped by economic interdependencies.
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In recent years, few US foreign economic policy issues have generated more atten-
tion than the role of currency movements on manufacturing sector competitiveness. As
the Chinese economy became the second largest in the world, and the largest source of
global exports, the relative value of the yuan took on increased importance. The eco-
nomic environment also contributed to the heightened concerns, as the US dealt with the
highest unemployment rates in decades and decreased job growth in many manufacturing
industries. Elected officials decried the competitive disadvantages faced by US producers,
arguing that currency misalignments harmed firms operating in domestic and foreign mar-
kets. In response to these concerns, Senator Sherrod Brown and a number of cosponsors
introduced the Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act. The bill, not the first of its
kind, sought to punish countries for artificially holding down currency values. Although
the proposal received substantial support, legislators representing states with high levels
of manufacturing and agricultural production were not uniformly behind the bill. What
generated opposition to the legislation if dollar overvaluation is a chief concern for these
sectors?
I argue that political alignments on exchange rate legislation reflect the importance
of economic interdependencies between the US and China. Even if many sectors might
benefit from a dollar that is weaker vis-a`-vis the yuan and other major currencies, a battle
on currency policy could lead to a costly economic conflict. This is a particularly important
concern in the context of exchange rate bills, where proposed policies are tied (sometimes
explicitly) to other areas of international economic policy.
Recent currency legislation, for instance, has contemplated imposing punitive tariffs on
countries deemed to be “currency manipulators.” Such an aggressive step might also lead to
retaliatory trade protection from abroad, and these tit-for-tat policy measures would entail
severe implications for a variety of US-based economic interests. First, many firms would
face substantial costs if additional tariffs were placed on Chinese goods. For instance,
these duties would harm US retailers who source goods from China. Second, beyond the
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measures imposed by the US, China might respond with changes to its own trade and
investment policy. This would have adverse consequences for industries that rely on China
as an export market, a location for production or a source of capital. Legislative behavior on
currency policy reflects these interdependencies between the two economies. Legislators
whose constituencies rely heavily on China as an economic partner are likely to oppose
such legislation. Importantly, even many US industries that might otherwise support the
ostensible goals of realignment legislation – obtaining a relatively weaker dollar – actually
find themselves opposing the proposed currency bills.
I test my hypotheses through a Bayesian statistical analysis of legislative behavior in
the context of two recent pieces of high-profile currency legislation introduced in the US
Congress. Using district and state-level economic data, as well as data on financial con-
tributions to legislators, I find support for my expectations. Legislators who received con-
tributions from US businesses that are economically dependent on China were more likely
to withhold support for the legislation. Constituency economic characteristics were impor-
tant factors as well; legislators from districts that export extensively to the Chinese market
were less likely to support the bills. In contrast, legislators representing comparatively
disadvantaged producers, many of which have a primarily competitive relationship with
Chinese producers, often supported the legislation. These results were robust to a host of
controls for district-level manufacturing profiles and labor market characteristics, as well
as legislator-level variables. In addition to the results of the quantitative analysis, the floor
debate on these currency bills indicates that members of Congress appreciated the potential
costs associated with triggering an economic conflict with a critical trade partner.
Recent research has shown that factors such as international competitiveness and capital-
intensity (Oatley 2010), reliance on foreign inputs and industry pass-through (Broz and
Werfel 2014) and balance sheet criteria (Walter 2008) determine the extent to which firms
are affected by currency movements. In addition to these considerations, this chapter high-
lights another way in which economic interdependence can shape political behavior on
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the exchange rate. The potential for exchange rate conflicts to spill over into trade and
investment policy is a key concern for legislators determining their positions on currency
legislation.
Additionally, the connection between trade and exchange rate policy cannot be over-
stated. In many cases, these policies are substitutable, and it makes little sense to consider
them in isolation. Doing so has long been a weakness in the exchange rate literature –
a weakness that has only recently been receiving adequate attention (see, e.g., Broz and
Werfel 2014; Jensen, Quinn and Weymouth 2013; Steinberg and Shih 2012; Oatley 2010;
see also Broz and Frieden 2006 for a review of the literature). It also bears noting that
political alignments on currency-related legislation will not precisely adhere to the pre-
dictions of the standard models of exchange rate preferences (anticipating a tradables vs.
non-tradables divide); nor will political alignments necessarily resemble the coalitions pre-
dicted by standard models of trade policy preferences (comparatively disadvantaged vs.
comparatively advantaged sectors).
Finally, these results highlight the implications of China’s regional and systemic impor-
tance (Acharya 2014; Layne 2012; McNally 2012). China’s rapid growth has altered the
structure of the international system, leading to a realignment of many countries’ foreign
policies (Flores-Macı`as and Kreps 2013). With respect to US foreign policy, research is in-
creasingly considering how the codependent relationship between the US and China shapes
policymaking (McNally 2012; Drezner 2009; Seo 2010). Despite extensive “China bash-
ing” in the current political rhetoric (Ramirez 2012), the findings here strongly suggest
that elected officials recognize the potential consequences associated with disrupting the
US-China economic relationship. Explanations for political behavior that fail to account
for international interdependencies may lead to a picture of policymaking that is at best
incomplete, and at worst, inaccurate (Oatley 2011; Oatley et al. 2013; Farrell and Newman
2014).
This chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I briefly discuss the literature on
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exchange rate preferences, and consider Congressional involvement on the currency issue.
In the following section, I generate several hypotheses concerning the likely sources of
political opposition to, and support for, currency realignment legislation. Then, I present
my research design and describe the data used to test my hypotheses. In the final two
sections, I discuss the results and conclude by exploring the implications of these findings.
Currency, Competitiveness and Congress
Every government faces two critical considerations regarding its country’s exchange
rate: the first relates to the level of fixity for the exchange rate regime (i.e., floating vs.
fixed); the second concerns the relative strength of the currency. As the US has adhered to
a floating rate regime since 1971, the former choice has been determined for the foreseeable
future. The latter consideration, however, remains a subject of controversy. In recent years,
the dollar’s relative value vis-a`-vis the yuan has become particularly important, as China
emerged as a critical economic partner for the US.
At its most basic, any given choice on the level of the exchange rate is essentially a
trade-off between competitiveness and purchasing power. A relatively depreciated currency
encourages exports and expenditure switching from imports to domestic goods, thereby
providing a boost to aggregate output (see generally Broz and Frieden 2006). As such,
the traded goods sector, including domestic producers who export abroad as well as pro-
ducers who compete with imported products, generally benefit from a weaker dollar. In
contrast, an appreciated currency increases the purchasing power of consumers and firms
in non-traded goods sectors, such as the finance and construction industries.1 These initial
observations generally lead us to expect that preferences on exchange rate legislation will
generally break down along tradables/non-tradables lines (Frieden 1991).
1The extent to which manufacturers benefit from a depreciated currency, however, is a function of several
factors. Under some conditions, e.g., heavy reliance on imported inputs, any gains to competitiveness could
be offset by decreased purchasing power (Broz and Werfel 2014; Broz and Frieden 2006).
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This prediction would certainly be in accord with much of the political rhetoric con-
cerning the relative values of the dollar and the yuan. Out of concern for manufacturing
competitiveness, legislators in the US have placed currency realignment on the legislative
agenda. This development coincided with a less confrontational approach to the issue by
the Bush and Obama Administrations. During both presidencies, the Treasury routinely
asserted that the yuan was undervalued, though it declined to label China a “currency ma-
nipulator” (a stance often portrayed as taking a soft line). Although it is clear that China
had taken some steps to allow a controlled appreciation of its currency, the yuan remained
undervalued. Accordingly, members of Congress increasingly began addressing the is-
sue by sponsoring exchange rate realignment legislation, often threatening to impose trade
sanctions on Chinese goods in the absence of a sustained appreciation of the yuan.
In light of the general relationship between currency values and competitiveness, we
might expect that Congressional support for realignment bills came from legislators who
represent manufacturing and primary goods sectors. And, we did see vocal support from
some senators and representatives with ties to these producers, including legislators from
key manufacturing centers in Michigan, Pennsylvania and Ohio. This support, however,
was hardly uniform. In fact, many legislators representing traded goods producers adamantly
opposed the proposed legislation. In the next section, I develop a series of hypotheses con-
cerning the observed behavior on exchange rate policy.Theory and Hypotheses
Legislative behavior on currency policy is heavily influenced by concerns regarding the
stability of the broader US-China economic relationship. The economic ties between the
US and its key trade partner (and the vulnerabilities these ties create), led many economic
interest groups and legislators to oppose the controversial currency legislation.
First, exchange rate choices are inextricably intertwined with other areas of interna-
tional economic policy, especially trade policy. Many pieces of currency legislation have
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provisions that directly affect trade. For example, recent currency bills in Congress con-
template imposing punitive tariffs against countries that are found to be manipulating the
exchange rate. And, even when currency policy and trade regulation are not explicitly tied
together, there is still a clear interplay between the policy areas, as a relative deprecia-
tion can often have the same practical effect as increasing trade barriers on foreign goods
(Eichengreen and Irwin 2009; Corden 1997; Frieden 1997; Oatley 2010; Broz and Werfel
2014; Jensen, Quinn and Weymouth 2013).2 Accordingly, industries and legislators stak-
ing out a position on a proposed currency realignment bill must consider how the bill could
impact their interests through both exchange rate and trade policy.3
Second, there is a high level of economic interdependence between the US and its key
trading partners, especially China, the presumptive target of much of the recent currency
legislation. Given the vast interconnectedness between the two economies, the possibility
of economic retaliation by the Chinese government looms in the background of any pol-
icy decision.4 A protectionist policy adopted by the US might very well be responded to
in kind; this possibility is a key consideration for economic interest groups and legisla-
tors.5 The potential for retaliation is made even more likely given the linkages between
the exchange rate and other international economic policy areas. A foreign government
could respond to aggressive exchange rate legislation through any number of policy mea-
sures, perhaps most readily in the context of trade policy. This point is an important one,
as the menu of options available to directly affect changes to another country’s exchange
rate/monetary policy are limited. In short, the interdependence of the US and Chinese
economies – a mutual dependence that implicates many different policy areas – impacts
actors’ behavior on the exchange rate.
2Recognizing the interaction between trade and exchange rate policy, several studies have explored how
the exchange rate influences industry demands for protection (Oatley 2010; Broz and Werfel 2014).
3See Davis (2005, 2009) for a discussion of the implications of issue linkage.
4See Hirschman (1979) and Keohane and Nye (1977) for a more general discussion of interdependence.
5See Frieden 1999 for a discussion of the ways in which strategic international interactions can influence
political behavior on economic policy.
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In the debate over recent currency legislation in the US, concerns regarding the poten-
tial effects of these bills were raised by a number of major economic interests. Industry
groups openly recognized that the proposed currency legislation might lead to economic
protectionism on the part of the US and/or its key trade partners. These concerns were
echoed in Congress. Senators Robert Portman, Mark Kirk, Jim DeMint, Orin Hatch and
Bob Corker, for example, all noted the costs associated with disruption to the US-China
economic relationship. They highlighted the importance of China as an export market, a
supplier, a destination for US investment and a growing source of inward foreign direct
investment. Economic ministers in China similarly warned that tit-for-tat retaliation could
ignite a trade war.6
In line with such concerns, some of the loudest critics of the legislation were US firms
that export extensively to China, as they would potentially face retaliatory tariffs. Although
most discussions of US-China trade emphasize the US’s role as a critical export destination,
aside from Canada and Mexico, no country receives more exports from the US than China.
In the last decade, US-to-China trade has grown five-fold, a pace far faster than the US
global export growth average (USCBC 2012). Continued access to the Chinese market is
an especially important concern for agricultural industries, including producers of wheat,
livestock and dairy goods, as well as certain high-end technology sectors, such as aerospace
product manufacturers. In fact, in these sectors, the US has enjoyed a trade surplus with
China. Moreover, it would seem that these are the types of industries that are ripe for
potential Chinese retaliation, as they have been targeted by Chinese trade policy in the past
(see Bown 2008; Zeng 2012).7
6In fact, Chinese retaliation might even be authorized by the WTO if the US’s currency legislation was
deemed non-compliant with international obligations. Regardless of the WTO-compliance of the parties’
trade policies, there could be immediate measures implemented that would at the very least disrupt trade in
the short term.
7Trying to determine the likelihood of Chinese retaliation in a particular sector is largely impossible, as its
trade dispute strategy is still a “blank slate” (Bown 2008: 34). That said, we can identify certain areas where
the Chinese government has considered imposing tariffs in the past. For instance, there has frequently been
concern regarding import surges of agricultural products from the US (Bown 2008), specifically relating to
poultry, beef and meat processing industries (Zeng 2012: 21). Similarly, the possibility that high-technology
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Beyond exporters, a host of US-based economic interests in non-traded goods sectors –
including retailers, as well as real estate and financial interests – have opposed the legisla-
tion. These groups would be substantially affected by the imposition of tariffs on Chinese
goods or US exports. For instance, US retailers who carry finished goods from China would
see the price of their inventory increase drastically. The same is true for sectors that rely
on imported intermediate goods, such as the construction industry. Financial interests are
likely to oppose a bilateral economic conflict for a host of reasons. Exports and capital
flows from China ultimately facilitate cheap borrowing and consumption in the US; addi-
tionally, the banking sector would benefit from stable relations that lead to financial sector
liberalization in China. These considerations hardly constitute an exhaustive list.
One might also argue that non-traded goods sectors oppose the legislation because they
generally benefit from a stronger currency. While such considerations might be partially
responsible for their opposition, this is only part of the story. First, the benefits these groups
realize from an appreciated currency are fairly “indirect” (Frieden 1994: 86). As such, their
preferences on the exchange rate are frequently less intense than those of the traded goods
sectors, and they are less likely to mobilize on the issue (Henning 1994: 33). In fact, there
is evidence to suggest that their political mobilization on the currency issue had at least
as much to do with concerns over the US-China trade/investment relationship as their con-
cerns regarding the relative value of the dollar. In a letter from the Business Roundtable to
Congress, a number of groups representing non-traded goods sectors (including Financial
Services Forum, Financial Services Roundtable, Retail Industry Leaders Association and
the National Retail Federation) stressed that tariff legislation would ultimately be costly to
the US in terms of job creation, could provoke trade retaliation, and was also potentially
WTO-incompatible (Business Roundtable 2011). Similarly, an op-ed by the CEO of the
Financial Services Forum highlighted the importance of China’s 1.3 billion person market
goods might be the subject of retaliation is suggested by previous efforts to protect the semiconductor indus-
try, as well as China’s contemplation of protection on solar energy related products (Zeng 2012: 5, 25).
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for financial services and traded goods exports (Nichols 2011). In both instances, the state-
ments explicitly argued that the yuan should in fact be permitted to rise against the dollar
– this indicates that maintaining the relative strength of the dollar may not have been a
primary goal.
Taken together, exporters-to-China and a wide variety of interests outside of the traded
goods sector all have incentives to oppose currency legislation. Whether the legislation
resulted in punitive tariffs by the US and/or retaliatory tariffs by China, these firms could
see an important relationship with a key economic partner disrupted. This discussion leads
to Hypothesis 1:
Hypothesis 1: Legislators who receive financial contributions from interests that are
economically reliant on the Chinese economy will oppose currency realignment legislation.
Hypothesis 1 is focused on legislators’ ties to industries through financial contributions.
Legislative behavior, however, is also driven by constituency economic characteristics. Ac-
cordingly, having a high level of China-bound exporters in a state or district is likely to drive
opposition to currency legislation. Several members of Congress specifically suggested that
this was an important consideration. In a floor speech in the Senate, for instance, Mark Kirk
noted that exports to China from his state totaled $3.18 billion. He warned, “A trade war
with China would put in jeopardy a number of jobs from my State of Illinois. ... I do
not think we should put these jobs at risk with an unnecessary trade war” (Cong. Rec. -
Kirk 2011).8 Hypothesis 2 captures the relationship between export profile and legislative
behavior:
Hypothesis 2: Legislators from districts/states with high levels of exports destined for
China will oppose currency realignment legislation.
8A number of prominent studies have noted that exporting interests can create an important economic
block of opposition to trade protection (Milner 1988; Bailey, Goldstein and Weingast 1997; Gilligan 1995).
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Although currently still in its nascent stages, China-to-US FDI is rapidly increasing.
This inbound investment serves as another source of economic interconnectedness between
the countries. Because these investments are often geographically concentrated, for some
regional economies they are significant. Locations that have clear potential for future Chi-
nese FDI may be especially hesitant to see their investment relationships threatened. In-
deed, Senator Bob Portman noted such considerations in his formal comments on the pro-
posed currency legislation. He pointed to the importance of Chinese capital as a source of
employment in Ohio, and observed that certain localities have been proactive in welcoming
Chinese investors (Cong. Rec. - Portman 2011). This discussion suggests that even if a
potential economic dispute is most likely to take place in the context of policies relating
to trade, the conflict could very well spill over into other areas, such as investment policy.
This is particularly true in the case of the US-China dispute, as the Chinese government
plays a significant role in directing and funding investment projects.
Additionally, many US-based corporations rely on cross-national supply chains for their
production processes. This development has led to an increase in bargaining position for
FDI recipients, who are more integral than even to global value chains (see, e.g., Gereffi
2012, 2024). Multinational production has also been shown to affect the trade policy pref-
erences of firms with higher levels of cross-national operations (Jensen, Quinn and Wey-
mouth 2013). As a result, I anticipate that sectors that heavily rely on China for outsourcing
might oppose an aggressive approach to pursuing currency realignment.
Hypothesis 3 concerns the relationship between inbound FDI and support for currency
legislation:
Hypothesis 3: Legislators whose constituencies rely on inbound or outbound Chinese
FDI will be less likely to support currency realignment legislation.
Thus far I have highlighted the ways in which mutual economic dependency can serve
to create opposition to currency legislation. Of course, many comparatively disadvantaged
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sectors are harmed by trade with China, and supported the legislation.
The steel industry is a prime example. The industry measures moderately below av-
erage on a scale of revealed comparative advantage for US manufacturing industries, and
the disadvantage is exacerbated by China’s enormous excess capacity in the industry. The
industry also has a history of actively pursuing trade protection through administrative
agencies and export restraints. A number of other comparatively disadvantaged manu-
facturing sectors, including portions of the auto industry and fabricated metals producers,
supported the legislation. Firms in these industries would stand to benefit from restrictive
trade policies, as is provided for in the realignment legislation. Alternatively, if the legisla-
tion ultimately resulted in a relative appreciation of the yuan, this would also benefit many
of these industries. This discussion leads to Hypotheses 4 and 5:
Hypothesis 4: Legislators who receive financial contributions from comparatively dis-
advantaged sectors will support currency realignment legislation.
Hypothesis 5: Legislators from districts/states with a high proportion of comparatively
disadvantaged industry will support currency realignment legislation.
In summary, although a large number of firms in the US are harmed by trade with China,
there are substantial business interests that benefit greatly from ongoing cooperation. These
firms and industries have every incentive to mobilize in opposition to proposed currency
legislation that could serve as a source of conflict between the two countries, particularly as
the dispute would implicate other areas of international economic relations, such as trade
and investment policy. Legislative behavior on recent realignment legislation reflects these
concerns.
Research Design and Data
To test my expectation that economic interdependence influences behavior on currency
legislation, I run a series of Bayesian logit/ordered logit models. I consider legislative
behavior in the context of the Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act, H.R. 2378, 111th
Congress (“CRFTA”), and the Currency Exchange Rate Oversight Reform Act, S. 1619,
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112th Congress (“CERORA”). Both bills proposed permitting domestic industries in the
US to seek administrative trade remedies (i.e., antidumping/countervailing duties) to offset
the advantage conferred on foreign producers by virtue of having an undervalued currency.
The CRFTA received 159 cosponsors (113 Democrat; 46 Republican), and the CERORA
received 22 (16 Democrat; 5 Republican; 1 Independent).9 Both bills were especially suc-
cessful in drawing attention to the currency issue. Although there have been a number of
currency realignment bills introduced in recent years, these two bills made it out of com-
mittee, and ultimately received roll call votes in their respective chambers. Because the
bills made it far in the legislative process, they triggered a great deal of interest group
mobilization.
The primary dependent variable in the analysis is each legislator’s decision whether or
not to sponsor/cosponsor the currency realignment legislation in question. The unit of anal-
ysis, therefore, is a legislator’s (co)sponsorship-opportunity, and the dependent variable is
coded as 1 if the legislator (co)sponsored the legislation, 0 otherwise. Models 1-2 exam-
ine House behavior on the CRFTA, and Models 4-5 examine the Senate’s behavior on the
CERORA. In Models 3 and 6, I run the models with an ordered dependent variable which
incorporates legislators’ roll call voting behavior as well.10
I rely on (co)sponsorship as the initial dependent variable here because it provides a
reliable indicator of legislators’ support for the bills. These bills were high-profile pieces
of legislation, and the initial sponsors successfully sought out cosponsors in an effort to
improve the proposed legislation’s prospects. Accordingly, cosponsoring or choosing not
to cosponsor these bills constituted an important decision for legislators. Although in some
cases a decision not to cosponsor a bill may be a poor measure of a legislator’s preferences
on a proposed policy (see Alema´n, Calvo, Jones and Kaplan 2009: 88), in this context
9The table on pages 3-5 of Appendix B, contained in the online-only supplementary files, denotes each
legislator’s (co)sponsorship choice, as well as his/her state and party.
10The N for the analysis ranges from 100 (in the Senate) to 433 (House), accounting for vacant seats during
the relevant period. The relatively small sample size in the Senate partially motivated my use of Bayesian
methods here (see Gill 2007; Western and Jackman 1994; Long 1997; Taylor, West and Aiken 2006).
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these bills were extremely controversial and heavily sponsored. Under these conditions, it
is appropriate to treat non-cosponsorship as an informative signal.11
My independent variables of interest are intended to capture legislators’ connections
to economic interests that are invested in the currency legislation; these connections may
arise from interest groups’ financial contributions or constituency economic profile. The
first two variables test Hypotheses 1 and 4. ANTI-REALIGNMENT $ is measured as the
contributions received from business interests that were likely to oppose passage of the
legislation, as a share of total contributions. Anti-realignment interests include China-
oriented exporters, such as many agriculture and technology producers. Such interests also
include businesses that carry finished goods from China, financial firms and the real estate
sector. These groups would be harmed by the imposition of tariffs on Chinese goods and
any retaliatory protection that might be imposed on US products.12
PRO-REALIGNMENT $ is measured as the contributions each legislator received from
interest groups that were likely to favor passage of currency legislation, as a share of total
contribution receipts. This includes groups that typically fare poorly as a result of trade
and investment competition with China, such as capital and labor in the steel and fabricated
metals industries.
To construct the PRO-REALIGNMENT $ and ANTI-REALIGNMENT $ variables, I needed
to identify the industries with a substantial stake in currency realignment legislation, and
then determine whether they had an identifiable (ex ante) position on the proposed policy.
The pro/anti-realignment interests identified in the preceding discussion are simply illus-
trative, and a more comprehensive treatment of key sectors’ posture with respect to the
11I provide additional discussion of the decision to rely on (co)sponsorship behavior in the “Results and
Discussion” section, below.
12Although there are numerous ways in which interest groups can influence legislators’ behavior on foreign
economic policy (see Fordham and McKeown 2003), the relationship between contributions and legislative
behavior is widely acknowledged (see, e.g., Broz 2006, 2011; Broz and Hawes 2006; Milner and Tingley
2011; Baldwin and Magee 2000; Magee 2010). Such contributions can directly encourage particular policy
positions (Grossman and Helpman 1994), or can constitute a reward or subsidy for maintaining a position
(Hall and Deardorff 2006).
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currency legislation is contained in Appendix A.
The next set of variables concern state/district economic characteristics. CHINA EX-
PORTS is included to capture the level of exports specifically destined for China that are
produced in each legislator’s district (Models 1-3) or state (Models 4-6). If many firms in
a legislator’s district are exporting to China, and these firms account for a large portion of
local economic activity, it is likely that the legislator would be reluctant to support any pol-
icy that might risk a trade war. The variable is measured as merchandise exports to China
as a share of state/district economic activity.
The presence of substantial Chinese investment in the local economy (and the potential
for more of such investment in the future) should make legislators more likely to oppose
currency legislation. CHINA FDI captures the importance of Chinese foreign direct invest-
ment in a given jurisdiction. The variable accounts for expenditures by Chinese-owned
entities on US investments, including greenfield projects as well as acquisitions that grant
investors at least 10 percent of a business’s voting rights (Rhodium Group 2012). The
variable is measured as Chinese FDI as a proportion of state GDP.
I also include a variable, OUTBOUND FDI, to denote how connected a legislator is to
industries that heavily rely on China as a location for large parts of their production pro-
cesses. Although many industries are likely to be affected in some way by investment (or
potential investment) in the Chinese market, there are certain sectors that already main-
tain heavy reliance on the Chinese economy. As a report by the US-China Trade Deficit
Commission noted, “Production shifts out of the U.S. into China are highly concentrated
in certain industries: electronics and electrical equipment (37 percent) ... toys (8 percent),
textiles (6 percent), plastics (6 percent), sporting goods (5 percent)” and others (Bronfen-
brenner et al 2001). Accordingly, I measure OUTBOUND FDI as the sum of contributions
from these various industries, as a share of total contributions.
I have included MFG EMPLOYMENT, a measure of manufacturing employment as a
share of total district employment. This variable captures any general relationship between
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manufacturing interests and support for currency legislation. I have also included MFG
INCOME as a proxy for the capital intensity of the manufacturing sector in a given state or
district.
To measure vulnerability to trade-related job loss, I rely on IMPORT PENETRATION, a
measure of the number of workers displaced due to foreign trade (Kondo 2012), and JOBS
LOST TO CHINA, which is coded as the proportion of job loss resulting from trade with
China during the 2001-2008 period (Scott 2010). I have also included a measure of union-
ization rates in the private manufacturing sector (Hirsch and Macpherson 2003). These
variables account for realized/potential job displacement due to competition with China,
and also roughly account for the predictions of the standard models of trade preferences
(Hiscox 2001, 2002). I expect a positive relationship between these variables and a legis-
lator’s propensity to support currency legislation.
Higher levels of unemployment might similarly increase demand for measures that are
intended to stimulate job growth or protect existing jobs (Cassing, McKeown and Ochs
1986). For that reason, I also include a standard business cycle variable (UNEMPLOY-
MENT).
Democratic partisanship is often associated with greater support for trade protection.
I therefore include DEMOCRAT, which is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the legis-
lator is a Democrat (or caucuses with the Democrats), and 0 otherwise. To capture any
relationship between a legislator’s left-right ideology and his or her position on currency
legislation, I also include IDEOLOGY. The variable is measured as each legislator’s NOM-
INATE score (Poole and Rosenthal 1997). Descriptive statistics and data sources for each
of the variables are contained in Table 4.1.
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Results and Discussion
The results from my statistical models, which are contained in Tables 4.2-4.4, provide
support for my hypotheses. Overall, the models indicate that US-China interdependence
drives legislators’ positions on currency realignment legislation.
Prior to turning to my results, I note that the output from a Bayesian statistical model is
different from a standard maximum likelihood (“MLE”) regression. A Bayesian analysis
yields a full distribution for a parameter, as opposed to a single fixed point. The “posterior
mean” is the mean value of the parameter’s distribution, which amounts to the analogue of
a maximum likelihood coefficient. Testing the effect of a variable in a Bayesian analysis is
also different than in the MLE context. Instead of relying on p-values, a variable’s effect can
be interpreted by observing the proportion of its posterior distribution that falls on either
side of zero (Gill 2007). The proportion of a variable’s posterior distribution that falls above
(below) zero corresponds to the probability that the variable’s effect is positive (negative).
These proportions yield results similar to frequentist hypothesis testing – having a posterior
distribution with 95 (90) percent of the distribution on either side of zero is roughly akin to
the variable being statistically significant at the .05 (.10) level.13
I begin the discussion of results with Models 1-2, which examine House behavior on the
CRFTA. Models 1 and 2 are logit models; as noted above, the dependent variable is coded
as 1 if the legislator in question (co)sponsored the bill, 0 otherwise. In both specifications, I
find strong support for Hypotheses 1, 2, 4 and 5. As the results were comparable in Models
1 and 2, I focus my discussion on Model 1 unless otherwise noted.
13Bayesian results, however, are only directly comparable to maximum likelihood estimates with a suffi-
ciently large sample size and the use of uninformative priors. The models here were run with uninformative
priors, using MCMCpack in R (Martin, Quinn and Park 2011). Diagnostic tests, discussed below, were
performed with the coda package (Plummer, Best and Cowles 2010).
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First, the posterior distributions for the ANTI-REALIGNMENT $ and PRO-REALIGNMENT
$ variables had the anticipated relationship (negative and positive, respectively) with a leg-
islator’s decision to cosponsor the legislation. ANTI-REALIGNMENT $’s posterior distri-
bution was overwhelmingly negative, suggesting that legislators representing interests that
rely on China as an economic partner were more likely to withhold support for the legis-
lation. Representatives receiving funds from interests that directly compete with Chinese
firms were more likely to support the bill. The distribution for PRO-REALIGNMENT $ was
decisively positive, with 97 percent of the distribution greater than zero.
Consistent with Hypothesis 2, legislators from districts with high levels of exports des-
tined for China were less likely to sponsor the legislation. This relationship was robust.
Almost the entirety of CHINA EXPORTS’s posterior distribution was less than zero, regard-
less of the model under consideration. In fact, the entirety of the distribution fell below
zero (when rounding to two decimal places). These results are consistent with my expecta-
tion that legislators representing industries with extensive export interests in China would
oppose the legislation, as realignment efforts could ultimately lead to restricted access to
the Chinese market.
It bears noting that export-orientation can in many cases capture another characteristic
of a district’s manufacturing profile. In particular, export-oriented firms are often highly
competitive and more resilient to exchange rate driven shocks to competitiveness (Oatley
2010). For this reason, legislators representing capital intensive industry may be less con-
cerned with exchange rate alignments. Here, however, I include a host of variables that
account for district-level sectoral composition (this includes an interaction between MFG
WAGE LEVEL and MFG EMPLOYMENT). The fact that I control for these variables in-
dicates that – even net of these characteristics – China-related export reliance still had a
negative relationship with support for currency legislation. Stated differently, CHINA EX-
PORTS is not simply capturing capital intensity, but rather, export dependence. This finding
provides strong support for Hypothesis 2.
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Figure 4.1: Effect of Key Independent Variables - Posterior Distribution Plots
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, legislators who received contribution for industries that
invest heavily in China were less likely to support the legislation. Unfortunately, because
inbound FDI data is only available at the state level, I was only able to test one aspect of
this Hypothesis in the House models.
In line with Hypothesis 5, legislators from import-competing states supported currency
realignment legislation, as indicated by the performance of IMPORT PENETRATION. At
least 99 percent of the variable’s distribution was greater than zero across the three models.
JOBS LOST TO CHINA and MFG UNIONIZATION were also positively associated with
support for the legislation, as anticipated, though the relationships were less robust for
these variables. To provide a visual illustration of the performance of my key variables,
posterior distribution plots are contained in Figure 4.1.
The other variables performed largely as expected. IDEOLOGY was negative, with the
majority of its distribution less than zero. This suggests that more conservative legislators
were less likely to support the bill. Similarly, Democratic partisanship had an overall pos-
itive association with support for the bill. Because of very high colinearity, both variables
could not be included in the model simultaneously. The results, however, are consistent
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regardless of which variable is included (compare Models 1 and 2).
In another model, PRO-REALIGNMENT $ and ANTI-REALIGNMENT $ were disag-
gregated, and the analysis was run with more fine-grained sectoral contributions data (see
Table 4.4 - Model 7). The results were consistent with those reported here: receipt of contri-
butions from the agricultural sector (exporters to China), financial/real estate interests and
the retail sector were negatively associated with support for realignment. Contributions
from import-competing manufacturing industries (including interests within the steel and
fabricated metals industries) were positively associated with support. These findings rein-
force my conclusions with respect to the heterogeneity of industry positions on exchange
rate legislation – including preference diversity within the traded goods sector.
Table 4.4: CRFTA/CERORA - Disaggregated Contribution Data
Post. 95% Cred. Prob Post. 95% Cred. Prob
Mean Intervals > 0 Mean Intervals > 0
CERORA Mod. 7 Mod. 8
INTERCEPT -4.04 -7.06, -0.91 0.00 -8.32 -28.44, 9.91 0.20
DEMOCRAT 1.08 0.54, 1.63 1.00 3.63 1.47, 6.44 1.00
IMPORT PENETRATION 1.26 0.55, 2.03 1.00 5.10 1.96, 8.79 1.00
JOBS LOST TO CHINA 0.74 -0.15, 1.61 0.95 2.18 -0.80, 5.14 0.93
UNEMPLOYMENT -2.90 -11.62, 6.11 0.26 -1.09 -4.92, 3.12 0.28
MFG INCOME -0.05 -0.62, 0.52 0.43 -0.46 -4.26, 3.44 0.41
MFG EMPLOYMENT 1.42 -0.60, 3.50 0.91 -0.35 -2.14, 1.48 0.34
MFG EMPL*MFG INC -0.03 -0.49, 0.45 0.45 0.06 -0.33, 0.45 0.63
MFG UNIONIZATION 0.07 0.02, 0.12 1.00 0.16 0.00, 0.32 0.98
CHINA EXPORTS -0.41 -0.71, -0.15 0.00 -1.62 -3.31, -0.32 0.01
AGRICULTURE SECT. $ -0.40 -0.80, -0.04 0.01 -0.60 -2.40, 0.97 0.26
FINANCE/BUSINESS $ -1.16 -1.97, -0.40 0.00 -0.63 -1.68, 0.00 0.03
STEEL/METAL SECT. $ 0.97 0.24, 1.70 0.99 1.91 -0.76, 4.84 0.91
RETAIL SECTOR $ -1.56 -3.12, -0.13 0.01 3.23 -2.69, 9.32 0.87
CHINA FDI 0.55 9.01, 9.15 0.56
N = 433 N = 100
Models 7 and 8 are specified comparably to Models 1 and 4, with the interest group contribution
variables divided into subgroups.
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The findings with respect to the financial, real estate and retail sectors might be in-
terpreted as consistent with existing explanations for sectoral exchange rate preferences
(see, e.g., Frieden 1991). That is, rather than through their trade/investment dependence on
China, these groups might oppose currency realignment legislation as a function of their
preferences for a stronger currency. As Henning (1994: 33) explains with respect to re-
tail and real estate sectors, however, the exchange rate is “far more salient for producers
of tradeable goods ... and thus a more important item on their political agenda,” whereas,
“[t]he nontradeable sector is rarely mobilized politically on external monetary issues.” Ad-
ditionally, the banking sector often does not have a unified preference on the exchange rate,
as “bank preferences in general are highly variable, highly situationally dependent, and
typically not held with high intensity” (Henning 1994: 26). Non-traded goods sectors did
mobilize on the bills under consideration here, and their statements on the issue suggest that
they were motivated in large part by considerations beyond the relative value of the dollar.
In any case, it is worth highlighting that the explanation offered for these sectors’ behavior
– their commitment to maintaining stability in the US-China bilateral economic relation-
ship – may constitute a complement to, rather than a substitute for, existing explanations
for political behavior on the exchange rate.
I experimented with several additional specifications of the House models. I ran an
alternate model where I allowed the intercept to vary by state to account for any geographic
variation that was not captured by the model specified (Gelman and Hill 2006; Clark and
Linzer 2012). The results are contained in the online-only supplementary files, and are
consistent with those reported here.
In addition to exploring cosponsorship behavior, I included a set of models to account
for roll call voting on the CRFTA. Model 3 is an ordered logit model with a dependent
variable coded as 0 if the legislator did not support the bill; 1 if he or she voted yea on
the bill; 2 if he or she (co)sponsored the bill and voted in favor of the legislation. The key
variables – CHINA EXPORTS, PRO-REALIGNMENT $, ANTI-REALIGNMENT $, IMPORT
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PENETRATION – all performed as they did in the (co)sponsorship models.
To examine the substantive importance of my findings, I calculated predicted proba-
bilities to assess how varying the observed value on the variables of interest changed the
probability of cosponsorship. These probabilities are based on Model 1.14 A one-standard
deviation increase in ANTI-REALIGNMENT $ led to an 8 percent decrease in the probabil-
ity of cosponsorship. An increase of the same magnitude to CHINA EXPORTS decreased
the predicted probability of supporting CRFTA by approximately 12 percent. A similar
increase to PRO-REALIGNMENT $ led to over a 7 percent increase in the probability of
a cosponsorship. Finally, an increase of the same magnitude to IMPORT PENETRATION
led to an 8 percent increase in the probability of cosponsorship. The statistical relation-
ships identified here, then, are both robust and substantively meaningful in terms of actual
legislative behavior.
Next, I turn to Models 4 and 5, where I assess senators’ behavior in the context of the
CERORA. The results are similar to those reported above, with some important exceptions.
PRO-REALIGNMENT $ was again positive, though less decisively so, with 84-94 percent
of its distribution greater than zero. ANTI-REALIGNMENT $ was overwhelmingly nega-
tive, and only 1 percent of its distribution was greater than zero. Also consistent with the
previous models, IMPORT PENETRATION had a clear positive relationship with support for
the legislation.
As above, CHINA EXPORTS had a negative relationship with support for the realign-
ment legislation, with the entirety of the variable’s distribution falling below zero (with
rounding). It is also worth noting that an alternate variable measuring total state exports
(to all markets, not just China) did not return a robust negative relationship. This point
is an important one, as the key driver of behavior was dependence on China, not simply
the constituency’s overall export orientation. Taken together, the performance of the key
independent variables provides evidence consistent with Hypotheses 1, 2, 4 and 5.
14These predicted probabilities were calculated by using the posterior mean value as a point estimate.
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The posterior distribution of CHINA FDI was fairly centered around zero, with approx-
imately half of the distribution falling below zero. As such, the model does not indicate
that there is a statistical relationship between inbound FDI and a legislator’s position on the
currency legislation, contrary to Hypothesis 3.15 This result may reflect the still-growing
role of Chinese FDI in the US economy. OUTBOUND FDI also led to an unexpected result;
the variable appeared to have a positive relationship with support for the bill. This finding
stands in sharp contrast to the performance of the equivalent variable in the House model,
providing mixed support for Hypothesis 3.
I note that in several robustness checks the results in the CERORA models were some-
what less consistent when compared to the models in the House. In Model 8 (Table 4.4), for
instance, contributions from steel/metals and business/finance had the anticipated relation-
ship with support for the currency legislation (positive and negative, respectively). Other
sectoral contributions did not have a strong statistical relationship with the outcome of in-
terest, however. This result may be a function of the relationship between narrow sectoral
interests and legislative behavior being less pronounced in the Senate, where legislators are
generally representing a broader set of economic interests.16
Model 6 (ordered logit) considered both cosponsorship and roll call voting behavior
on the CERORA. Some of the variables that explained cosponsorship decisions in Models
4 and 5 performed in a similar manner here. For example, CHINA EXPORTS and IM-
PORT PENETRATION had the anticipated relationships with the dependent variable. Oth-
ers, namely PRO-REALIGNMENT $ and ANTI-REALIGNMENT $ did not. This result is
not necessarily surprising. By the time the CERORA made it to the voting stage, a num-
ber of factors indicated that a House version of the bill was not going to have the support
of leadership. In fact, key figures, including David Camp (chairman of the House Ways
15Because CHINA FDI is compiled at the state level, this variable was only included in the Senate models.
16Additionally, in Model 10, I ran Model 4 as a hierarchical model. Although the results (contained in
the online only supplemental files) were largely consistent with those reported here, the CHINA EXPORTS
variable had a less decisive relationship with the outcome of interest.
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and Means Committee) and Speaker John Boehner, indicated that a currency-related bill
was not a priority (Lesniewski and Weyl 2011). As a result, the fate of the CERORA was
largely a foregone conclusion, potentially rendering the vote more about “China bashing”
than legislators’ genuine concern with the actual economic implications of the bill. Vote
choice on such a bill, then, is largely a function of legislative position taking, rather than
a genuine effort to impact policy (see, e.g., Seo 2010; Trubowitz 1998). Under these con-
ditions, it is inappropriate to read too much into the model of voting behavior on this bill.
Indeed, this concern partially motivated my focus on (co)sponsorship behavior here.
Extensive diagnostics suggest that the models performed well. With respect to mixing,
trace plots and running mean plots showed no signs of trending. Geweke model diagnostics
and Gelman-Rubin statistics were similarly favorable. Based on the results of these four
tools, there is little reason to be concerned about non-convergence. The results from these
tests are presented in Appendix B (online).
In sum, then, the models provide support for my hypotheses. I found consistent support
for Hypotheses 1, 2, 4 and 5 in the context of legislative behavior related to the CRFTA in
the House. My findings were largely consistent, with a number of important qualifications,
in the context of the CERORA in the Senate.
Conclusion
Bilateral economic relationships can lead to dependencies that shape political behav-
ior on the exchange rate. Given the various linkages between exchange rate policy and
other areas of international economic policy, there are many potential sources of vulnera-
bility stemming from the US’s economic relationship with key trade partners. The ongoing
conflict over the relative value of the dollar and the yuan epitomizes this dynamic. US
industries that compete with Chinese producers often support aggressive efforts to seek
currency realignment. Economic interdependencies, however, also lead many industries to
oppose realignment legislation. Legislators who represent business interests that rely on
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China for trade and investment opportunities were likely to withhold support for the leg-
islation. Through an analysis of Congressional behavior on two major pieces of currency
legislation, my statistical analysis provides evidence consistent with my central hypotheses.
Existing explanations for political behavior in the areas of exchange rate and trade
policy do not fully capture actors’ positions on currency legislation. The standard model
of exchange rate preferences generally predicts that traded goods sectors prefer a weaker
currency, while non-traded goods sectors prefer a stronger currency. The standard model of
trade preferences suggests that comparatively advantaged industries will oppose currency
bills as protectionist, and uncompetitive industries will support the legislation. Although
some of the observed political mobilizations surrounding the currency bills were consistent
with these expectations, many were not. The US agricultural sector serves as a useful
example in this regard. As a comparatively disadvantaged traded goods sector, we might
expect that this industry would be among the most ardent supporters of pursuing a weaker
dollar or, failing that, imposing punitive tariffs against trade partners. Many agricultural
interests, however, came out in strong opposition to the proposed legislation. The industry’s
reliance on China as a huge and growing export market – a market that could potentially
be restricted in the event of an economic conflict – shaped the sector’s political calculus on
exchange rate legislation.
Recent work on the nuances of exchange rate preferences demonstrates that firm/industry-
level factors determine how sensitive businesses are to exchange rate fluctuations (see, e.g.,
Broz and Werfel 2014; Jensen, Quinn and Weymouth 2013; Oatley 2010; Walter 2008).
This research has begun to identify additional sources of heterogeneity with respect to ex-
change rate preferences across, and even within, industries. The findings here highlight
several ways in which issue linkage and bilateral economic dependence drive political be-
havior on the exchange rate.
These results raise several considerations for future research. First, whether analyzing
behavior at the firm, industry, legislator or country level, research must fully acknowledge
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intersections between policy areas. Theoretical development and empirical analyses alike
must recognize that political behavior in any issue area rarely takes place in an isolated
arena. In international economic policy, for instance, the intersection between trade and
exchange rate policy cannot be overstated.
Second, there is growing recognition that actors’ preferences and strategies are heavily
driven by international forces. Political economy research that neglects to fully account
for the interdependence of the global economic environment may fail to accurately explain
and anticipate political behavior (Oatley 2011; Farrell and Newman 2014), and may very
well lead to short-sighted or suboptimal policy guidance. This is as true for studies of
financial flows and labor market regulation as it is for exchange rate policy. Research must
adequately consider the ways that retaliation, diffusion, contagion and other international
influences can impact political behavior (see, e.g., Greenhill, Mosley and Prakash 2009;
Manger and Peinhardt 2013; Oatley et al 2013).
The ongoing controversy surrounding currency legislation in the US illustrates the im-
portance of recognizing the overlap between policy areas, as well as the pivotal role of mu-
tual economic dependence. While currency conflicts are typically cast as an effort to fight
on behalf of domestic producers against beggar-thy-neighbor economic policies abroad,
this is only part of the story. In the recent US experience, even industries that frequently
prefer a weaker currency (and those that often have weak preferences on the exchange rate)
vigorously opposed realignment efforts; these industries would suffer from economic pro-
tectionism on the part of the US or its key economic partners. Despite the heated rhetoric
suggesting that the US should take a hard line against China, many policymakers in the US
and in China recognized the risks involved with such an approach. This included legisla-
tors representing economic interests that were vulnerable to the consequences of a trade
war, as well as officials representing broader constituencies. After the introduction and
subsequent vote on the CERORA, President Obama suggested that the legislation could
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lead to Chinese retaliation. Similarly, Speaker John Boehner called the bill “pretty dan-
gerous,” warning that such legislation “could start a trade war” (Reuters 2011). US-China
interdependencies constrain behavior on exchange rate legislation, and these constraints
are recognized at the highest levels of policymaking.
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Appendix A - Data & Coding for Interest Group Contribution Variables
The data on legislators’ contribution receipts were compiled by Maplight.org, and sourced
from OpenSecrets.org. MapLight catalogs contributions to legislators and identifies the in-
terest groups/sectors that were the source of the contributions.
With respect to the two bills covered here – the CRFTA and CERORA – MapLight
identified over 40 groups as having taken positions on the legislation.17 I restricted the
list to groups with an identifiable ex ante preference for or against the legislation. This
selection was based on several criteria. First, sectors that enjoy a substantial bilateral trade
surplus with China, such as agriculture and certain high-tech industries, would be more
likely to oppose any measures that might disrupt access to their key export market (see,
e.g., Seo). Second, financial, real estate and retail interests should oppose the legislation.
This opposition may be driven in part by their preference for a stronger currency; however
they generally have a relatively weak preference when it comes to the level of the exchange
rate (Henning 1994: 33). I argue that their behavior on the exchange rate is also substan-
tially driven by their desire to maintain a strong bilateral economic relationship. Third,
for reasons similar to those discussed above, “pro-market” organizations (e.g., Chamber
of Commerce) would oppose the legislation. Fourth, sectors that compete with Chinese
producers, and are not highly integrated with China’s market, are more likely to support
currency legislation to help boost their competitiveness. These sectors would benefit from
a relatively weaker dollar or US-imposed trade protection; the steel and manufactured met-
als industries are good examples, as they have actively sought policy measures to improve
competitiveness (Broz and Werfel 2014).
In Table 4.5, I list the interest groups that are invested in the legislation (as determined
by MapLight.org), and then identify their posture with respect to the policy proposal. In
17For the Senate, the data include contributions during the period from January 1, 2006 to September 22,
2011 (the date of the introduction of the bill). For the House, the period ranged from January 1, 2006 to May
13, 2009. The date ranges were selected so as to cover a full election cycle for all legislators.
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addition to considering the criteria discussed above, I also consulted press releases and
various other documents from key interest groups and industry associations to ascertain
their position on the legislation. Many of the anti-alignment interests, for instance, signed
a letter to Congress opposing the legislation (see, e.g., Business Roundtable 2011). Others
were members of the “Fair Currency Coalition,” a group of industries that has been active
on the currency issue. Such evidence was used to confirm my coding of interest groups’
positions.
For some interest groups, determining their anticipated posture with respect to the leg-
islation was relatively uncontroversial. In other cases, however, a number of cross-cutting
factors within a single sector were simultaneously at work. For instance, the computer
industry has a trade deficit with China, but also has a capital account surplus. A simi-
lar pattern is present in the apparel industry; domestic manufacturers are strongly import-
competing, but many US-based firms perform production processes in China. For many of
these “mixed” interest industries we can see different groups within the same sector taking
opposing positions on the legislation. Accordingly, contributions from these groups were
excluded from the models presented. In several robustness checks, however, I experimented
with alternate codings for PRO-REALIGNMENT $ and ANTI-REALIGNMENT $ where I in-
cluded contributions from these sectors. These modifications did not substantially alter the
results presented.
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Table 4.5: Interest Group Realignment Legislation Preferences
Interest Group Posture Explanation
Agr. services and related
inds.
Oppose Trade surplus with China†
Aircraft mfg. Oppose Trade surplus with China
Apparel and accessories
stores
Mixed
Rely on consumer good imports from China;
import-competing
Labor Unions (in import-
competing sectors)
Support Comparative disadvantage
Chambers of commerce Oppose Pro-market; see discussion in text
Communications and
Electronics
Mixed Heavy investment in China; import-competing
Computer mfg. and ser-
vices
Mixed Heavy investment in China; import-competing
Fabricated metal products Support Comparative disadvantage
Finance, Insurance and
Real Estate
Oppose Non-traded; see discussion in text
Financial services and
consulting
Oppose Non-traded; see discussion in text
Fishing Oppose Trade surplus with China†
Livestock Oppose Trade surplus with China†
Meat processing and prod-
ucts
Oppose Trade surplus with China†
Milk and dairy producers Oppose Trade surplus with China†
Poultry and eggs Oppose Trade surplus with China†
Business Associations Oppose Pro-market; see discussion in text
Retail trade Oppose
Rely on consumer good imports from China;
see discussion in text
Securities, commodities
and investment
Oppose Pro-market; see discussion in text
Steel Support Comparative disadvantage
Telecommunications Mixed Heavy investment in China; import-competing
Wheat, corn, soybeans and
cash grain
Oppose Trade surplus with China†
Wine Oppose Trade surplus with China
†Trade surplus in NAICS Cat. 11, Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting
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5 EVALUATING LEGISLATORS’ TRADE PRIORITIES – CONSIDERING
(CO)SPONSORSHIP BEHAVIOR
For some members of Congress, trade policy is a centerpiece of their legislative agenda;
for others, the policy area is of only marginal importance. Standard quantitative treatments
of legislative behavior on trade policy, however, often fail to differentiate among legislators’
various levels of attention to trade policy. This shortcoming is in part due to an overwhelm-
ing reliance on one type of data – roll call voting – that only captures a small portion of
the lawmaking process. Analyses of voting behavior tell us little about the factors that
make legislators most active and invested in trade policy. To overcome these limitations,
I examine a more selective form of legislative activity: bill sponsorship/cosponsorship. In
particular, I explore the legislative coalition that has supported policies related to import
competition over the course of four decades. This approach provides three key benefits.
First, it allows us to identify the members of Congress that prioritize legislation related to
trade competitiveness. Second, the approach permits an assessment of how the salience
of trade policy fluctuates over time. Third, this empirical strategy facilitates the testing of
explanations for trade preferences without relying on a limited, and potentially unrepresen-
tative, portion of the legislative process.
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A substantial portion of the academic literature on trade politics explores the posture of
members of Congress with respect to trade liberalization or protectionism. The most promi-
nent approach for making this assessment is, by far, to examine roll call voting behavior
(see, e.g., Bailey 2001; Baldwin and Magee 2000; Conley 1999; Fordham and McKeown
2003; Gartzke and Wrighton 1998; Hiscox 2002; Karol 2007; Keech and Pak 1995; Nollen
and Quinn 1994; Sussman and Daynes 1995; Tosini and Tower 1987; Wink, Livingston,
and Garand 1996).
An important limitation associated with such an approach is that it necessarily focuses
on a truncated portion of the legislative process. Even studies that examine a compilation
of many votes are analyzing a phenomenon that amounts to a minute portion of legisla-
tive behavior on trade policy. While hundreds of bills are regularly sponsored in a given
congress – and even more cosponsorships offered on these bills – voting is rare. It is not
at all uncommon for a full congress to entertain only a handful of votes that are primarily
relating to trade policy (Allee and Miler 2012). During the last 20 congresses, the number
of trade bills that have been passed in any given Senate has ranged from 0 to 9. In six of
these Congresses, the number of bills passed numbered three or less. The rarity of such
behavior raises serious concerns as to how much researchers can confidently glean from an
overwhelming focus on this variant of legislative behavior.
Further adding to these concerns, there are several well-documented critiques of roll
call voting analyses, many of which extend beyond the trade policy realm. For one, strate-
gic behavior is common in voting. In some cases, party leadership or the executive branch
may be very forceful in pushing legislators to vote a certain way. In other instances, perhaps
where the fate of a bill is not in doubt, legislators may be “permitted” to vote their district.1
Additionally, a legislator may cast seemingly inconsistent votes on the same piece of legis-
lation; he or she may vote yea on a procedural vote in support of a bill, only to vote against
1Congressional leaders may monitor the progress of a vote and determine whether or not they will allow
legislators to defect from the party position to satisfy constituency interests. Alternatively, a vote without
serious prospects of passage may be arranged to permit politically attractive grandstanding (Galantucci 2014).
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the bill on its substance, in an effort to engage in position taking and/or blame avoidance.
Additionally, in some cases isolating a legislator’s position on particular provisions within
a bill is compromised by the inclusion of unrelated provisions attached to the same legis-
lation. As a result, the vote under consideration may not be a “clean vote” on the issue of
interest to researchers (see Broz and Hawes 2006). An extensive literature has established
that factors relating to agenda control, procedural rules and strategic behavior have strong
effects on voting decisions (see, e.g., Cox and McCubbins 2005; Roberts 2007; Clinton
2007; Shepsle and Weingast 1994).
Despite the various concerns associated with studies of roll call voting, there has been
a glaring lack of attention devoted to exploring other forms of Congressional behavior on
trade, with only very limited exceptions (see, e.g., Allee and Miler 2014; Box-Steffensmeier,
Arnold and Zorn 1997).2 Accordingly, an analysis of other types of legislative behavior is
an important step in overcoming some of the weaknesses associated with roll call analyses.
Indeed, in a recent review of the legislative trade policy literature, Todd Allee and Kristina
Miler note that “in the same way that the broader congressional literature has shifted to in-
corporate a wide range of non-voting behavior, the literature on trade politics in Congress
should expand the scope of research to include non-voting ways that legislators participate
in trade policymaking” (2012: 5). One especially useful area for further research is bill
cosponsorship.
2In a recent effort, Allee and Miler (2014) examine Congressional participation in the proceedings of
the International Trade Commission. They note that members of Congress may assist domestic producers
to secure administrative trade protection (i.e., antidumping duties), by testifying in person at ITC hearings,
providing written testimony and writing/forwarding letters to ITC commissioners on behalf of an interested
party (see also Caddel 2014). In an earlier study, researchers examined legislators’ pre-voting announcement
of their position on NAFTA (Box-Steffensmeier, Arnold and Zorn 1997). The authors found substantial
variation among legislators in terms of their initial announcement on the landmark trade legislation; those
who faced strong and unambiguous signals from constituents, interest groups and/or policy leaders were
more likely to announce early.
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Bill (Co)sponsorship
Bill (co)sponsorship presents an ideal context to explore Congressional behavior on
trade. Sponsorship constitutes an avenue for position taking targeting voters and business
interests (Arnold 1990; Fiorina 1974; Mayhew 1974; Schiller 2000; Sulkin 2005, 2011).
And, because interest groups play a paramount role in trade policy (Grossman and Helpman
1994; Schiller 2000, 2006), sponsoring legislation that signals policy preferences that are
favorable to these groups’ interests may have substantial rewards in terms of campaign
contributions (Rocco and Gordon 2010).
Beyond constituency oriented position taking, sponsorship also serves as a vehicle for
legislators to signal their priorities to other policymakers (Kessler and Krehbiel 1996; Tal-
bert and Potoski 2002; Wilson and Young 1997; Howell and Pevehouse 2007; Lindsay
1992-1993). A sponsor can introduce legislation to indicate to other legislators that he or
she has a particular interest or expertise in the issue area under consideration, or to demon-
strate shared policy preferences with these other legislators (Fowler 2006; Kessler and
Krehbiel 1996; Talbert and Potoski 2002; Wilson and Young 1997). As such, introducing a
bill might serve to suggest a high probability of support for certain types of policies in the
future, thus facilitating the formation of legislative coalitions. Additionally, and especially
in the context of foreign policy, sponsorship may signal preferences to policymakers in the
executive branch (Howell and Pevehouse 2007; Lindsay 1992-1993).
Cosponsorship, although a comparatively inexpensive action when compared to pri-
mary sponsorship, is also more than mere position taking or cheap talk. A broad base of
cosponsors can be used to demonstrate wide support for a bill. Such support can help a
bill’s prospects in committee, and may indicate that the bill in question will be resilient
to filibustering or a presidential veto (Krehbiel 1995). And, cosponsorships are not taken
lightly, as there are consequences to reneging on such a commitment (Bernhard and Sulkin
2013).
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Importantly, cosponsorship serves as a key signal of legislative preferences because it is
a highly selective act. The average legislator cosponsors only a small percentage (approx-
imately 2 or 3 percent) of all bills that are introduced (Hertherington 2001). Accordingly,
examining bill cosponsorship patterns can give a great deal of insight into legislators’ pref-
erences, and can help distinguish among preference intensity in a way that roll call behavior
cannot. Roll call voting on trade bills – on the rare occasions when it takes place – includes
nearly every member in the chamber.
While few trade bills make it to the floor for a vote, the legislative coalition involved in
cosponsoring these bills changes drastically over time. As Figure 5.1 demonstrates, both
the number of bills, as well as the number of legislators cosponsoring those bills, fluctuates
from congress to congress. To illustrate, 43 unique senators sponsored bills related to trade
policy in the 99th Congress, and 96 senators cosponsored at least one of these bills. In
contrast, in the 107th Congress only 8 senators were primary sponsors of trade legislation,
with 33 senators cosponsoring at least one of these 8 bills. This variation is overlooked in
standard empirical treatments of trade politics that empirically focus on a small number of
roll call votes.
Active Sponsors of Trade Legislation
Leveraging the wide variation in sponsorship activity, I will explore the various political
economy factors that drive attention to trade policy. In this section, I present a number of
hypotheses related to the factors that influence legislators to (co)sponsor bills related to im-
port regulation. These explanations for trade policy preferences have been explored in other
contexts, frequently through examinations of roll call voting. Such factors include district
economic profiles, macroeconomic fluctuations and political institutional considerations.
The composition of industries in the local economy will influence a legislator’s support
for particular trade policies (Krehbiel 1993; Bailey, Goldstein and Weingast 1997; Gilligan
1997; Rogowski 1987; Busch and Reinhardt 1999; Pincus 1975). Industries can influence
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policymakers’ behavior by participating in the legislative process, and by helping legisla-
tors to get elected in the first instance (see, e.g., Fordham and Mckeown 2003; Grossman
and Helpman 1994; Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000; Gawande and Hoekman 2006;
Mayer 1984).
Among the most important and most studied economic characteristics are those relat-
ing to sectoral profile and factor endowment. The Ricardo-Viner, or “sectoral,” model of
trade preferences, predicts that the composition of local production will determine levels
of support for trade protection. According to this model, a legislator from a region whose
economy is heavily reliant on import-competing manufacturing is more likely to support
trade protection. Industry interest groups, as well as individuals that are affected by the
performance of these industries, are more likely to prefer trade policies that protect domes-
tic businesses from international competition. In contrast, if a legislator’s constituency is
heavily reliant on industries that are export-oriented, he or she should be more likely to sup-
port trade openness. These internationally competitive firms do not require trade protection
to remain competitive. Additionally, these groups seek access to open markets abroad, and
this is frequently achieved through mutual liberalization (Bailey, Goldstein and Weingast
1997; Gilligan 1997; Milner 1988).3
Relative factor endowment has also been shown to influence trade policy preferences
(Rogowski 1989; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; O’Rourke and Sinnott 2002; Hiscox 2002). Pur-
suant to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, a legislator whose constituency exploits the abundant
factor of production (capital/high-skill labor in the U.S.) should be more likely to support
free trade. Individuals and firms utilizing the abundant factor have a comparative advantage
in the production and export of their goods, and thus prefer free trade. In contrast, if a legis-
lator’s constituency primarily comprises low-skilled labor (the scarce factor of production
3For example, Coughlin (1985) noted that the presence of the automobile and steel industries in particular
Congressional districts increased the likelihood that a legislator voted in favor of a domestic content bill for
automobile manufacturing. Tosini and Tower (1987) found that support for textile quota legislation reflected
a district’s overall orientation toward foreign trade, i.e., export-oriented vs. import-competing. Allen and
Hopkins (1997) found that the percentage of state employment dedicated to textile and apparel production
had an impact on legislative voting on trade policy (see also, Fordham 1998, Irwin and Kroszner 1999).
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in the U.S.), he or she should be more likely to support trade protection, as firms/individuals
exploiting the scarce factor produce goods that are likely to be uncompetitive in the face of
import competition.
The predictions of the sectoral and factor-based models of trade preferences lead to my
first set of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1a: Legislators from states with high levels of import-competing industry
are more likely to cosponsor import regulation bills.
Hypothesis 1b: Legislators from states with high levels of export-oriented industry are
less likely to cosponsor import regulation bills.
Hypothesis 1c: Legislators from states with increased levels of highly-skilled workers
are less likely to cosponsor import regulation bills.
Over-time variation in the macroeconomy also influences elected officials’ behavior on
trade. Two key aspects of the national economy are particularly important here – the first
relates to the business cycle, and the second relates to currency movements. Both types of
fluctuations have been used to explain changes in trade policy preferences.
Substantial research has demonstrated that downturns in the national economy stimu-
late demand for trade protection (Bagwell and Staiger 1995; Cassing, McKeown and Ochs
1985, Gallarotti 1985; McKeown 1984; Wallerstein 1987). As an economy contracts, pro-
ducers respond to the concomitant drop in demand for their goods by seeking new trade
barriers. As a result, it is often anticipated that legislators respond to (or potentially antici-
pate) these demands by cosponsoring trade legislation relating to import competition.
Additionally, appreciation of the real exchange rate has been shown to lead to an in-
crease in industry demands for trade protection (Knetter, Michael and Prusa 2003; Oatley
2010). As the dollar appreciates, U.S. traded goods are rendered more expensive relative
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to foreign goods. These periods of appreciation entail substantial costs to the competitive-
ness of many marginally competitive industries. Under these conditions, trade protection
can help distressed firms to address the exchange rate driven decrease to competitiveness.
Accordingly, tradables interests, and in turn the legislators who represent these interests,
are likely to respond by increasing their support for trade protection. This discussion leads
to my second set of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: Cosponsorship of import regulation bills will increase during periods
of high unemployment.
Hypothesis 2b: Cosponsorship of import regulation bills will increase during periods
of dollar appreciation.
A number of institutional/political factors may also impact cosponsorship behavior.
Research has highlighted the ways in which partisanship and the balance of power in gov-
ernment can shape legislative behavior on trade policy.
The institutional dominance of a particular party may impact the Congressional agenda
on trade, as numerous scholars have identified a partisan alignment on trade policy (Karol
2000; Nollen and Quinn 1994; Baldwin 1985; Milner and Judkins 2005; Dutt and Mitra
2005; Epstein and O’Halloran 1996; Simmons 1994). In particular, it is often anticipated
that, starting in the 1970s, the Democratic Party became relatively more supportive of trade
protection. This may be due in part to closer ties to economic interests that are vulnerable
to trade-related job loss. It might also be that the party’s comparatively liberal ideology
is more compatible with intervention in the economy. Whatever the primary determinant,
the general consensus is that Democrats will be on balance more supportive of trade pro-
tection.4 As such, when the balance of partisan power within Congress tilts towards the
4Although scholars differ as to the timing and extent of this realignment, the general consensus in the
literature is that the transition was underway in the 1970s.
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Democratic Party, this may have a positive relationship with support for trade protection.
Another institutional consideration is related to the distribution of power in Congress.
Divided government has been found to have a positive association with trade protection.
One explanation for this finding relates to Congress’s desire to limit its delegation of au-
thority. Under periods of divided government, Congress tends to limit the executive’s au-
thority to pursue trade liberalization (Lohmann and O’Halloran 1994; see also Gilligan
1997; Milner and Rosendorff 1997).
As these various explanations suggest, considerations related to the balance of power
in the Congress/Presidency may impact trade policy making. This discussion leads to my
final set of hypotheses:
Hypothesis 3a: Cosponsorship of import regulation bills will be positively associated
with Democratic partisanship.
Hypothesis 3b: Cosponsorship of import regulation bills will increase during periods
of divided government.
Research Design
I rely on a series of negative binomial models to identify the factors that influence legis-
lators to cosponsor trade legislation related to import competition. The time period for the
analysis runs from 1973 to 2012, covering 18 Senates. The period encompasses a broad set
of political environments, such as varying partisan control over the chambers of Congress
and the Presidency. This period also includes a number of important macroeconomic fluc-
tuations related to the business cycle and exchange rate.
The primary dependent variable is COSPONSORSHIPS. This variable is a count, and is
calculated as the number of cosponsorships that each legislator provided on bills relating
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Figure 5.1: Import Regulations
to import competition in each congress under consideration. For these models, therefore,
the unit of analysis is a senator-congress. The count ranges from a low of 0 to a high of 16,
with a mean average value of approximately 1.6. 5
To determine which bills qualified as import competition bills, I began with the list of
all bills that were classified as “foreign trade” bills in the Policy Agendas Project (see Adler
and Wilkerson, 1973-2012; Baumgartner and Jones 1993). From this set of legislation, I
next identified the bills that dealt with import competition. To do so, I examined the bill
summaries in the THOMAS Congressional database, and in many cases consulted the full
text of the bill. Bills that proposed increases to tariff rates, set quantitative restrictions,
or imposed additional requirements on imported goods (e.g., labeling or licensing require-
ments), were classified as import competition bills. Bills that could prospectively limit
imports were included as well. This would, for instance, include bills that might restrict
the ability of the president to pursue liberalization in a particular sector. This would also
5In a supplementary set of models, I explore influences on legislators’ propensity to serve as primary
sponsors of import regulation bills. This alternate dependent variable, SPONSORSHIPS, is coded as the num-
ber of import competition bills sponsored by each senator during the particular congress under consideration.
I include the results and discussion of these models (Models 5/6) below.
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include bills that permitted the executive to impose trade retaliation in the event that a set
of trade negotiations were unsuccessful.6 The sample also includes bills that provided for
agency reorganization to better address import competition.
The independent variables included in the analysis are cast at the national, state and
legislator levels. The national variables relate to the macroeconomic environment. The
state-level variables relate to production and labor market profiles of the local economy in
the state that each Senator represents. The final set of variables relates to criteria specific to
the particular legislator under consideration. I will first discuss the state/national variables
and then turn to the legislator-level variables.
The first four independent variables included in the analysis relate to the sectoral and
factoral make-up of a legislator’s constituency. Following a number of studies of Con-
gressional economic policymaking (see for example Bailey and Brady 1998; Fordham
2008), I include two variables to account for the economic importance of export-oriented
and import-competing manufacturing in each state. IMPORT-COMPETING is an index that
measures the extent to which manufacturers in a given state produce goods that are heav-
ily imported from abroad. The variable is measured as the state-level income generated by
these industries as a proportion of state personal income. The variable EXPORT-ORIENTED
is measured in a similar manner; it represents the percentage of income generated by net
exporting industries as a share of total state personal income. These variables are designed
to capture the predictions of the sectoral model of trade preferences.
The next variable, ED. ATTAINMENT, is designed to approximate the factoral endow-
ment within a state. States with many high-skilled laborers and capital owners, as evidenced
by higher average levels of education, are more likely to be engaged in export-oriented pro-
duction, and will therefore prefer trade openness. Higher levels of education, then, should
decrease support for bills related to import competition. Educational attainment may also
6Accordingly, the bills under consideration might relate to “fair trade” and market access abroad, provid-
ing that such bills also contain provisions relevant to domestic import competition.
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capture any effect that increased levels of education have on individuals’ free trade prefer-
ences (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Mansfield and Mutz 2009). This variable is coded
as the percentage of individuals who obtained a college degree in each senator’s state.
To account for characteristics of the labor market in a state, I include UNIONIZATION.
Organized labor has been among the constituencies that are most skeptical of trade lib-
eralization. This is not surprising in light of the predictions of the factoral model of trade
preferences, as labor is the relatively scarce factor of production in the U.S. As such, higher
proportions of unionized employees in a state may be expected to increase support for im-
port competition legislation. This variable is calculated as the percentage of the state’s
labor force that belonged to a union, and is measured in the first year of the congress in
question.7
The next two independent variables are related to economic cycles. Research has found
a positive relationship between economic contractions and demands for trade protection
(Bagwell and Staiger 1995; Gallarotti 1985; McKeown 1984). Accordingly, I include
NAT’L UNEMPLOYMENT, which is measured as the national unemployment rate during
the first year of the congress in question. I anticipate a positive relationship between this
variable and the propensity of legislators to cosponsor import regulating bills. (I also ex-
periment with a state-level unemployment variable, STATE UNEMPLOYMENT, to account
for local or regional business cycle contractions. My expectations for this variable are
consistent with those for the national-level business cycle measure.)
The next macroeconomic variable relates to the real exchange rate, REER. The vari-
able is included to capture the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on support for import
competition legislation. I anticipate that demands for trade protection will rise as the dollar
appreciates, as domestic tradables producers are rendered less competitive when compared
7Although the sectoral and factoral models of trade preferences lead to divergent predictions, including
variables to capture both sets of explanations is common in the foreign economic policy literature. See, e.g.,
Broz and Hawes 2006; Baldwin and Magee 2000; and Beaulieu 2002.
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to their foreign counterparts. As such, the cosponsorship of bills related to trade compet-
itiveness will increase following an appreciation. This variable is an index of the dollar’s
real trade-weighted value against other major currencies (Oatley 2010).
I include a host of additional senator-level variables. Partisanship and ideology are of-
ten associated with preferences on trade (see, e.g., Nollen and Quinn 1994; Baldwin 1984).
I have included a dummy variable, DEMOCRAT, coded as 1 if the legislator is a Democrat;
0 otherwise. I anticipate a positive relationship between this variable and cosponsorship. I
also include IDEOLOGY, which is measured as the first dimension of each senator’s NOM-
INATE score. Higher values on this variable indicate a more conservative legislator; ac-
cordingly, I expect a negative relationship between IDEOLOGY and the dependent variable.
I also include a dummy variable denoting membership on the Senate Committee on
Finance. Legislators on this committee have special access to trade policy hearings and
briefings, and are able to see the various markups of such bills to see how the legislation
typically fairs in the lawmaking process. Additionally, they witness firsthand committee
debate on legislative proposals (Krehbiel 1991; Evans 1991; Fenno 1973; Hall 1987, 1996;
Allee and Miler 2013), and may face particular pressures to take the lead on legislation
within the purview of their committee (see, e.g., Destler 1998, 2005). For these reasons,
membership on this committee may make behavior on trade policy, in general, more likely.8
Accordingly, I expect a positive relationship with the dependent variable here.
Finally, I included a variable, TOTAL BILLS, to control for the number of bills intro-
duced by each senator in each congress. This variable serves as a proxy for a legislator’s
overall level of activity. I include this variable to ensure that any increase in the cosponsor-
ship of trade protection is not simply a function of an overall elevated level of bill sponsor-
ship activity. I expect a positive coefficient on this variable.
8However, there is no reason to anticipate that membership on the committee is associated with support
for import competition legislation as opposed to other types of trade bills. As such, I do not have especially
strong prior expectations as to how this variable will perform.
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My statistical models provide results consistent with my key hypotheses. See Table 5.1.
Importantly, several of the most prominent explanations for trade-related legislative behav-
ior find support in an empirical analysis that relies on legislators’ non-voting behavior.
As noted above, the unit of analysis for these models is the senator-congress, and the
dependent variable is the number of import competition bills cosponsored by the legislator
in the congress under consideration. All models were run with cluster robust standard
errors, clustered on the individual senator.
The variables that were included to capture the predictions of the sectoral model of trade
preferences behaved as anticipated. Legislators representing import-competing states were
far more likely to cosponsor import regulations, while those representing export-oriented
manufacturing interests were less likely to do so. The coefficient on IMPORT-COMPETING
was positive and statistically significant at the .01 level; the EXPORT-ORIENTED parameter
was negative and also significant at the .01 level. These results suggest that the sectoral ex-
planation for trade preferences contributes to explaining legislative behavior, and provides
evidence consistent with Hypotheses 1a/1b.
The factoral model of trade preferences did not receive support in the model. The co-
efficient on ED. ATTAINMENT was positive, contrary to expectations, though the variable
did not come close to reaching statistical significance. Even more surprising was the neg-
ative and statistically significant coefficient on UNIONIZATION. I anticipated a positive
relationship between a heavily unionized constituency and a legislator’s support for im-
port competition bills, as organized labor is often among the loudest critics of free trade.
One explanation for this finding is that factor mobility in the contemporary U.S. economy
is limited (see, e.g., Hiscox 2002a, 2002b). If so, this would undermine the fundamental
assumption driving the factoral model of trade preferences, thus explaining the relatively
stronger explanatory power of the sectoral model.
However, another potential explanation for the findings with respect to the ED. AT-
TAINMENT and UNIONIZATION variables relates to data limitations here. First, average
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Table 5.1: Models of Cosponsorship Behavior
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
coef/se coef/se coef/se coef/se
IMPORT-COMPETING 0.591*** 0.570*** 0.599*** 0.576***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
EXPORT-ORIENTED -0.552*** -0.539*** -0.543*** -0.528***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
NAT’L UNEMPLOYMENT 21.923*** 21.669*** 21.897*** 21.712***
(2.22) (2.22) (2.21) (2.21)
REER 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.084*** 0.084***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
DIVIDED 0.250*** 0.248*** 0.249*** 0.248***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
SAME PARTY. PRES -0.061 -0.069 -0.059 -0.067
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
ED. ATTAINMENT 0.006 0.002 0.007 0.004
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
UNIONIZATION -0.016*** -0.020*** -0.016*** -0.020***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
MAJORITY -0.073 -0.031 -0.081 -0.037
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
DEMOCRAT 0.349*** 0.357***
(0.06) (0.06)
NOMINATE -0.476*** -0.491***
(0.09) (0.09)
TOTAL BILLS 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
SENIORITY -0.010 -0.008
(0.01) (0.01)
PARTY LEADER -0.222 -0.243
(0.16) (0.16)
COMM. LEADER -0.071 -0.080
(0.07) (0.07)
FINANCE 0.187*** 0.188***
(0.07) (0.07)
FOR. RELATIONS -0.090 -0.092
(0.08) (0.08)
LABOR -0.098 -0.118
(0.08) (0.08)
INTERCEPT -1.881*** -1.546*** -1.848*** -1.515***
(0.25) (0.25) (0.26) (0.26)
N 1452 1491 1483 1483
AIC 4732.7 4733.3 4703.8 4705.2
Models 1-4 are negative binomial models. * indicates significance at p < 0.10; ** at p <
0.05; *** at p < 0.01.
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levels of educational attainment are admittedly loose proxies for the factoral composition
of a state’s economy. Second, with respect to the findings on unionization, the data on
union membership rates is aggregated at a very high level. That is, the membership figures
include all varieties of union members, including participants in service sector and public
sector unions. Accordingly, UNIONIZATION may not effectively capture the prominence of
unskilled (and thus comparatively disadvantaged) labor within a state. More fine-grained
data is, unfortunately, not available for the full time period in question.9 Therefore, while
the results with respect to ED. ATTAINMENT and UNIONIZATION cast some doubt on the
predictions of the H-O model of trade preferences (and Hypothesis 1c), for the reasons
stated, these conclusions must be treated as somewhat tentative.
The variables relating to the national economy performed as expected, providing robust
support for Hypotheses 2a/2b. Legislators were increasingly likely to cosponsor import
competition bills during periods of high national unemployment. NAT’L UNEMPLOYMENT
was positive and statistically significant at the .05 level. Using a state-level measure of
unemployment (STATE UNEMPLOYMENT) led to consistent results, though the statistical
relationship and model fit were slightly stronger using the national unemployment variable.
This finding suggests that a legislator’s assessment of economic performance may often be
based on national level (sociotropic) considerations.
The real exchange rate variable (REER) also had a statistically significant and positive
relationship with the outcome of interest. As the dollar strengthened against the currencies
of key U.S. trading partners, legislators were more likely to cosponsor trade legislation.
Consistent with my expectations, when the appreciated dollar decreased the competitive-
ness of U.S. traded goods sectors, legislators were more active in cosponsoring legislation
that might assist these industries to remain profitable.
9When using data specifically on private manufacturing sector union membership, the unexpected nega-
tive relationship disappears. And, in fact, the sign on UNIONIZATION becomes positive (unreported). Relying
on these more appropriate union data, however, reduces my effective sample size by about fifty percent.
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Several of the legislator-level variables warrant discussion. Partisan affiliation and ide-
ology had the anticipated relationships with cosponsorship patterns. DEMOCRAT was pos-
itive and robustly related to cosponsorship choice (see Model 1). In another specification,
I replaced partisanship with a variable denoting ideology on a continuous scale, based
on each senator’s NOMINATE score. There too, more liberal senators (those with lower
NOMINATE scores) were more likely to cosponsor import competition legislation (see
Model 2). Although trade policy may be less partisan than a host of other issue areas,10
party affiliation/ideology is still associated with particular orientations on economic liber-
alization.
The results with respect to the political institutional factors were mixed. DIVIDED
GOV’T had a robust positive relationship with the number of import competition regula-
tions introduced. This finding is consistent with earlier studies that examined the ways in
which the balance of political power in the legislative and executive branches influences
trade policy (see, e.g., Lohmann and O’Halloran 1994; Gilligan 1997). This finding pro-
vides support for Hypothesis 3b.
The models provide mixed support for Hypothesis 3a. On the one hand, Democratic
control of the Senate was not associated with a greater number of legislators cosponsoring
import regulation legislation. On the other hand, DEMOCRAT and NOMINATE were in-
dependently statistically significant. The performance of these variables indicated a strong
relationship between Democratic partisanship or a liberal ideology and support for legisla-
tion concerning import competitiveness.11 One potential explanation for this result is that
there is a strategic dynamic at work, whereby the minority party makes an additional effort
to obtain cosponsors to overcome committee opposition to a proposal. Under such circum-
stances, it might be that legislators are less driven to acquire Democratic cosponsors when
10Based on interviews of numerous members of Congress and their staffs, Strahan (1990) found that trade
was among the least ideologically driven issues when compared to welfare, social security and tax policy.
11These variables were collinear at a fairly high level – greater than .75 – and were therefore not included
in the model simultaneously. Use of either variable led to consistent results, however.
167
the party controls the Senate.
With respect to other institutional considerations, the partisanship of the president was
not related to cosponsorship behavior on import regulating legislation. The sign on SAME
PARTY PRES. was negative, though the coefficient was far from statistical significance.
There is, therefore, no support for the proposition that common partisanship with the presi-
dent increases a legislator’s cosponsorship propensity. In an unreported model, I included a
variable simply denoting the party of the president (coded 1 for a Democrat); this variable
was positive but did not reach statistical significance. While a number of studies have iden-
tified particular presidencies as being more or less inclined to support free trade policies
(see, e.g. Magee, Brock and Young 1989), the results here do not suggest that these ten-
dencies are related to cosponsorship behavior. In terms of influencing legislators, perhaps
the largest role for the executive is in the initial drafting process, as well as later in the
legislative process when the push for roll call support is underway.12
To explore the substantive impact of the key variables, I calculated predicted probabili-
ties. The variables relating to the sectoral profile of a legislator’s state both had meaningful
effects on cosponsorship behavior. Figure 5.2 contains plots of the predicted number of
cosponsorships, per congress. In the first plot, the x-axis represents the level of import-
competition in the state economy. As the plot indicates, for legislators in either party, the
predicted number of cosponsorships rose sharply as these legislators represented states with
increasingly large shares of import-competing industry. This effect was particularly strong
for Democrats. The second plot in Figure 5.2 shows the predicted number of cosponsor-
ships as the export-orientation of a legislator’s state increases. As expected, the number
of cosponsored import regulations drops off quite rapidly as the local economy becomes
increasingly export-oriented. Both IMPORT-COMPETING and EXPORT-ORIENTED had a
strong impact on a legislator’s propensity to support the regulations considered here.
12As we would expect, TOTAL BILLS had a positive and statistically significant coefficient. This result sug-
gests that cosponsorship rates in the area of trade policy correspond with the overall level of bill introduction
activity in the Senate.
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Figure 5.2: Predicted # of Cosponsorships, by Import-Export Orientation
Figure 5.3: Predicted # of Cosponsorships, by Macroeconomic Climate
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Figure 5.3 also contains predicted cosponsorship plots. Here, I show the predicted
number of cosponsorships while varying the value of the key macroeconomic variables.
The x-axis represents the real exchange rate in the first plot, and the national unemployment
rate in the second plot. Both figures depict a similar pattern: cosponsorship of bills related
to import competition escalated quickly as the dollar appreciated or unemployment rose.
A move from the 25th percentile to the 75th percentile value on either of these variables
led to approximately a threefold increase in the predicted number of cosponsorships per
legislator.
DIVIDED GOV’T similarly had a meaningful impact on cosponsorship behavior. Sen-
ators cosponsored, on average, 30 percent more import competition bills during periods
of divided government than during unified government. This is true for both Democrats
and Republicans, though the former group of legislators sponsored bills at a rate 40 per-
cent higher than their Republican counterparts in general. This finding is consistent with
the notion that US trade policy is sometimes characterized by a “fire alarm” variant of
oversight. That is, Congress (the principal) delegates much of the day-to-day authority to
administrative units (agents). But, under such a system, Congress defines the scope of ex-
ecutive/administrative authority, and then legislators and industry monitor the performance
of the system. When the system is not sufficiently attentive to Congressional demands, we
can expect greater activity from the principal (Lohmann and O’Halloran 1994; O’Halloran
1994).
In terms of robustness, the performance of the key variables was consistent across spec-
ifications. Importantly, these findings were stable after the inclusion of a host of additional
control variables. These include committee membership (FINANCE; FOREIGN AFFAIRS;
LABOR), years of service (SENIORITY), committee leadership (COMM. LEADER) and
party leadership (PARTY LEADER).
Of the additional variables, the only one that had a statistically significant relationship
with cosponsorship rates was FINANCE; membership on the Senate Finance committee
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was associated with a greater propensity to cosponsor import competition bills. While
there is no a priori reason to believe that members of this committee are more likely to
favor protectionism, they are overall more likely to participate in trade policy making. This
factor is likely driving the result here.
In sum, the analysis provides evidence consistent with my primary hypotheses. Hy-
potheses 1a/1b, 2a/2b and 3b found strong support in the models. Not only did the variables
designed to capture these hypotheses perform as expected, they also had large substantive
impacts in terms of legislative cosponsorship behavior.
The focus of this analysis is on cosponsorship behavior. That said, the foundation of the
legislative cosponsorship coalition is, of course, the set of underlying bills that were intro-
duced. For this reason, and as a robustness check, I examine primary sponsorship behavior.
The dependent variable in these models is a count of the number of import regulation bills
that were introduced by each senator in each congress under consideration. Aside from the
modified dependent variable, the models are specified in a manner equivalent to Models 1
and 2.
The performance of the variables in this set of models is generally consistent with the
cosponsorship models presented above. The international orientation of local manufac-
turing sectors had a statistically significant relationship with primary bill sponsorship be-
havior. IMPORT-COMPETING was positively associated with sponsorship, while EXPORT-
ORIENTED yielded a negative relationship. Both parameters were again significant at the
.01 threshold. The macroeconomic variables performed as they did in the previous models
as well. Both NAT’L UNEMPLOYMENT and REER had the anticipated positive relation-
ship with sponsorship, and were statistically significant at the .01 level.
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Table 5.2: Models of Primary Sponsorship
Model 5 Model 6
coef/se coef/se
IMPORT COMPETING 0.776*** 0.750***
(0.14) (0.14)
EXPORT-ORIENTED -0.642*** -0.625***
(0.19) (0.19)
NAT’L UNEMPLOYMENT 16.803*** 16.644***
(4.86) (4.85)
REER 0.044*** 0.044***
(0.01) (0.01)
DIVIDED 0.261 0.280
(0.18) (0.18)
SAME PARTY PRES. -0.065 -0.007
(0.14) (0.14)
ED. ATTAINMENT -0.046*** -0.050***
(0.02) (0.02)
UNIONIZATION -0.007 -0.011
(0.01) (0.01)
MAJORITY -0.349** -0.342**
(0.14) (0.14)
DEMOCRAT 0.169
(0.14)
NOMINATE -0.505**
(0.21)
TOTAL BILLS 0.026*** 0.025***
(0.00) (0.00)
INTERCEPT -3.049*** -2.840***
(0.58) (0.57)
N 1497 1492
AIC 1863.9 1858.4
Models 5-6 are negative binomial models.
* indicates significance at p < 0.10; ** at p < 0.05; *** at p < 0.01.
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Two key differences between these models and the models of cosponsorship behavior
relate to the role of partisanship and divided government. DEMOCRAT was no longer statis-
tically significant. This is a function of several individual Republican senators being very
active primary sponsors of import competition legislation during the period under consid-
eration. For instance, Senator John Heinz [R-PA] was among the most active sponsors of
the subject legislation in either party. Nonetheless, IDEOLOGY was still negative and statis-
tically significant at the .05 level, indicating that more conservative senators were generally
less likely to introduce legislation relating to import competition.
Also unlike the previous models, the coefficient on DIVIDED GOV’T, while still pos-
itive, failed to reach statistical significance at conventional thresholds. The result with
respect to DIVIDED GOV’T in these models suggests that divided government had an im-
pact on members’ propensity to cosponsor bills, but not on the introduction of bills in the
first instance. Perhaps this indicates that legislators who are most invested in trade will
sponsor such legislation even in spite of a low chance of passage. After all, bills that do not
become law still serve an important signaling function.13
Although there are several variations between the models of cosponsorship behavior
(Models 1-4) and the models of primary sponsorship (Models 5-6), overall the results are
consistent with respect to Hypotheses 1a/1b and 2a/2b. The findings indicate that, as above,
district economic profiles and the prevailing macroeconomic climate have an important im-
pact on the (co)sponsorship of trade legislation. These factors explain the wide legislator-
to-legislator variation in terms of participation in the area of trade policy.
Conclusion
The key contribution of this chapter is to examine the drivers of Congressional attention
to trade at the legislator level. This chapter has used (co)sponsorship data to identify the
13Surprisingly, educational attainment had the anticipated relationship with the dependent variable in these
models, but not in the models above.
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factors that are most likely to influence support for legislation relating to import regulation,
while accounting for the substantial differences in legislators’ levels of activity in the area
of trade policy. Unlike roll call voting, where all legislators essentially participate to the
same degree (notwithstanding the occasional abstention), cosponsorship behavior is subject
to wide variation in rates of activity. Some legislators cosponsored as many as 16 bills
relating to import competition in a single congress, while in that same congress a number
of legislators cosponsored 0 bills. Similarly, one legislator served as primary sponsor for
9 bills in a single session, while the vast majority of senators sponsored 0. This stark
difference in legislators’ level of involvement in pursuing import competition legislation
was taken into account in my research design.
My results provide strong support for a number of prominent hypotheses for trade pol-
icy preferences. The economic composition of a constituency drives activity on import
regulation legislation. Representing an import-competing state substantially increased sup-
port for such legislation; representing an export-oriented constituency had a strong negative
relationship with cosponsorship propensity. These findings are consistent with the canon-
ical sectoral model of trade preferences. The existing literature on macroeconomic cycles
and support for policies designed to address trade competition found support as well. A
higher unemployment rate and a stronger dollar both led to an increase in (co)sponsorship
of such legislation.14 Divided government also had the anticipated positive relationship
with cosponsorship of trade competition bills.
Beyond the vast literature that focuses on analyzing roll call voting, there are only a
very limited number of studies that systematically examine other forms of congressional
behavior in the context of trade policy. And, as has recently been highlighted, this leads
to several substantial weaknesses in the literature (Allee and Miler 2013). The results here
contribute to overcoming these limitations. Examining a variety of non-voting behavior can
provide us with greater insights into activity at the chamber and legislator level. Relying on
14The results on this score were confirmed when relying on primary sponsorship data as well.
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such data, we can see that Congress’s level of participation in trade policy has fluctuated,
but certainly has not diminished.
Data Description
As noted in the main text, the sample of relevant legislation was drawn from the Con-
gressional Bills Project database, which codes bills according to the policy topic areas of
the Policy Agenda Project. The Policy Agendas Project codes each bill according to one
major topic and one subtopic. Under the broad “foreign trade” major topic, the dataset
further classifies bills into 8 substantive subtopics: (1) General, (2) Trade Negotiations,
Disputes and Agreements, (3) Export Promotion and Regulation, Export-Import Bank, (4)
International Private Business Investments, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, (5)
Tariff and Import Restrictions, Import Regulation, (6) Productivity and Competitiveness
of U.S. Business, U.S. Balance of Payments, (7) Exchange Rates and Related Issues, (8)
Other. Bills relating to import competition could be drawn from any of these categories,
though the bulk of the bills came from categories (1), (2), (5) and (6).
Categorizing a bill was based on its most important provisions. For example, if a bill
was overwhelmingly designed to foster greater trade, but had one minor provision that
might be regarded as potentially protectionist, the bill would not be categorized as an im-
port regulating bill. Where there was a rough balance between provisions relating to import
competition and greater liberalization, the bill was coded as an import regulation. Because
trade bills are often extremely complex, and reflect negotiations and compromise provi-
sions, there is necessarily some judgment associated with classification.
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